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Abstract
This thesis explores geopolitically diverse fictional responses to 9/11 and the War on Terror. 
Drawing on Judith Butler’s (2009) notion of the “frames of war,” Jacques Derrida’s (2005) 
conception of the ‘friend’/ ‘enemy’ binary, and Mahmood Mamdani’s (2004) critique of the 
‘good’ Muslim, ‘bad’ Muslim dichotomy (delineated in 2001 by President George W. Bush) I 
examine how selected examples o f contemporary literature, as well as a popular television 
series, depict the War on Terror; and analyse how these differently situated texts structure their 
respective depictions of Islam and Muslims. In the first chapter, I focus on how The Reluctant 
Fundamentalist (2007), a novel by the Pakistani author, Mohsin Hamid, problematises the 
‘good’ Muslim, ‘bad’ Muslim binary, and argue that the protagonist’s decision to leave the 
United States in the wake of 9/11 represents an important political comment on global 
perceptions of American foreign policy and the human cost of millennial capitalism. Chapter 
2 is an investigation of two novels: The Silent Minaret (2005) and I  See You (2014), by the 
South African writer, Ishtiyaq Shukri. By situating his characters in a variety of geopolitical 
spaces and temporal realities, Shukri encourages the reader to discard the structuring frames of 
nation, race, and religion, and links the vulnerability and violence implicit in the War on Terror 
to a longer history of conquest, colonialism, and apartheid. In the process, Shukri illustrates the 
importance of understanding repressive local contexts as interwoven with global and historical 
power dynamics. Chapter 3 is a study of the popular American television series, Homeland 
(2011—), created by Alex Gansa and Howard Gordon, and focuses on the manner in which the 
Central Intelligence Agency’s “Overseas Contingency Operations” are portrayed by the show. 
I argue that Homeland initially problematises the ‘friend’/ ‘enemy’ binary, but subsequently 
collapses into a narrative in which these two polarities are construed by prevailing American 
attitudes towards Islam and the notion of the War on Terror as a necessity. This thesis concludes 
that texts that characterise the War on Terror as a global phenomenon, and situate it within a 
broad historical discourse, are able to subvert the singularity ascribed to the 9/11 attacks, as 
well as the epochal connotations of the ‘post-9/11 ’ literary genre. I argue that the novels I have 
chosen scrutinise the ways in which perceptions are framed by dominant forms of media, 
historiography, and political rhetoric, and not only offer unique insights on the repercussions 
of the global War on Terror but attempt to conceive o f humanity in its totality, and therefore 
destabilise the ontological and reductive operation of the frame itself.
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Introduction: Narrating, Understanding, and Framing the War on Terror
As the wreckage of the World Trade Centre smouldered in downtown Manhattan on the 
evening of September 11, 2001, the President of the United States of America, George W. 
Bush, addressed the American public from the White House:
Today, our fellow citizens, our way o f life, our very freedom came under attack in a 
series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts [. . .]. A great people has been moved to 
defend a great nation. Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations o f our biggest 
buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America. These acts shatter steel, 
but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve. America was targeted for attack 
because we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no 
one will keep that light from shining. Today, our nation saw evil -  the very worst of 
human nature -  and we responded with the best of America. [. . .].This is a day when 
all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice and peace. America 
has stood down enemies before, and we will do so this time. None of us will ever forget 
this day, yet we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world. 
(“9/11 Address to the Nation”)
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon killed 2,996 people. It was 
not simply the number of casualties that sent convulsions through the United States but the 
form of the attacks themselves. Al Qaeda had committed the most destructive act of non-state 
terrorism in living memory, and they did so with giant flying suicide bombs.1 W.J.T. Mitchell, 
in Cloning Terror (2011), notes that the attacks represented a “spectacle designed to traumatise 
a nation” (21), while Jean Baudrillard, in The Spirit o f Terrorism (2002), asserts that “the whole 
play o f history and power” was “disrupted” by the televised images o f al Qaeda’s deadly plan 
coming to fruition (4). Baudrillard goes on to say that the collapse of the World Trade Centre 
was a moment in which the world’s media saw the Twin Towers “responding to the suicide of 
the suicide-planes with their own suicide” -  the perfect embodiment of an “absolute event” (7, 
4). While Mitchell and Baudrillard’s observations underline the “symbolic violence” of what 
came to be known as 9/11, the latter suggests that it is important not to permit the perceived 
“singularity” of the attacks overwhelm one’s sensibilities (4, 29). Terrifying as they may have 
been, they did not occur in an historical vacuum, and cannot be understood without recourse to
1 W.J.T. Mitchell defines non-state terrorism as a form of “psychological warfare designed to breed anxiety and 
fear in a population,” adding that it is “not a direct military engagement like invasion, siege, or occupation, but 
the staging of relatively limited acts of violence, usually against symbolic targets, designed to demoralise a 
population, and incite a reaction (generally an overreaction) by the police and military apparatus of a nation-state” 
(21).
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the history between the United States and the Muslim world.2 Judith Butler, in Precarious Life 
(2004), remarks: “That US boundaries were breached, that an unbearable vulnerability was 
exposed, that a terrible toll on human life was taken, were, and are, cause for fear and for 
mourning,” but she adds that the attacks were “also instigations for patient political reflection” 
(Precarious xi). The months after the fall of the Twin Towers held the potential for the United 
States to scrutinise its position in the global order, and to look to its historical relationship with 
the Muslim world for answers. According to William Blum, in America’s Deadliest Export 
(2013), rather than critically evaluating the context out of which 9/11 arose, however, 
American mainstream news media outlets3 -  such as CNN and Fox News, as well as print 
publications such as The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times -  retreated into the 
assumption that the attacks were the result of “an irrational hatred of the US and its way of life, 
based on religious and cultural misunderstandings and envy” (316).4
The role of the news media in framing the collective American experience of 9/11 
cannot be understated. In Islam through Western Eyes (2012), Jonathan Lyons provides a 
comprehensive list of The New York Times’ front-page articles in the four months after the 
attacks. Some o f these titles include, “‘This Is a Religious W ar,’ ‘Jihad 101,’ ‘Barbarians at the 
Gate,’ ‘The Force of Islam,’ ‘Divine Inspiration,’” and, most significantly, “‘A Head-on 
Collision of Alien Cultures’” (12). Thanks to headlines such as these, notes Lyons, “the media 
[became] the single biggest influence on American’s attitudes toward Islam, especially among 
those with negative opinions towards Muslims” (12).
Stephen Jones and David Clarke observe that attempts by George W. Bush and his 
country’s mass media to ascribe to 9/11 a “certain otherworldliness” signified the president’s 
desire to create a narrative that labelled terrorism as antithetical to “any form of negotiation, 
reason or dialogue” (307, emphasis added). Framing the ‘terrorist’ in this fashion, as a mindless 
and “suicidal life form,” forecloses instantly any attempts to understand the context of the 9/11 
attacks (Mitchell 74). As Blum notes, the news media’s “gravest shortcoming is much more 
their errors of omission than their errors of commission” (Blum, America’s 276).
2 See William Blum’s chapter, “A Concise History of US Global Interventions,” in Rogue State (2014), 162-220.
3 Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman (2008) describe the mass media as a “propaganda model,” noting that 
the function of this model is to “amuse, entertain, and inform, and to inculcate individuals with the values, 
beliefs, and codes of behaviour that will integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society” (1). 
David Demers echoes Chomsky and Herman’s claims, and defines “mass media systems theory” as a “theory 
which posits that mass media are institutions contributing to the maintenance of a community or society, usually 
in a way that supports the status quo or serves the interests of powerful economic and political elites” (184).
4 See Blum’s chapter, “The Media,” in America’s, 269-84.
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In late 2001, Osama bin Laden claimed America had brought 9/11 on itself, and declared that 
the attacks were a response to the country’s military having “spearheaded the Crusade against 
the Islamic nation [umma], sending thousands o f troops to the Land o f the Two Holy Mosques 
[Saudi Arabia]” (qtd. in Karen Armstrong, Fields o f Blood 349). Bin Laden also called the 
United States’ continual support for the state of Israel a form of “hypocrisy,” and stated that 
“Israel for more than 50 years has been pushing U.N. resolutions and rules against the wall 
with the full support of America” (“Letter to America”).5
Rather than focusing on the political implications of bin Laden’s words -  therefore 
providing a context as to why the country had been targeted by al Qaeda -  American politicians 
and mainstream media remained fixated on the violent imagery of the attacks themselves.6 By 
having 9/11 “filtered” through channels o f mass communication (Mitchell xi), the American 
public was encouraged to believe that the country was attacked because of its “freedom, its 
democracy, its wealth” rather than its government’s foreign policies in the Middle East and 
Central Asia (Lynne Cheney qtd. in Blum, Rogue xv). Another significant “error of omission” 
that would have placed the 9/11 attacks in context -  had it been publicly acknowledged by 
Bush and his staff -  implicated the American government in providing the material conditions 
from which many contemporary extremist organisations would evolve at the end of the Cold 
War (Blum, America’s 276). Although the history behind the rise of al Qaeda became a topic 
for public consumption thanks to news outlets such as The Guardian,7 The Telegraph,8 and the 
New Yorker,9 Noam Chomsky observes that the origins o f the group were “barely mentioned” 
by American politicians in late 2001 (Imperial Ambitions 108).
According to Mahmood Mamdani in his book, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim (2004), al 
Qaeda was born out of the collapse of the American and Pakistani-sponsored Afghan 
mujahedeen, or “soldiers engaged in jihad,” who were trained to fight the Soviet Union 56789
5 The entirety of bin Laden’s “Letter” is available on The Guardian's website. Despite bin Laden’s clear 
rationale for the 9/11 attacks, one should, of course, recognise that the murder of innocent civilians can, and 
should, never be condoned.
6 See The New York Times' publication, Portraits o f  Grief (2002), edited by Howell Raines and Janny Scott, which 
documents the lives of those who died on 9/11. Also see Barry Zwicker, Towers o f  Deception: The Media Cover- 
Up o f9/11 (2006).
7 See Jason Burke’s article, “Frankenstein the CIA Created,” The Guardian (1999).
8 See Marcus Warren’s article, “We Can Beat Taliban,” The Telegraph (2001).
9 See “Tuesday and After” (2001): a collection of articles by writers such as Jonathan Franzen, Susan Sontag, 
John Updike, and Amitav Ghosh, published in The New Yorker in September 2001. These writers account for 
the horror of 9/11 but also remind readers about the history of American military interference in the Muslim 
world.
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during their 1979-89 occupation o f Afghanistan (127).10 Rather than using his country’s 
established military power to fight the Soviets, the American president at the time, Ronald 
Reagan, instructed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to channel funds through the 
Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in order to train Afghan militants who would fight 
the Soviet occupiers. This decade-long programme came to be known as Operation Cyclone.11
Mamdani posits: “Had the anti-Soviet crusade been organised in a national framework,” 
then “the CIA would have looked for mainly Afghani recruits to wage it. But with the war 
recast as an international jihad, the CIA looked for volunteers from Muslim populations all 
over the globe” (131). Although the “$3 billion in covert aid” that the CIA supplied to the 
mujahedeen was designated for its Afghan volunteers, Arab and Pakistani fighters are also 
known to have benefitted from this funding (141). Among the Arab volunteers were Ayman 
al-Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden, who would go on to establish al Qaeda in the years leading 
up to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. “The real damage the CIA did” during the 
Afghan War, Mamdani argues, “was the privatisation of information about how to produce and 
spread violence -  the formation of private militias -  capable o f creating terror” (138, emphasis 
original). In fact, he goes so far as to claim that
The United States and its allies created, trained, and sustained an infrastructure of terror, 
international in scope, free of any state control, and wrapped up in the language of 
religious war. Official America learned to distinguish between two types of terrorism -  
‘theirs’ and ‘ours’ and cultivated an increasingly benign attitude to ours. But then it 
turned out that their terrorism was born of ours. (234, emphasis added)
If one considers the implications of these allegations, then 9/11 can be understood as an 
important lesson in the repercussions of misguided foreign policy. The decision by the CIA to 
“organise the Afghan jihad as a quasi-private international crusade” had backfired and, while 
the United States may have defeated the Soviets by proxy in Afghanistan in 1989, the country 
paid a heavy price for the victory at the dawn of the new millennium (Mamdani 169). Nine 
days after the 9/11 attacks, George W. Bush declared a “war on terror,” claiming that it would
10 Mamdani remarks that scholars of Islam differentiate between two broad traditions of jihad: the greater and 
the lesser jihad. The former “is a struggle against weakness of self; it is about how to live and attain piety in a 
contaminated world. Inwardly, it is about the effort of each Muslim to become a better human being” (50). The 
lesser jihad, however, “is about self-preservation and self-defence; directed outwardly, it is the source of Islamic 
notions of what Christians call ‘just war,’ rather than ‘holy war’” (50).
11 The lengthy and expensive period of CIA support for the mujahedeen is well documented in other sources. See, 
Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (2004); Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone (2006); Peter Bergen, The Longest 
War (2011); Karen Armstrong, Fields o f  Blood (2014); and Andrew Feinstein, The Shadow World (2015).
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begin “with al Qaeda” but would “not end until every terrorist group of global reach had been 
found, stopped and defeated” (qtd. in Ron Suskind 19).
Of course, in order to wage this war, Bush and his cabinet needed to define what kind 
of individual constituted a ‘terrorist.’ Former Vice Chairman o f the National Intelligence 
Council, Graham E. Fuller, notes that the definition provided by the United States Department 
of Defence describes the terrorist as an individual who makes use of “unlawful violence or [the] 
threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear,” and whose motives are primarily “political, 
religious, or ideological” (328, emphasis original). No definition, Fuller observes, “is offered 
for the term ‘unlawful,’ but it appears to mean ‘not sanctioned by government” (329). In the 
Department of Defence’s definition, then, state-sanctioned violence -  as opposed to ‘terrorist’ 
violence -  exists within the confines of the law, and is therefore valid, necessary, and 
justifiable.
“Justifiable” was the term used by George Bush when plotting his country’s response 
to 9/11, and the self-confessed “war president” claimed: “History has called us into action; and 
we’re not going to miss this opportunity to make the world more peaceful and more free” (qtd. 
in Bob Woodward 91, 113). On October 7, 2001, the United States and its allies embarked on 
the first campaign of the War on Terror: Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, which 
was premised on removing the Taliban government from power and capturing Osama bin 
Laden. By the end of the year, the American military had succeeded in temporarily ousting the 
Taliban, but had failed in its mission to detain or kill bin Laden.
Following the partial success of Operation Enduring Freedom, George Bush, 
Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, and Secretary of Defence, 
Donald Rumsfeld, began an intricate planning process for the invasion of Iraq. According to 
Bush, the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, was “teaming up with al Qaeda” to attack the 
United States and there could be “no doubt” that he “possess[ed] weapons o f mass destruction,” 
or WMD (qtd. in Woodward, 178, 164). As some politicians and journalists on both sides of 
the Atlantic noted prior to the invasion, there was a lack of tangible evidence for these claims. 
The much-anticipated Iraq Inquiry (finally published in 2016) confirms this. Sir John Chilcot, 
Chairperson of the Inquiry, states that the claims made by President George Bush and British 
Prime Minister, Tony Blair, apropos Saddam Hussein’s alleged possession o f WMD 
represented an “intelligence failure,” adding that there “continue to be demands for factual 
evidence of the presence of WMD in Iraq” (77, 130). As for Bush’s assertions that Hussein had 
teamed up with al Qaeda, National Security Advisor to the Bush administration, Brent 
Scowcroft, wrote in early 2002, “[t]here is scant evidence to tie Saddam to terrorist
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organisations, and even less to the September 11 attacks (qtd. in Woodward 159). Nevertheless, 
in April 2003, the United States -  in tandem with the United Kingdom and other member states 
of the Coalition of the Willing -  embarked on Operation Iraqi Freedom.12 Their goal was to 
overthrow Saddam Hussein and his Ba’ath party, which they did with surprising ease. What 
followed the invasion, however, was a brutal and lengthy occupation, lasting from 2003 until 
2011, and claiming, according to conservative estimates, approximately 175,000 civilian 
lives.13
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have contributed to the radical destabilisation of both 
nations, and have led to the globalised state of terrorism today. As Butler observes: “In pursuing 
a wayward military solution [to 9/11], the United States perpetrates and displays its own 
violence, offering a breeding ground for new waves of young Muslims to join terrorist 
organisations” (Precarious 17). The veteran Iraqi-based journalist, Patrick Cockburn, echoes 
Butler’s claims, and states that the rise of the so-called Islamic State “is the outcome of the war 
in Iraq since the US invasion of 2003 and the war in Syria since 2011” (The Rise 8).14 Butler 
and Cockburn are not alone in their assertions that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq fuelled a 
sharp rise in global terrorism. For instance, Sir John Chilcot notes that the “consequences of 
the invasion and of the conflict within Iraq which followed are still being felt in Iraq and the 
wider Middle East” (4). The Iraq Inquiry is a scathing indictment on Britain’s involvement in 
the Iraq War, and emphasises that one of the primary reasons for the proliferation of terrorism 
both within and outside the country stemmed not only from the occupation but from the failure 
“to plan or prepare for the major reconstruction programme required” to stabilise the country 
(124). As such, the “serious disorder” that characterised post-occupation Iraq spilled over into 
a wider context, making the United States and Europe -  as well as susceptible countries within 
the Middle East -  targets for terrorism (4).
Under the presidency of Barack Obama, American foreign policy has undergone a 
number of changes. Notably, the president has instructed staff members at the Pentagon to 
substitute the phrase “Global War on Terror” with “Overseas Contingency Operations,” stating 
that America’s “intelligence and military agencies will not wage war against a tactic (terrorism)
12 “Coalition of the Willing” was the name given to the nation-states allied with the United States in the Iraq 
War. See Bob Woodward, Plan o f Attack (2004).
13 See the Iraq Body Count database, which, drawing on nearly 50,000 independent data entries, is a reliable 
indicator of the number of civilians killed in Iraq between 2001 and 2016.
14 Throughout this thesis, I shall refer to this organisation as either the Islamic State or “Daesh” -  the Arabic 
acronym for “al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham” (“The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant”).
6
but will instead focus on a specific group of networks” (qtd. in Paul Shinkman).15 Mitchell 
cautions that Obama’s decision to rename the War on Terror is nothing more than a 
“bureaucratic obfuscation,” as the war can “not be declared over because it is not over, and 
never can be” (23). Although the “shock and awe” tactics favoured by George W. Bush have 
been harshly criticised by his successor (Woodward 102), Obama maintains that America’s 
Overseas Contingency Operations represent a “war of necessity, not a war of choice” (qtd. in 
Blum, America's 36).16
President Obama’s language is camouflaged in the rhetoric of fate and duty, almost as 
if  the United States is waging the War on Terror reluctantly, with a sense of responsibility for 
the world at large. Rather than interrogating the root causes of anti-American terrorism, Obama 
claims that, in order to “ensure prosperity here at home and peace abroad,” the United States 
must “maintain the strongest military on the planet” (qtd. in Blum, America's 287). The 
paradox of maintaining peace through military power has been a cornerstone of mainstream 
American rhetoric about the War on Terror. Terms such as “freedom,” “peace,” and 
“democracy” have been vital in creating a certain perception of the War on Terror -  that it is 
not only permissible and justifiable as a result of 9/11, but that it is unavoidable because the 
enemy (terror) will not subside (Blum, Rogue x, vi). In other words, a certain kind of 
interpretative frame has been imposed around the War on Terror in order to “justify, explain, 
and narrate it” as it unfolds (Mitchell i).
When I speak of the frame, I am referring to Judith Butler’s conception of it in Frames 
o f War: When is Life Grievable? (2009). According to Butler, the frame is an externally 
imposed method of governing material perceptions, and it “implicitly guides the [act of] 
interpretation” when one is presented with an individual, a population, or an event (Frames 8). 
The notion of the frame as a structuring entity does not originate from Butler’s work, and is 
explored in detail by Erving Goffman in his 1974 book-length essay, Frame Analysis. Like 
Butler’s theory, Goffman’s analysis o f “primary frameworks” concludes that they represent a 
“schemata of interpretation,” in that they render a particular sce ne or individual with meaning 
(Goffman 20, 21). Another prominent critic apropos the notion of frames and framing is George 
Lakoff, whose book, D on’t See an Elephant (2008), quantifies the frame as intrinsic to all 
instances of perception and comprehension. As Lakoff himself states: “Frames are mental
15 See Scott Wilson and Al Kamen’s article, “Global War on Terror is Given New Name,” The Washington Post 
(2009).
16 See Edward Delman’s article, “Obama Promised to End America’s Wars -  Has He?” The Atlantic (2016).
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structures that shape the way we see the world,” adding that they are formed by the power that 
language has over human understanding (xv).
For Butler, the frame acts to “delimit the visual field” and create a narrative about “what 
can be seen and what can be heard,” especially during times of war (8, xi). In essence, its 
function is to generate a certain “version of reality” (xi). The “reality” enclosed in the frame, 
however, is always open to scrutiny. Butler notes:
The frame does not simply exhibit reality, but actively participates in a strategy of 
containment, selectively producing and enforcing what will count as reality. It tries to 
do this, and its efforts are a powerful wager. Although framing cannot always contain 
what it seeks to make visible or readable, it remains structured by the aim of 
instrumentalising certain versions of reality. This means that the frame is always 
throwing something away, always keeping something out, always de-realising and de- 
legitimating alternative versions of reality. (Frames xiii)
Following 9/11, what Butler calls the “embedded evaluative structure” -  or, the politically 
saturated frames implicit in the composition of the mass media -  endeavoured to create a single 
story about the events of that day (Frames 51). This “structure” would choose what to “include 
in the field of perception,” and could therefore delineate what would count as an intelligible 
narrative (66). By focusing on the event itself rather than on the historical circumstances out 
of which it had arisen, the official narrative of 9/11 represented one “version o f reality” (xi). 
This narrative omitted crucial information that would have placed the attacks -  morally 
reprehensible as they were -  in context.17 One can think of the frame, therefore, “as both 
jettisoning and presenting, and as doing both at once, in silence, without any visible sign of its 
operation” (73). Because it “seeks to contain, convey, and determine what is seen,” the power 
of the frame, Butler suggests, lies in its ability to influence and concretise “broader norms” 
through its creation of a narrative (10, 63). Thus, Butler notes, “powerful forms o f media” are 
always in a process of interpreting in advance, what one sees, hears, and subsequently thinks 
(47). The frame of the media therefore comes to function “didactically” (Jones and Clarke 303).
Because the frame operates ontologically, it is the very structure through which subjects 
are imbued with specific meaning. It works to differentiate the self from the other and, 
importantly, creates this very division itself. The frame therefore becomes a means of 
delineating and coding who is one’s friend and who is one’s enemy. For Jacques Derrida, what
17 British media, according to Brian McNair, was more attentive to the history behind the rise of al Qaeda than 
most American news outlets. See “UK Media Coverage of 9/11,” in How the World’s News Media Reacted to 
9/11 (2007), 30-9.
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makes the “figure of the enemy” recognisable is a matter of “practical identification,” and a 
process of knowing “how to identify” the enemy as such (83, 116, emphasis original). Derrida 
argues that “an identifiable enemy” is not merely useful, but fundamental to the formation and 
positioning of the political self (83). The ‘enemy’ thus becomes a counterpoint to the ‘friend,’ 
and the relationship between these two polarities represents “the very concept of the political” 
(84). Put simply, because the figure of the ‘enemy’ is able to put the self in question, it becomes 
-  to a degree -  an oppositional figure to that of the ‘friend.’
Much American news coverage after 9/11, notes Mitchell, “divided the world into good 
and evil,” in which the “iconic figure of the enemy” -  Osama bin Laden or Saddam Hussein -  
became “visible and locatable” (7, 3). These two individuals, I suggest, became what Derrida 
would call “declared” enemies (61). The “declared” enemy is nothing short of “indispensible,” 
as this figure is vital for those who feel they must “‘rise’ to the level of their own virtue” (61). 
Both bin Laden and Hussein were former ‘friends’ of the United States, but had reneged on 
their ‘friendship’ and, in the process, became figures of unimaginable evil -  individuals who 
should be “annihilated, not only driven back” (Derrida 133).18
Although “perceptions o f history” are shaped habitually by “audio-visual-textual 
images” transmitted by the world’s media, it is important to remember that, while global 
coverage of 9/11 and the War on Terror lent itself to some nuance and debate, the function of 
the frame is to manufacture a single narrative out of numerous realities (Mitchell xi). This 
means that there are alternative frames through which to understand phenomena such as 9/11. 
As Arundhati Roy notes in her 2002 speech, “Come September,” “[t]here can never be a single 
story. There are only ways o f seeing” (1).
Madalena Gonzalez and Julien Bringuier suggest that one alternative and accessible 
means by which to understand the events surrounding 9/11 is through the reading and writing 
of literature. For Gonzalez and Bringuier, the genre of “post-9/11” fiction is a vital means of 
responding to the tragedy of 9/11, as its content often explores “the physicality o f the event; a 
physicality that immediately became imagery or mythology, and that must be reshaped into a 
tangible world again” (229). More important, they argue, is the fact that ‘post-9/11’ fiction has 
the ability to reshape “the collective perception” of 9/11, as it wrenches the narrative “from the 
clutches of an all-powerful media that pretends to have the last word on the subject” (232). 
How, then, would the world’s authors narrate the traged y of the World Trade Centre attacks?
18 Bin Laden, as a result of his commitment to ousting the Soviets from Afghanistan, would have been an 
exceptionally helpful ‘friend’ to America in the 1980s. Whereas Hussein’s “rise to power was largely aided by 
the United States during the Reagan era and Iraq’s catastrophic war with Iran” (Mitchell 89).
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Would writers in the United States erect “a wall in time between ‘pre-9/11’ and ‘post-9/11’ 
thinking,” or would they acknowledge that this violent event was itself a form of ‘blowback’ 
for bygone American foreign policy (Mitchell 162)?19
The traumatic effects of 9/11 on the United States’ public are apparent in a number of 
novels written by American authors in the wake of the attacks. For example, Don DeLillo’s 
Falling Man (2007) encapsulates the nation’s sense of vulnerability by focusing on the 
incursion of the public sphere into American private life following 9/11. While DeLillo’s stark 
and poetic novel is powerful and unsettling, it nevertheless characterises the United States as 
nothing more than a victim in the attacks, therefore dislodging the event itself from any kind 
of historical or political context. Jay McIerney’s 2006 work of fiction, The Good Life, avoids 
any literal depiction of the attacks themselves, instead focussing on the national mood in the 
days surrounding 9/11. Like Falling Man, McIerney’s novel is premised on the collapse of 
interpersonal relationships, and more than captures the “indefinite state of emergency” that 
gripped the United States in the years following the attacks (Mitchell 52). Despite their 
differences in form and content, both DeLillo and McIerney depict an American public coming 
to terms with a heightened sense of its own vulnerability after 9/11. This sense of vulnerability 
was a new phenomenon for many living in the United States, and I argue that it represented a 
sudden awareness that American life was precarious.
For Butler, “precariousness” is a “shared condition of human life” (Frames 13). That is 
to say that precariousness is a generalised condition of what is living, and that lives “are by 
their definition precarious” (25). Because lives “can be expunged at will or by accident,” 
acknowledging one’s innate precariousness is accompanied by the realisation that “one’s life 
is always in some sense in the hands of the other” (25, 14). Despite the ubiquity of 
precariousness as a condition of life, there are structuring frames that seek to eschew this fact. 
Butler notes: “If I identify to a community of belonging on the basis o f nation, territory, 
language, or culture, and if I then base my sense of responsibility on that community, I 
implicitly hold to the view that I am responsible only for those who are recognisably like me 
in some way” (36). If one’s interpretative frame is structured by nationalism, for example, then 
a subject who falls outside of the given parameters of the nation-state to which one belongs is 
perceived not to be as precarious as subjects within the recognisable nationalistic framework.
19 “Blowback,” according to The Nation's Chalmers Johnson, “is a CIA term [which was] first used in March 
1954 in a recently declassified report on the 1953 operation to overthrow the government of Mohammed 
Mossadegh in Iran” (“Blowback”). Johnson notes that the term is “a metaphor for the unintended consequences 
of the US government’s international activities that have been kept secret from the American people” 
(“Blowback”).
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When acts of violence are committed against those with whom one shares a nationality there 
are -  as there were after 9/11 -  frequent opportunities for “public grieving” and the 
memorialisation of the dead (39). Conversely, the deaths of unrecognisable subjects do not 
cause the same degree of “moral outrage” (41).
The reason I find DeLillo and McIerney’s novels -  inspired as they may be -  unsuitable 
for a discussion about global literary responses to the War on Terror is because they focus 
specifically on the effects of 9/11 on Americans, and therefore imply that only American life 
is precarious. Furthermore, both novels not only neglect the historical context that made 9/11 
possible, but they also overlook the overwhelming military response to the attacks. Rather than 
investigating the War on Terror -  which has made life increasingly perilous for those outside 
the United States -  in conjunction with the trauma experienced by Americans on 9/11, DeLillo 
and McIerney, like the American mass media, turn their attention to the perceived vulnerability 
of American life in the wake of the attacks. Harleen Singh, in “Insurgent Metaphors” (2012), 
claims that the scope of American post-9/11 literature is, for the most part, too “inward­
looking” in its depictions of 9/11 and its aftermath (23). I agree with Singh’s observation, and 
argue that many other cultural products of the post-9/11 United States, such as film and 
television, also construct their narratives around the notion that American lives are more 
precarious -  and therefore worthy of greater protection -  than the lives of non-Americans.
For instance, the plot of the television series, 24 (2001-2010), aired by FOX and created 
by Joel Surnow and Robert Cochrain, is premised on containing and eliminating numerous 
‘terrorist’ threats facing the United States. Each season of 24 follows Jack Bauer, an American 
Counter-Terrorist Unit officer who will do virtually anything -  including using forms of torture 
-  to keep his country safe. While more ambiguous in its political outlook, Katheryn Bigelow’s 
film Zero Dark Thirty (2012) is also about the finding, stopping, and purging of ‘terrorist’ 
threats. Bigelow’s film looks specifically at how information provided by tortured detainees in 
CIA ‘black sites’ lead to Operation Geronimo: the orchestrated death of Osama bin Laden in 
May 2011. According to Jessica Winter, Zero Dark Thirty has “become the most politically 
divisive” film in recent memory (32). Not only does it contain “brutal scenes” o f torture but it 
“forges false connections between the information gleaned by torture and the eventual 
discovery of bin Laden’s hideout” (32). Bigelow, however, claims her work is “deeply moral,” 
in that it “questions what was done in the name of finding bin Laden” (qtd. in Winter 33). 
While 24 reflects the supposed innumerability o f America’s ‘enemies,’ Zero Dark Thirty makes 
the viewer complicit in the “enhanced interrogation tactics” used by the Central Intelligence
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Agency in its pursuit of bin Laden, and therefore postures as a potential critique of the War on 
Terror itself (Winter 32).
Despite their differing narrative approaches to the War on Terror, 24 and Zero Dark 
Thirty both shed light on the paranoid mindset of the United States after 9/11. In so doing, they 
render the American homeland -  and only the American homeland -  as susceptible to terrorist 
attacks. That only a small number of attacks -  classified as acts of terror -  have occurred in the 
United States since 2001 appears to corroborate Singh’s claim that, following 9/11, “American 
life has continued at an unabated pace -  whereas life in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan has 
been radically destabilized” (“Insurgent” 23).20 By emphasising the uncertainty of American 
life in the twenty-first century, many American literary and filmic responses to the attacks of 
September 11 provide a singular perspective on what is, in fact, a “world picture” (Mitchell 
79). Furthermore, in fixating on the dangers posed exclusively to the United States, these 
cultural products inevitably occlude the fact that the actions of the American military have -  in 
some parts of the world -  made life increasingly precarious for others.
Thus, rather than examining literary responses to 9/11 that treat the attacks as a singular 
event, this thesis will consider three novels and a television series that are differently situated 
fictional responses to America’s War on Terror following the attack on the Twin Towers. By 
including Pakistani, South African, and American narratives in my argument, I aim to 
understand how the War on Terror is perceived in specific local settings -  as well as in a global 
sense -  and how the interpretative frame around this war differs with regards to geopolitical 
context. Furthermore, I will demonstrate how my chosen texts vary in their respective 
portrayals of Islam and of Muslim characters, and how these portrayals either affirm or 
problematise the frame imposed on the religion and its followers following 9/11 and the War 
on Terror.
In Chapter 1, I examine Mohsin Hamid’s 2007 novel, The Reluctant Fundamentalist. 
Hamid’s novel ruptures the supposed binary between the geopolitical West and the Islamic 
world by focusing on a Pakistani protagonist, Changez Khan, whose life as a financial analyst 
in New York is thrown into uncertainty by 9/11 and its aftermath. As the War on Terror begins 
in Afghanistan, Changez recognises that his lucrative occupation is helping to reinforce 
America’s economic power, thereby contributing to the country’s ability to wage war in the
20 Under the banner of “terrorist attacks” in the United States, Bobby Ilich includes the Fort Hood Mass 
Shooting (2009), The Boston Marathon Bombing (2013), the San Bernardino Attacks (2015), and the Orlando 
Nightclub Shooting (2016). Ilich notes that there have been 37 terrorist attacks in the United States since 2001, 
with 23 of these claiming 151 lives. See his article, “The United States after 9/11,”IBT (2016), for information 
on these specific attacks.
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Muslim world. Upon realising that he is “no longer capable of so thorough a self-deception,” 
Changez relinquishes his life in the United States and returns home to his family in Lahore, 
Pakistan (Hamid, Reluctant 100).
Hamid’s novel is an important literary interpretation of 9/11 and the War on Terror, as 
the author takes the reader into the mind of a character familiar with both Pakistan and the 
United States. The fact that Changez is a “western-educated urbanite,” as well as an open critic 
of the conduct the United States in the aftermath of 9/11 (54), permits Hamid to scrutinise what 
Mamdani calls “Culture Talk” -  a divisive form of rhetoric premised on the simultaneous 
polarisation and “politicisation o f culture” (17, 27). As such, the reader is encouraged to 
reframe his/her preconceived notions about Islam, Pakistan, and America, and encounters a 
critique of the United States from a narrative perspective that refutes national absolutism and 
is transnational, indeed global, in its outlook. In drawing attention to the suffering and fear that 
the War on Terror has facilitated in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and beyond, I claim that Hamid 
underscores what Butler calls the “precarity” that characterises life for populations situated 
around focal points of this global war (Frames 25). Like her understandings o f the frame and 
precariousness, Butler’s concept of precarity is vital to my argument throughout this thesis.
Although “precariousness and precarity are intersecting concepts,” Butler insists that 
precarity is not a generalised attribute of human life (25). Rather, precarity “designates that 
politically induced condition in which certain populations suffer from failing social and 
economic networks of support and become differentially exposed to injury, violence, and 
death” (25, emphasis added). Unlike precariousness, which is “coextensive with birth itself,” 
precarity is a condition o f life asymmetrically imposed on individuals and populations through 
powerful external forces (14). The “differential distribution of precarity” therefore denies the 
reality that all lives are innately precarious (25). As a result of this denial, those for whom 
conditions of precarity are normalised are seen as lacking the shared quality o f human life, and 
are therefore considered “ungrievable” if subjected to violence or death (38). An “ungrievable” 
life, according Butler, “is one that cannot be mourned because it has never lived, that is, it has 
never counted as a life at all” (38). What Butler describes as the “division of the world into 
grievable and ungrievable lives” is criticised sharply in The Reluctant Fundamentalist and, in 
my study of the novel, I will demonstrate that Changez returns to Pakistan to protect those for 
whom precarity has become increasingly commonplace due to the American military’s 
response to 9/11 (38).
The precarity of life for those affected by the War on Terror is also a central concern of 
my second chapter, which discusses two novels: The Silent Minaret (2006) and I  See You
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(2014) by the South African author, Ishtiyaq Shukri. What makes Shukri’s work unique is the 
perspective from which he writes. As a South African novelist, he comments on the American 
response to 9/11 from a distance, whilst locating his characters in various geographical and 
socio-political contexts that are focal points of oppressive global power systems. By varying 
his characters’ geopolitical settings, as well as continually shifting the temporal dimensions of 
his narratives, Shukri links the struggle of the individual to a global history of continued power 
disparities -  such as South Africa during and after apartheid, the Israeli occupation o f Palestine, 
and the asymmetrical militarism of the War on Terror. Like Hamid, Shukri redraws the 
American “version o f reality” imposed around 9/11 and the War on Terror (Butler, Frames xi). 
He emphasises the precarity of life for Muslims in the world after 9/11 and links the War on 
Terror to a longer history of colonialism and imperialism.
As I will demonstrate, the respective protagonists of I  See You and The Silent Minaret 
-  Tariq Hassan and Issa Shamsuddin -  are concerned with reorienting the frames through 
which historically “ungrievable” lives are perceived. Issa’s focus in his doctoral research on 
the early European colonisation of South Africa, as well as Tariq’s skills as a photojournalist 
covering conflicts in various parts of the globe, allow both characters to document the precarity 
of vulnerable populations from around the world and throughout history. It is from Shukri’s 
character, Tariq, that I derive the title of my thesis. Tariq notes that “we’ve tamed the world by 
framing it” (I See You 175), and I argue that, throughout Shukri’s narratives, the reader is 
encouraged to ‘untame’ the world by discarding the established frames through which certain 
populations and individuals are perceived as “ungrievable” (Butler, Frames 38).
My research into differently situated responses to the War on Terror would not be 
complete without including an American interpretation of this war. As such, my third chapter 
analyses the American television series, Homeland (2011-), written by Alex Gansa and 
Howard Gordon, in order to gauge how the War on Terror is depicted in the world’s most 
popular medium of entertainment. With specific reference to Jacques Derrida’s conception of 
the ‘friend’ and ‘enemy,’ I will demonstrate that Homeland initially succeeds in blurring the 
lines between these political polarities by examining the vexed relationship between a CIA case 
officer, Carrie Mathison, and a United States Marine, Sergeant Nicholas Brody, whom Carrie 
suspects of having been ‘turned’ during his eight-year capture in Iraq. As Homeland progresses, 
however, the show’s potential critique of the ‘friend’/ ‘enemy’ binary unravels, and the plot 
collapses into a more familiar narrative of ‘us’ and ‘them,’ in which Muslim characters are 
portrayed largely as antagonistic to American interests.
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As I will argue, in its first season, the series succeeds in contextualising terrorism in 
both historical and socio-political terms. This focus on the roots of terrorism undermines the 
misconception -  widely circulated during Bush’s presidency -  that “the more you love 
freedom, the more likely it is you’ll be attacked” (Bush qtd. in Blum, Rogue 29). Yet, as 
Homeland continues, it becomes clear that attempts to understand terrorism become less 
important than portrayals of the potential harm that terrorism could have on the United States 
and its interests. Efforts to problematise the War on Terror itself are weakened by the series’ 
somewhat insular narrative and, by depicting the United States as vulnerable to attack, the show 
actually contributes to the conception of the War on Terror as a necessity, therefore echoing 
both Bush and Obama’s declarations to this effect. Unlike Shukri and Hamid’s novels, the 
narrative scope of Homeland -  while more ambitious than a programme like 24 -  is linked 
inextricably to the perceived precarity of American life. As such, the show all too often 
characterises citizens of the United States as more valuable and more vulnerable than non- 
Americans.
Each chapter of my thesis not only discusses literary and filmic responses to different 
aspects of the War on Terror but also examines this war chronologically. The Reluctant 
Fundamentalist provides a literary interpretation of 9/11 and the opening stages of Operation 
Enduring Freedom; The Silent Minaret critiques Operation Iraqi Freedom and links the 
invasion of Iraq, as well as the framing of its media representation, to a longer history of 
colonial control; I  See You is focused closely on the relationship between Israel and Palestine 
after 2007, as well as the wider repercussions of the War on Terror such as the proliferation of 
private security companies and the governmental censure of journalists; and Homeland 
presents a fictive account of the global operations of the American Central Intelligence Agency 
in the application of foreign policy since the death of Osama bin Laden. Each chapter therefore 
serves as a critique of the chosen texts as well as a measure of the political and historical 
contexts out of which these texts have arisen.
As long as the War on Terror remains a normalised state of international affairs, there 
will be artists, authors, and creators who, in their own unique ways, will continue to interpret 
and reinterpret the effects that this conflict has had on both those waging it and those suffering 
it. O f course, for many populations around the world, the violence of the War on Terror is 
nothing new. The uncomfortable familiarity of violence in spaces of precarity is a central 
preoccupation of this thesis, and I hope that my work will act as a caution against the generic 
and simplistic category of ‘post-9/11’ in both a literary and historical sense. The notion of a 
‘post’ is ill suited for a conception of the globalised forms of violence executed in the name of
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the War on Terror. While America might find itself in a post-9/11 world, the conditions under 
which many Iraqis, Afghans, Pakistanis, and countless others live are at once eerily familiar 
and radically different. Sustained conditions of precarity -  some as a direct result of America’s 
response to 9/11, others related to semi-dormant conflicts that the War on Terror has reignited 
-  make the category of ‘post-9/11,’ both in the political and literary sense, seem rather 
contrived. As such, I would advocate a movement away from the literary genre termed ‘post- 
9/11,’ and argue for a gravitation towards an understanding of fictional representations of the 
War on Terror as inextricable from the global history of which this war is a part.
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Chapter 1: Fundamentalism, Finance, and Fractured Identities: Mohsin 
Hamid’s The Reluctant Fundamentalist.
Mohsin Hamid’s 2007 novel, The Reluctant Fundamentalist, is an insightful literary 
interpretation o f the effects of 9/11 on America, as well as a representation of the impact that 
the country’s politico-military response to the attacks had on nations in the Islamic world and 
Muslims living in the United States. The novel’s plot entails a conversation between the 
Pakistani narrator-protagonist, Changez Khan, and an unnamed, unvoiced American at a cafe 
in Lahore, Pakistan. Changez’s exchange with the anonymous American takes the form of what 
Nath Aldalala’a calls a “confessional dramatic monologue,” in which the former enlightens the 
latter about his past life in the United States (4). Having attended university, worked, and fallen 
in love in America, the narrator has returned to Pakistan in the aftermath of 9/11 and India’s 
impending invasion of his home nation.
As well as assessing America’s emotional, socio-political, and military response to the 
tragedy of 9/11, Hamid’s novel also offers a judgement of the country’s dominance o f the 
global free market. The author characterises Changez, in the years prior to 9/11, as a profit- 
driven analyst at Underwood Samson & Company: a valuation firm based in New York. In 
essence, Underwood Samson calculates “how much businesses are worth,” and advises their 
clients about where in their business models they should downsize in order to boost profits 
(Hamid, Reluctant 5). The firm’s guiding principle: “Focus on the fundamentals,” encourages 
employees to maintain a “single-minded attention to financial detail” when determining “an 
asset’s value” (98, emphasis original).
During his time with Underwood Samson, Changez is encouraged to be unfeeling 
towards those individuals deemed to be surplus to certain companies’ operational requirements. 
Like his mentor, Jim, he learns to be a “shark,” of the financial world (Hamid, Reluctant 70). 
While the protagonist fails to recognise the morally questionable nature of his work prior to 
the attacks on the World Trade Centre, the onset of the War on Terror opens his eyes to 
America’s “project of domination” (126). Once he finally realises that his occupation 
implicates him in his adopted nation’s ability to wage war on a global scale, he rejects the 
“fundamentals’’ of Underwood Samson, and returns to Pakistan (98, emphasis original).
The use of the word “fundamentalist” in the title of Hamid’s novel is itself provocative, 
as the term is often misunderstood. According to Mahmood Mamdani, one should question
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those who equate “religious fundamentalism” with “‘political terrorism’” (37). He goes on to 
say:
‘Fundamentalism’ as a religious phenomenon has to be distinguished from those 
political developments that are best described as political Christianity or political Islam. 
Religious ‘fundamentalism’ is akin to a countercultural, not a political movement. The 
problem with using the term ‘fundamentalism’ to describe all such movements is that 
it tends to equate movements forged in radically different historical and political 
contexts, and obscures their doctrinal differences, including the place of violence in 
religious doctrine. (37, emphasis original)
For Mamdani, the contemporary use of the term “fundamentalism” appears misleading, even 
dangerous in its homogeneity (37). Rather than perceiving “political movements that speak that 
language of religion” as examples of “Islamic fundamentalism,” one should, he claims, 
understand them as manifestations of “political Islam” (37). Significantly, Mamdani also 
argues that religious fundamentalism is “not a throwback to a premodern culture but a response 
to an enforced secular modernity,” whereas political Islam finds its roots in the “work of non­
clerical political intellectuals” (39, 47, emphasis original). Despite the ir non-clerical stance on 
religion, these scholars, such as Muhammad Iqbal, argue that Islam itself is representative of a 
“political identity not in terms of a nation-state, but as a borderless cultural community” 
(Mamdani 53). For Iqbal, the Islamic community is ideological, political, religious, and above 
all, non-territorial; and he calls this community the umma.1
Changez is no doubt “the reluctant fundamentalist” of Hamid’s novel and yet, according 
to the author in his recent book of essays, Discontent and its Civilisations (2015), there is “no 
real evidence that Changez is religious” (185). Hamid observes that his protagonist’s beliefs 
“could quite plausibly be those of a secular humanist,” adding that Changez “may well be an 
agnostic, or even an atheist” (Discontent 185).2 If  one assumes Mamdani’s line of argument 
and claims that fundamentalism can only be discussed in relation to religion, then one should 
ask why it is that Hamid labels his protagonist a fundamentalist.
As a novelist, Hamid operates metaphorically, and teases out and takes advantage of 
the poetics of language itself. I therefore argue that his use of the word fundamentalist acts as 
a means o f reorienting the scope through which one considers the concept of fundamentalism
1For in-depth accounts of how the umma came to be thought of as a form of political, religious, and cultural 
Islamic nation, see Karen Armstrong, Islam (2007) and Reza Aslan, No God but God (2011).
2 The Five Pillars of Islam, or rukn, for example, are not the “'fundamentals” to which Changez adheres (Hamid, 
Reluctant 98, emphasis original). The Five Pillars are what every Muslim should strive to uphold, and they are: 
almsgiving; the shahada, or testimony; prayer five times daily; observing the Ramadan fast; and the pilgrimage, 
or hajj, to Mecca.
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as a strictly religious practice. For example, his protagonist’s occupation at Underwood 
Samson is linked intricately to a form of fundamentalism that is not religious but financial. In 
the months following 9/11, Changez discards the “fundamentals’” to which he has adhered at 
Underwood Samson but does not, in the process, become religious (98, emphasis original). So 
if, in Mamdani’s words, religious fundamentalism is a response to an “enforced secular 
modernity” (39, emphasis original), then could other forms of fundamentalism not also arise 
due to the presence o f external pressures over which one has no control?
A series of uncontrollable events prompts Changez to leave the United States, and the 
protagonist claims that he feels unable to escape the “growing importance of tribe” (Hamid, 
Reluctant 117). Does his statement imply that, despite not being a practicing Muslim, he still 
envisages himself as part of the umma? Moreover, whether he does or does not consider himself 
a part of Islam’s “borderless cultural community,” what are the secular “fundamentals” to 
which Changez reluctantly adheres upon his permanent return to Pakistan (Mamdani 55; 
Hamid, Reluctant 98, emphasis original)?
In returning to Lahore, Changez reframes his priorities, and recognises that the 
insecurity of life in the Muslim world has been exacerbated by his contribution to the financial 
sector of the “American empire” (Hamid, Reluctant 152). The nonviolent ““fundamentals” that 
he adopts are therefore premised on protecting his family -  and other lives in Pakistan -  from 
the power and might of American foreign policy (98, emphasis original). This is not to say that 
a concern for Pakistani nationalism is at the forefront of the protagonist’s mind; as Joseph 
Darda argues, Changez, upon his return to Pakistan, “considers the lives of others first, as 
sustained by social and political conditions” (111). It is not, in other words, because Pakistan 
is an Islamic Republic that the protagonist returns to defend it. Instead, he returns because the 
nation’s citizens -  and those throughout the Muslim world -  find themselves increasingly 
vulnerable to the actions of the United States in the aftermath of 9/11.
Rather than envisioning himself only as a member of the umma, Changez comes to 
understand that the recognition o f how and why precarity enacts itself on fellow human beings 
represents the most important set of “fundamentals” to which one can adhere (98, emphasis 
original). In contrast to those advocated by Underwood Samson, the “fundamentals” towards 
which Changez gravitates after his experience in America value compassion over capital, 
goodness over greed, and humanity over hegemony (98, emphasis original). Furthermore, if 
concern for the whole o f humanity lies at the core of his ideology, then it is easy to see why he 
challenges a nation which alleges to care about the fate of the globe yet feels “justified in 
bringing so many deaths to Afghanistan and Iraq” during the War on Terror (178). In fact, the
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protagonist publicly denounces America’s militaristic conduct in Afghanistan and Iraq, and his 
comments “appear to resonate” with the international media in Pakistan (182). Hamid never 
discloses whether Changez’s nameless American interlocutor is in Lahore -  perhaps in the 
capacity of a CIA officer or FBI agent -  to investigate the protagonist’s public and “intemperate 
remarks” about the United States’ foreign policy (183). The tension between the narrator- 
protagonist and the possible American “emissary” will be discussed in the next section of this 
chapter, but first I will consider the manner in which Hamid positions his narrative in global 
terms, therefore underlining the ubiquitous financial, military, and political power of the 
contemporary United States (183).
By situating the overarching narrative in Lahore, Hamid’s novel counters the 
conventional locale o f American literary responses to 9/11 and, by emphasising the geopolitical 
relationship between the United States and Pakistan, The Reluctant Fundamentalist inverts the 
“inward-looking” lens of much American ‘post-9/11’ fiction (Singh, “Insurgent Metaphors” 
23). In other words, Hamid has produced a very specific type of response to 9/11 and the War 
on Terror: one shaped by both familiarity and anger with the United States. Leerom Medovoi 
claims that Hamid uses Changez’s experience in America as the novel’s “geopolitical raison 
d  etre and object of its rhetorical design rather than its general cultural ground,” as the author 
focuses his literary lens on the global anxieties following the attacks of 9/11 (646, emphasis 
original). In the process of tracing the intercontinental influence of the War on Terror, Hamid 
“map[s] a world in which Pakistan orbits around the US in a larger global system o f wealth, 
culture, and power,” whilst simultaneously drawing the two nations into a mutually distrustful 
relationship with one another (Medovoi 645, emphasis added).
Changez’s address to the American is comprised of recollections o f his time spent in 
Pakistan, the Philippines, Chile, and America, implying that the novel could be interpreted as 
a “bi-national allegory about the relationship between the US and Pakistan, perhaps even the 
entire ‘third-world’” (Medovoi 646). The inclusion of the spaces of Chile and the Philippines 
-  which Changez visits as part of his work for Underwood Samson -  allow Hamid to employ 
a subtle critique of the ever-expanding millennial capitalist project of the United States, and to 
demonstrate the ways in which “local experience is linked to global structures of dominance” 
(Singh, “Insurgent” 29). Notably, Pakistan, Chile, and the Philippines are all locations with a
20
history of American military intervention and influence.3 The presence of American interests 
in all three of these nations is explored throughout the narrative of The Reluctant 
Fundamentalist, and is made even more explicit by the fact that the nameless American whom 
Changez is addressing is in Lahore on undisclosed business.
1.1 Mutually Assured Suspicion: The Narrative Framework of The Reluctant 
Fundamentalist
There are two narrative strands in The Reluctant Fundamentalist. Narrative A entails the 
interactions in the present between the unnamed American and Changez in Lahore and it 
encircles narrative B: the story Changez is recounting to the American. In this sense, the 
protagonist acts as what Abdul Baseer calls a “homodeigetic narrator,” in that he is both 
narrating his story to the American and is a “character in the events recounted” (280). Hamid’s 
finely-crafted chronicle explores the past life that Changez led in the United States while 
frequently refocusing the story in the present -  the Old Anarkali District in Lahore -  by making 
reference to the anonymous American in the second person: a technique that Irene Kacandes 
calls “narrative apostrophe” (329).
The dual focus in terms of narrative time means that Changez is addressing the stranger 
from a position and place changed profoundly by the American response to 9/11, and he has 
the benefit of hindsight when he recounts his initial infatuation, and subsequent 
disillusionment, with the United States. By making Changez the sole narrative voice in the 
conversation with the American “you,” however, Hamid’s novel refuses what Peter Morey 
calls the “normalising consolation of dialogue” (139). In abstaining from the use of 
conventional dialogue in narrative A, Hamid inverts the historically asymmetrical relationship 
between the United States and the Islamic world. The narrator-protagonist’s monologue, then, 
could represent a “restructuring of contemporary political hierarchy [as] the Pakistani speaks 
and the American is silent” (Singh, “Insurgent” 26). This “restructuring,” I suggest, is actually 
a reversal of political voices as, according to Jonathan Lyons, the “W est’s ‘conversation’ with
3 The Philippines, Blum notes, “has long been the most strategic location for US war-making in Asia, the site of 
several large American military bases, which have been the object of numerous protests by the citizens” (Rogue 
191). In the case of Chile, it was on September 11, 1973, that a CIA-backed coup overthrew the Marxist 
government of Salvador Allende, replacing him with General Augusto Pinochet. The tremors of Pinochet’s 
totalitarian regime still haunt the nation today. See Lubna Qureshi’s book, Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende (2009), 
for a detailed description of the American government’s involvement in the overthrowing of Allende, as well as 
its overt support for Pinochet’s military dictatorship.
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Islam has always been a one-sided affair, essentially a dialogue with itself, revealing much 
about the subject but little or nothing about the object in question” (4).
Hamid silences the American addressee and, by constantly having the protagonist refer 
to the stranger in the second person, writes the reader into the novel as a “politicised character” 
(Aldalala’a 3). The author’s use of “narrative apostrophe” therefore acts as a means of 
provoking the reader to respond as the American, even though this response “does not occur 
within the same communicative circuit as the literary message” (Kacandes 332). Given the 
narrative technique employed in the novel, I agree with Medovoi’s assertion that Hamid’s work 
is not “of or by, but rather fo r  Americans,” in that it attempts to enlighten the Americanised 
reader as to some of the detrimental effects that the country’s actions have had on the globe 
(646, emphasis original). Not only has the War on Terror contributed to the globalised nature 
of war today, but it has also fomented the American public’s mistrust of Muslims. This nervous 
sense of suspicion is written powerfully into the nameless American of The Reluctant 
Fundamentalist and, regardless of the fact that he has no narrative voice, his distrust of 
Changez, other Muslims in the vicinity, and perhaps even Pakistan itself, is palpable throughout 
narrative A.
Upon first noticing the American’s discomfort, Changez attempts to allay the stranger’s 
fears, asking him not be “frightened” by his “beard,” for he is “a lover o f America” (Hamid, 
Reluctant 1). The fact that the narrator feels the need to strike an equilibrium between having 
a traditional Muslim beard and his ‘love’ for the United States underlines America’s historical 
suspicion of the Islamic world. Changez’s reassurances, however, go unnoticed by the 
foreigner, whose presence remains shrouded in ambiguity.
In the final chapter of the novel, Changez tells the American that upon his permanent 
return to Lahore he began lecturing at an unnamed university. His new occupation allows him 
to teach his students about the duplicitous relationship between the United States and Pakistan, 
and he begins a political campaign premised on a diplomatic and military “disengagement” 
between the two countries (Hamid, Reluctant 178). The protagonist’s acts of defiance against 
American interference in Pakistan, he claims, initially began as demonstrations demanding 
“greater independence in Pakistan’s domestic and international affairs” (179). When the 
peaceful protests attracted more people, however, they “grew to newsworthy size,” and the 
foreign press in Pakistan labelled the gatherings as “anti-American” (179). As an outspoken 
critic of the United States, Changez becomes a part of the “war-on-terror” montage, and is 
“plagued by paranoia” at the thought of being a person of interest to the CIA or FBI (182, 183). 
Despite his insistence that he is “no ally o f killers; [but] simply a university lecturer,” his stance
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on American foreign policy could render him as a potential threat to the United States (181). 
Regardless of Changez’s assertion that the American “should not imagine that we Pakistanis 
are all potential terrorists, just as we should not imagine that you Americans are all undercover 
assassins,” his interlocutor’s evident unease does not dissipate (183). So restless is the 
American that the protagonist even compares his behaviour to that of “an animal that has 
ventured too far from its lair and is now, in unfamiliar territory, uncertain whether it is predator 
or prey” (31).
This shared suspicion of one another is, at least partially, a result of 9/11 and the way 
in which the media has influenced American perceptions of the Islamic World and vice-versa. 
This fractious relationship has an extensive history, but has reached new levels of paranoia 
since 9/11. Aldalala’a argues that the tone Changez adopts when commenting on the 
American’s apparent unease is a “mixture of an assumed naivete with worldliness [which] 
echoes the courtesies of diplomatic rhetoric underpinned with threats of aggression -  the 
hallmarks of international relations” (3). By choosing a wary American as the addressee of 
Changez’s monologue, as well as locating narrative A in Lahore, Hamid provides his reader 
with a literary example o f the suspicion with which the unknown is treated by the United States’ 
public and government, especially in the global political climate after 9/11.
Upon noticing a scar on Changez’s forearm, the American’s expression is described as 
taking on a “certain seriousness,” and the narrator enquires whether he is “wondering what sort 
of training camp” could have inflicted this injury (Hamid, Reluctant 46). The ominous 
reference to training camps -  synonymous with the Taliban, al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and 
many other ‘terrorist’ organisations -intensifies the distrustful undertones of the meeting 
between the two characters in narrative A. This potential hostility is heightened by the narrator- 
protagonist’s descriptions of the American’s body language and “bearing,” and he even claims 
to see what he believes to be the outline of an “armpit holster” in the stranger’s jacket (2, 139). 
Whether or not the object in question is indeed a weapon adds to the ambiguity of the 
American’s purpose in Lahore, and signals that, even if violence were nothing more than a 
prospect, Changez, as a Pakistani, would be in the seat of power. If physical conflict is an 
eventuality, however, Hamid seems to imply that the American will instigate it, as the stranger 
perhaps believes the protagonist to be what Mamdani -  drawing derisively on George W. 
Bush’s essentialist statements about Islam in the aftermath of 9/11 -  calls a ‘bad’ Muslim.
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Mamdani contends that American views of Muslims tend to fall into one of two distinct camps: 
‘good’ Muslims, or ‘bad’ Muslims. The former, he argues, are perceived as “modern, secular, 
and Westernized,” whereas the latter are seen as “doctrinal, antimodern, and virulent” (24). 
After the attacks on the World Trade Centre, President George W. Bush implored the American 
public to differentiate between “bad Muslims,” who were responsible for acts of terrorism, and 
“good Muslims,” who would assist America in their War on Terror (15). As well as reducing 
a complex, age-old religious identity to a mere adjective imposed by a people outside of the 
Islamic world itself, Mamdani suggests that this mode of discourse offered a far more sinister 
interpretation of Islam: “Unless proved to be ‘good,’ every Muslim was presumed to be ‘bad.’ 
All Muslims were now under obligation to prove their credentials by joining a war against the 
‘bad’ Muslims” (15).
The ‘good’ Muslim -  acting in the interests of the United States -  can be thought of as 
what Derrida calls the useful friend, whereas the ‘bad’ Muslim -  capable of horrific deeds of 
violence -  represents the “declared” enemy (23, 61). A ‘good’ Muslim’s “usefulness” to the 
United States therefore becomes the criteria by which s/he is judged (Derrida 23). It is precisely 
Changez’s usefulness to American finance that frames him as a ‘good’ Muslim during his work 
for Underwood Samson, and his thoroughgoing assimilation is marked by his “sophisticated 
accent” and familiarity with American culture (Hamid, Reluctant 8).
One problem with dividing Muslims into the essentialist categories of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
is that it inscribes to those individuals a political identity without taking into account the fact 
these identities are forged across a spectrum of culturally diverse contexts. What Mamdani 
calls “Culture Talk,” is often responsible for the twinning of cultural and political identities, 
and he proposes that the trouble with Culture Talk is that it “assumes that every culture has a 
tangible essence that defines it, and it then explains politics as a consequence of that essence” 
(18). This kind of essentialism is anathema to Mamdani, who notes that “cultural differences 
need not translate into political differences” (153). Culture Talk assumes that political identities 
are rigid and unchanging, and implies that these identities are intimately bound up with one’s 
cultural experiences. If this line of reasoning goes unchallenged, then one risks perceiving 
cultures, as well as the identities they engender, as inflexible monoliths in the context of a 
continuously changing world. One should not, in other words, arrange for culture a neat frame 
into which it would not ever be able to fit, and the same is true of most forms of identification.
1.2 ‘Good’ Muslim, ‘Bad’ Muslim: Changez’s Impossible Desire for Singularity
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Stuart Hall, for example, argues that attempting to provide a “stable, unchanging” definition of 
identity (cultural or otherwise) is deeply problematic, as one’s identity is “never complete, 
always in process and always constituted within, not outside, representation” (222). Modes of 
representation are therefore crucial to understanding the ways in which certain cultures are 
perceived and discursively disseminated.
The manner in which Changez is represented throughout The Reluctant Fundamentalist 
marks him as a unique character. That the protagonist experiences a shift in his priorities due 
to his experiences in the United States after 9/11 -  as well as a modification of the manner in 
which he presents himself -  echoes Hall’s observation that “[f]ar from being eternally fixed in 
some essentialised past, [identities] are subject to the co ntinuous ‘play’ o f history, culture and 
power” (225). Following 9/11, Changez alters his appearance by growing a traditional Islamic 
beard, which, arguably, represents his longing for a cultural signifier of his nation’s religion. 
His beard, however, is not symbolic of his devotion to Islam, but functions as a means of 
differentiating himself from the “army of clean-shaven youngsters” at Underwood Samson 
(Hamid, Reluctant 130). If, as Mamdani posits, culture should be thought of “in terms that are 
both historical and nonterritorial,” then one could assume that by growing his beard, Changez 
is perhaps non-religiously aligning himself with the “borderless” umma (27). Considering that 
he is not religious but “still calls himself a Muslim,” it seems important to ask how it is that he 
identifies with the global Islamic community (Hamid, Discontent 185).
As I have argued, the “fundamentals” that Changez adopts when he returns to Lahore 
are premised on the recognition of precarity and vulnerability (Hamid, Reluctant 98, emphasis 
added). His assumed secularism does not foreclose his comprehension of the damage that the 
War on Terror has had on Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the umma as a whole. Rather than 
identifying with Muslims on a religious basis, as one might assume a fundamentalist would, I 
claim that Changez comprehends what it means to be a Muslim after 9/11 -  culturally 
misunderstood and precariously positioned. Considering, as Butler does, that “precarity cuts 
across identity categories as well as multicultural maps” (Frames 32), it could be argued that 
Changez feels it is his duty to protect the umma not because the populations who comprise this 
community are Muslim, but because they are often powerless to protect themselves. Of course, 
because the United States and the Muslim world appear to be ever more at odds with one 
another after the attacks on the Twin Towers, Changez’s allegiances to the umma might signify 
him as a ‘bad’ Muslim through American eyes. The protagonist, however, is an example ofjust 
how fabricated is George Bush’s binary.
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Like Mamdani and Hall, Hamid is himself an advocate of “hybridity” as a means of 
understanding the fluidity of identity politics (Discontent xvii). He claims: “Hybrids do more 
than embody mixtures between groups. Hybrids reveal the boundaries between groups to be 
false” (Discontent xvii).4 Despite similarities between the author and his protagonist, Hamid 
insists that Changez “feels the need to be one thing -  just Pakistani or just a Muslim. [Whereas] 
I ’m very comfortable as a hybridized mongrel” (“Wisdom”).5 If, as Hamid claims, “hybridity” 
should be embraced, why would he choose to write about a protagonist who desires singularity?
In the months following 9/11, Changez’s need for “a stable core” is evident (Hamid, 
Reluctant 148, emphasis original). He feels torn between the United States and Pakistan, and 
his worries are only worsened by the fact that he does “not know where [he stands] on so many 
issues o f consequence” (148). He even admits to the American that his sense of “identity was 
so fragile” during his final months in the United States (148). It is precisely because his 
fractured sense of self so troubles him that he desperately needs to consolidate himself. 
Attempting to do so, if one follows Hamid’s argument, appears to be an almost impossible task 
and, upon his return to Lahore, Changez admits defeat in his battle for unification. He concedes: 
“it is impossible to reconstitute ourselves as the autonomous beings we previously imagined 
ourselves to be. Something of us is now outside, and something of the outside is now within 
us” (174).
As I will demonstrate, this “something” that Changez accrues during his time in the 
United States contributes less to his sense of cultural hybridity -  as Mamdani, Hall, and Hamid 
would have it -  than it does a form of assimilation. This is a position that, as Changez’s 
experiences demonstrate, is demanded of him by mainstream white American culture but is 
also, paradoxically, made almost impossible for Muslims living in the United States to achieve, 
particularly in the political climate after 9/11. This is not to say that the protagonist is not a 
cultural hybrid, as his rejection of his position at Underwood Samson does not represent a 
refusal of America per se but rather an attempt to distance himself from the kind of person he 
becomes when working and living there. Once he fully recognises that his assimilation into the 
United States requires him to foment the already widespread precarity in the world, he instead 
chooses to identify with those for whom conditions of vulnerability have become routine.
4 Readers might find useful Amartya Sen’s concept of identity in Identity and Violence (2007), in which the 
author reasons that, far from being rooted in an essentialised notion of oneself, one’s identity is, in fact, an 
incremental process of discovery -  shaped by one’s social, cultural, familial, and geopolitical surroundings.
5 Hamid has lived a “global life,” in that he was born in Pakistan, but lived much of his life in the global and 
economic West (“Wisdom”). See Discontent and its Civilisations for a fuller picture of the kind of life that Hamid 
has lived.
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Changez realises that he cannot, in good conscience, embody what it supposedly means to be 
a ‘good’ Muslim, and his turn towards Pakistan indicates an attempt to exorcise his 
Americanised self (Hamid, Reluctant 98, emphasis added).
The inclusion of Changez’s struggle for unity thus acts as a twofold literary device. 
First, the protagonist’s uncertainty represents the inner turmoil that presumably characterises 
life for many Muslims in America after 9/11, who, like himself, might feel that their loyalties 
are torn. Second, Hamid shows his reader that singular identities are neither possible nor 
desirable in the first place. Rather than attempting to distil the intricacy of the self, the author 
suggests that one should embrace its complexity, and acknowledge that “to be a human being 
and to be a hybrid being are the same thing” (Discontent xviii). Hamid’s novel, therefore, is 
not simply a Pakistani or Muslim response to 9/11. Instead, it is framed by a specific type of 
position -  one that has experienced 9/11 and its subsequent War on Terror from both the 
American and Pakistani perspectives. In other words, the novel is a response of a 
“mongrelised” identity -  an identity that has tried but inevitably failed to singularise itself 
(Hamid, qtd. in Singh, “Deconstructing Terror” 149).
Changez, of course, is neither a ‘good’ nor a ‘bad’ Muslim, but the very fact that he 
opposes the United States’ “constant interference in the affairs of others” is more than enough 
to raise American suspicions (Hamid, Reluctant 156). What makes the framing of him as a 
‘bad’ Muslim -  at least in the eyes of the nameless American of narrative A -  all the more 
intriguing is that, prior to 9/11, and despite already fractured ties between the United States and 
the Islamic World, Changez hardly needs to prove himself as a ‘good’ Muslim. Maintaining 
this image of himself, however, requires constant vigilance.
1.3 A “Western-Educated Urbanite” or the “Dictator of an Islamic Republic”
As a result of appearing to be a ‘good’ Muslim -  “modern, secular and Westernised” -  
Changez’s initial integration into American society is relatively simple (Mamdani 24). He 
arrives in the United States with significant knowledge of the nation’s cultural dimensions, and 
graduates from Princeton as a “western-educated urbanite” (Hamid, Reluctant 54). During his 
time at university, Changez’s interactions with fellow Princetonians involve conversations 
about Star Trek, Top Gun, and other cultural products of the United States, and it bears 
mentioning that his “Anglicised accent” is nothing but a boon to his ostensibly seamless 
assimilation into American life (42).
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Changez’s comfort within elite American society is due to that fact that he comes from a family 
whose “home sits on an acre of land in [. . .] one of the most expensive districts in [Lahore],” 
but the narrator admits that the “rupee has declined steadily against the dollar,” and that when 
the time came to send him to college, “the money simply wasn’t there” (Hamid, Reluctant 9­
10). The Khan family’s affluence has dwindled through the generations but, as Changez 
reminds the American, “status, as in any traditional, class-conscious society, declines more 
slowly than wealth” (10). Changez’s drive to succeed in America is influenced partially by his 
family’s flagging financial position in Lahore and their “inability to purchase what [they] 
previously could” (11). In accepting a position at Ivy League universities, he notes that foreign 
students, upon graduation, were “expected to contribute [their] talents to [American] society” 
(4). By the time he leaves Princeton, Changez is ready and willing to fulfil his debt to the 
United States, and is on the verge of an exclusive internship with Underwood Samson in New 
York.
Despite being thought of as a ‘good’ Muslim by his American friends, the protagonist 
recalls a moment in which his loyalties come under scrutiny. Having been offered a position at 
Underwood Samson, he and his fellow Princetonians enjoy a summer holiday on the island of 
Rhodes, in Greece. Changez remembers a particularly tense moment from his vacation:
We went out for dinner with the group [. . .]. And then [Chuck] went around the table 
and asked each of us to reveal our dream for what we would most like to be. When my 
turn came, I said I hoped one day to be the dictator of an Islamic republic with nuclear 
capability; the others appeared shocked and I was forced to explain that I had been 
joking. (29)
Through one innocuous comment, Changez very nearly becomes a ‘bad’ Muslim when viewed 
through American eyes. What this small but important incident in the novel suggests is that the 
distrust of Muslims appears to be a prominent view of the American elite well before the fall 
of the World Trade Centre. If his Princeton compatriots really are his friends then surely they 
would understand that Changez’s attempt at humour is, in fact, a parody of the stereotypical 
‘bad’ Muslim. By insisting that his comment is a joke, the protagonist is forced to restore the 
partially fractured perception of himself as a ‘good’ Muslim in the eyes of his fellow students. 
In the same way that the Muslim can easily transgress the fictitious line between ‘good’ and 
the ‘bad,’ Derrida argues that the ‘friend’ and the ‘enemy’ “intersect and ceaselessly change 
places” (72). What is significant about Changez’s brief fluctuation between ‘friend’ and 
‘enemy,’ in this instance, is how he is made aware that, despite his Ivy league education, his 
acceptance as an Americanised Muslim will never be final, and that he will need to remain
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cautious about the way in which he presents himself so as to not be thought of as a ‘bad’ 
Muslim.
Notwithstanding his desire to fit in with his American counterparts, Changez also finds 
himself condemning their “self-righteousness” when dealing with local Greeks, and wonders 
“by what quirk of history [his] companions [. . .] were in a position to conduct themselves in 
the world as if they were its ruling class” (Hamid, Reluctant 21). He even admits to thinking 
of their behaviour as “so devoid of refinement” that they would have been regarded as 
“upstarts” in Pakistan (21). Thus, well before the event of 9/11, it appears that Changez has 
some deep misgivings about the sense of entitlement he finds characteristic of so many 
Americans. Although his distaste at his fellow students’ behaviour is palpable during his time 
in Greece, the protagonist is not beyond assimilating into their selfish ways. On the contrary, 
the higher he climbs on the ladder of corporate success at Underwood Samson, the more 
obnoxious and arrogant he becomes. Given the “enormously powerful” position he holds at 
such an exclusive financial firm, his change in demeanour, while not excusable, is perhaps 
understandable (67).
One o f the benefits o f working for Underwood Samson, Changez recalls, was the fact 
that he could live in New York. The cosmopolitan nature of the city astonishes him, and he 
recalls that he was “in four and half years, never an American; [but] immediately a New 
Yorker” (Hamid, Reluctant 33). In the years before 9/11, New York represents a space of 
comfort for him, which is no doubt helped by the fact that “in a subway car, [his] skin would 
typically fall in the middle of the colour spectrum,” and “[o]n street corners, tourists would ask 
[him] for directions” (33). The protagonist even feels comfortable wearing his “white kurta of 
delicately worked cotton” on his days off from work (48). Changez feels at “home” in the city, 
and his status as an Underwood Samson employee situates him in the very epicentre of the 
United States’ financial prowess (32).
In its essence, the protagonist’s occupation at Underwood Samson involves the firing 
of individuals who stand in the way o f profit. He and his co-workers are required to calculate 
their clients’ “potential for future growth,” and are obliged to determine “how much fat [can] 
be cut” from a given company (Hamid, Reluctant 95). The “fundamentals” of Underwood 
Samson therefore disregard the human needs of a company’s workforce in favour of financial 
accumulation (98, emphasis original). To this effect, Changez concedes: The “compassionate 
pangs I felt for soon-to-be redundant workers were not overwhelming in their frequency,” and 
he remembers that the degree of commitment required by the job left him with “rather limited 
time for such distractions’” (99, emphasis added). The protagonist’s involvement in the
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capitalist project of the United States means he is actually encouraged to ignore the human 
suffering that underpins his work. As a ‘good’ Muslim, Changez is required to benefit the 
American economy rather than trouble himself over the many faceless individuals whose lives 
he is “overturning” (152). The people whom Underwood Samson advises their clients to 
retrench are framed as auxiliary, and are seen as obstacles, rather than contributors, to what 
financial success means in the twenty-first century.
From his studies at Princeton to his employment at Underwood Samson, Changez 
grasps his “American dream” with both hands (Hamid, Reluctant 93). Rather than attempting 
to hide his “Pakistaniness,” he actually enjoys the circumstances in which he finds that he must 
present himself as a ‘good’ Muslim in order to be thought of as a ‘friend’ to Underwood 
Samson (71). He recalls that being a Pakistani endeared him to his workplace associates: “I 
was aware of the advantage conferred upon me by my foreignness, and I tried to utilise it” (42). 
Changez, it appears, is in a unique position at Underwood Samson. Because he is seen as a 
‘good’ Muslim, he is willing to assimilate into American society and promote its economic 
“efficiency’ (39, emphasis original). He even imagines that he and his work colleagues, 
“[s]horn of hair and dressed in battle fatigues, would have been virtually indistinguishable” 
(38, emphasis added). This military metaphor characterises Changez as a soldier in America’s 
economic army, and thus foreshadows his later realisation that his work at Underwood Samson 
helps facilitate the United States’ military dominance over the globe. But, as long as his 
“fundamentals’’ are financial rather than religious or social, Changez will be read as a ‘good’ 
Muslim, and he finds himself at ease within the institutional culture of Underwood Samson 
(98, emphasis original).
So enamoured is he by his occupation that Changez admits to thinking of himself not 
“as a Pakistani, but as an Underwood Samson employee,” and he concedes to the American 
that he had been seduced by the “professionalism that underpins your country’s success in so 
many fields” (Hamid Reluctant 31, 37). Throughout his employment at Underwood Samson, 
he is not merely an average apprentice in the realm of corporate America, and he remembers 
that he “stood out from the pack,” as he had “harnessed his desire to succeed” (40). In a matter 
of months, he becomes, thanks to his “tenacity,” a crucial cog in Underwood Samson’s 
financial machine (41).
Changez’s steady assimilation into the world of American capital is most notable while 
he is evaluating cost-cutting options at a record label in Manila with a group of Underwood 
Samson employees. He remembers that when working in the Philippines he “attempted to act 
and speak [. . .] more like an American” (Hamid, Reluctant 65). He continues:
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The Filipinos we worked with seemed to look up to my American colleagues, accepting 
them almost instinctively as members of the officer class of global business -  and I 
wanted my share of that respect as well. So I learned to tell executives my father’s age, 
‘I need it now;’ I learned to cut to the front of lines with an extraterritorial smile; and I 
learned to answer, when asked where I was from, that I was from New York. (65, 
emphasis original)
It should be clear that the protagonist’s integration into the “officer class o f global business” 
coincides with the steady erosion of the “respectful” behaviour that had once differentiated 
from his Princeton compatriots (Hamid, Reluctant 95, 25). Because he is in a position of control 
over others’ livelihoods, Changez need not bother with simple matters of etiquette and, as he 
and his Underwood Samson team go about “shaping the future with little regard for the past,” 
the protagonist’s “personal efficacy” begins to grow (116). It is while he is working in the 
Philippines, however, that the September 11 attacks happen. This destructive incident sparks 
an irreversible rupture in Changez’s sense of identification as a New Yorker.
1.4 The “Symbolism” of Atrocity: Changez’s Visual Experience of September 11
Two interrelated events contextualise Changez’s reaction to 9/11, and both make him question 
the purpose of his position in the corporate world and American society itself. He tells the 
American that, while sharing a limousine with a fellow Underwood Samson employee in 
Manila, he meets the eye of a Filipino jeepney driver,6 whose “undisguised hostility” was 
evident in his gaze (Hamid, Reluctant 67). Changez recalls that he was shaken by this look, 
and assumed the Filipino “simply [did] not like Americans,” once again identifying himself as 
a member of the United States’ global economic elite (67). If, as the novel suggests, the 
protagonist is in the process o f incorporating himself into capitalist America, then the following 
interaction between Changez and his Underwood Samson colleague in the limousine is the first 
example o f his compulsion to singularise his sense of self. In other words, the glance that he 
shares with the Filipino foreshadows his desire to unify his points of identity following the 
attacks on the World Trade Centre.
As the protagonist glances towards his Underwood Samson associate, he admits that 
something “rather strange” took place (Hamid, Reluctant 67). He recalls:
6 Jeepneys are a popular form of transport in the Philippines. They are constructed from the remnants of old United 
States Military Jeeps left in the country after the Second World War.
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I looked at him -  at his fair hair and light eyes and, most of all, his oblivious immersion 
in the minutiae of our work -  and thought, you are so foreign. I felt in that moment 
much closer to the Filipino driver than to him; I felt I was play-acting when in reality I 
ought to be making my way home, like the people on the street outside.
(67, emphasis original)
Changez’s meditations on the stare between himself and the jeepney driver lead Changez to 
the conclusion that the two of them shared a “sort of Third World sensibility” -  a glance of 
transnational identification in which his loyalties come under scrutiny (67). In identifying with 
the Filipino and estranging himself from his American colleague, the protagonist’s adopted 
sense o f self is revealed to him as just that: a mask of that he must wear in order to be thought 
of as a ‘good’ Muslim.
During the days leading up to the 9/11 attacks, Changez’s identification with the 
Filipino plagues his thoughts. He recounts to his American interlocutor in Lahore that, although 
he was the only non-American in the group, he suspected that his “Pakistaniness was invisible” 
(Hamid, Reluctant 71). Despite his acknowledgment that he is “play-acting,” his professional 
loyalty to the United States makes his response to the 9/11 attacks all the more enigmatic, and 
he cautions the American that his reaction was far from sympathetic (67).
Like so many people on September 11, 2001, Changez witnesses the attacks on the 
World Trade Centre through the medium of television. He remembers:
I turned on the television and saw what at first I took to be a film. But as I continued to 
watch, I realized that it was not fiction but news. I stared as one -  and then the other -  
of the twin towers of New York’s World Trade Centre collapsed. And then, I smiled. 
Yes, despicable as it may sound, my initial reaction was to be remarkably pleased. (72, 
emphasis original)
Changez admits to feeling a “profound sense of perplexity” at his reaction to the attacks, and 
he implores the American to believe that he is not “indifferent to the suffering of others” 
(Hamid, Reluctant 73, 72). It is not the slaughter of innocent civilians that triggers his smile, 
but what the enormity o f the footage represents. Changez recalls that he became “caught up in 
the symbolism of it all” because “someone had so visibly brought America to her knees” (72). 
The visual frame imposed around the symbolic collapse of the Twin Towers holds Changez in 
its gaze, and his unusual response to the scenes of destruction raises an important point about 
the narrative perspective of The Reluctant Fundamentalist. In having Changez respond to the
32
attacks with a smile, Hamid resists “an a priori condemnation of 9/11” because he realises that 
the attacks themselves may not have been universally condemned (Singh, “Insurgent” 28).
By having Changez react in a manner that undermines what one could assume to be the 
conventional American response to 9/11, Hamid complicates the notion of allegiance. For, if 
one considers the position in which Changez finds himself in the United States then his 
response is curious indeed. Al Qaeda, after all, struck at the very heart of America’s economy, 
destroying the World Trade Centre and creating a spectacle designed to “mobilise mass fear” 
(Mitchell 162).7 As a self-confessed New Yorker, as well a powerful component of America’s 
global financial reach, Changez is implicated as a symbolic victim o f the attacks. His reaction 
to the destruction of these vivid icons of America’s economic supremacy seems to frame him 
as a ‘bad’ Muslim, at least from the perspective of the American in narrative A. This negative 
perception of him is intensified in narrative B when he and his Underwood Samson colleagues 
leave the Philippines for New York several days after the attacks.
At the airport in Manila, Changez is “escorted by guards into a room” where he is strip- 
searched and questioned (Hamid, Reluctant 74). Following this degrading experience, he flies 
to New York “uncomfortable in [his] own face,” aware that he is “under suspicion” as a result 
of his ethnicity (74). Singh argues that the clash of identities that Changez experiences when 
flying back to the United States is a result of his “dual identification” as both “victim and 
attacker,” as he is confused about where and with whom his sympathy and his guilt should be 
situated (“Insurgent” 27). When he and his Underwood Samson associates land in New York, 
Changez is “dispatched for a secondary inspection,” and is questioned about the “purpose” of 
his trip to the United States (Hamid, Reluctant 75). Despite his insistence that he “live[s]” in 
the United States, his clearly Muslim name and Pakistani passport are deemed sufficient reason 
for those at international borders to interrogate his reasons for being in America (75). What 
makes his temporary detainment all the more humiliating is the fact that he has willingly 
offered himself up to the forces of corporate America and, not for the last time, is in some sense 
betrayed by the nation he might have called home.
After the 9/11 attacks, any “advantage” that his “Pakistaniness” conferred upon 
Changez during his work at Underwood Samson is obsolete, and his ethnicity becomes the 
primary way in which he is perceived (Hamid, Reluctant 42, 71). From his identification with
7 The 9/11 attacks attempted to destroy symbols of America’s economic, military, and political dominance. Blum 
posits that al-Qaeda’s deadly plan would have required two planes for the World Trade Centre, one for the 
Pentagon, and, he argues, that the plane which crashed in Pennsylvania may well have been on its way to the 
White House (Blum, Rogue xiv).
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the jeepney driver in the Philippines to his reaction to 9/11, his desire for assimilation has begun 
to recede. Yet, despite the growing awareness of his visibility as a Pakistani, Changez continues 
to pursue the possibility o f becoming a New Yorker. But the city in which he felt so comfortable 
prior to 9/11 is unrecognisable, and has become a site of national “mourning” (78).
1.5 Nostalgia, Self-Righteousness, and New York’s New Character
Changez’s “uncharitable -  indeed, inhumane” -  reaction to 9/11 continues to trouble him upon 
his arrival back in the United States (Hamid, Reluctant 79). In spite of his misgivings, he 
attempts to carry on with his life as he had known it prior to the attacks, and endeavours to 
make himself appear as a ‘good’ Muslim in a nation “gripped by a growing self-righteousness 
and rage” (94).
Mamdani observes that the American mass media’s insistence on 9/11’s “epochal 
significance” framed the event itself as something outside o f a “historical or political context” 
(15). Changez alerts the anonymous American to the widespread historical amnesia he 
perceives in the media’s reaction to 9/11, and sarcastically questions the legitimacy of his own 
story in order to emphasise this point. He says to his interlocutor: “surely it is the gist that 
matters; I am, after all, telling you a history, and in history, as I suspect you -  as an American 
-  will agree, it is the thrust of one’s narrative that counts, not the accuracy o f one’s details” 
(Hamid, Reluctant 118, emphasis original). By sardonically questioning the substance of the 
American version of history, Changez is by no means justifying the attacks on the World Trade 
Centre. Rather, he is making the American aware that such destruction was not without 
precedent. He undermines the method by which 9/11 was framed by the American news media, 
and critiques the fact that it was perceived and depicted as a singular event rather than a 
catastrophic result of “the manner in which America conduct[s] itself in the world” (156). 
While the ruins of the Twin Towers continue to “smoulder” upon his return to New York, 
Changez attempts to carry on with his life as it had been before 9/11 (Hamid, Reluctant 80). 
The city, however, has changed, and the protagonist observes the “deeply anxious” character 
of New York’s inhabitants (82). His guilt for having smiled at an incident that brought so much 
suffering to his adopted home troubles him, and he remembers that the “photos, bouquets [and] 
words of condolence” around the city made him feel a “constant murmur of reproach” (79). 
“Other reproaches,” Changez tells the American, “were far louder” (79). He continues:
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Your country’s flag invaded New York after the attacks; it was everywhere. Small flags 
stuck on toothpicks featured in the shrines; stickers of flags adorned windshields and 
windows; large flags fluttered from buildings. They all seemed to proclaim: We are 
America -  not New York, which in my opinion means something quite different -  the 
mightiest civilization the world has ever known; you have slighted us; beware our 
wrath. Gazing up at the soaring towers of the city, I wondered what manner of host 
would sally forth from so grand a castle. (79, emphasis original)
The cosmopolitanism that had previously made Changez so comfortable in New York has been 
replaced by something that instils in the protagonist a great sense of unease: American 
patriotism. Arundhati Roy notes that the “blizzard of Made-in-China American flags” acted as 
a focal point around which the nation rallied following 9/11 (“Come” 1). The country’s public, 
shaken by the violence of the attacks, needed something pre-existing onto which they could 
affix their insecurities. Blum explains that “patriotism, like religion, meets people’s need for 
something greater to which their individual lives can be anchored” (America’s 307). The 
tangible surge in American patriotism unsettles Changez, and he sees the victimhood that the 
nation has inscribed upon itself as a “dangerous nostalgia” (Hamid, Reluctant 115).8
The protagonist’s repeated references to this collective sense o f American “nostalgia” 
echo Blum’s conception of patriotism as a type o f stabiliser, a yearning for a secure and familiar 
sense of nationhood. Changez even tells the American that he had “always thought of America 
as a nation that looked forward; [but] for the first time [he] was struck by its determination to 
look back’ (Hamid, Reluctant, emphasis original 115). In his eyes, the American public seems 
to be suffering from a crisis of identity -  as if they have lost both those who perished in the 
attacks and their sense of place in the world. Butler proposes that the sense of loss felt by 
Americans in the wake of 9/11 was both physical and ideological. She claims that it was the 
“loss of the prerogative, only and always, to be the one who transgresses the sovereign 
boundaries o f other states, but never to be in the position of having one’s own boundaries 
transgressed” which so debilitated the American public (Precarious 39). The uniqueness of the 
9/11 attacks should therefore be understood as both a result of the horrifying spectacle that they 
provided and the fact that they occurred on American soil -  in a country that always seemed to 
be in absolute control both of its own fate and the fate of other nations.
This longing for an unattainable and mythical past is also implied by Changez’s 
complicated relationship with Erica, a native New Yorker. Hamid, I suggest, includes Erica in
8 It seems to me that this “nostalgia” is also a yearning for the Cold War mentality of a definite figure of the 
‘enemy,’ which was, by its very political nature, an oppositional subject to that of the free and democratic United 
States.
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the novel as an allegorical representation -  (Am)Erica -  o f his protagonist’s initial fondness 
and subsequent disillusionment with the United States.9
1.6 Failing (Am)Erica and the Visible Pakistani
Upon first meeting Erica in Greece (while on holiday with his Princeton friends), Changez 
describes her as having an uncommon “magnetism” (Hamid, Reluctant 22). After the 9/11 
attacks, however, Erica, like her nation, disappears into a “powerful nostalgia” (113). Even 
before 9/11 she is in a fragile emotional state, and is still mourning the death of her long-term 
boyfriend, Chris, who had died in the year 2000. Erica describes Chris, as indeed she does 
Changez, as having an “Old World appeal” (27). The allegorical connection between 
(Am)Erica and Chris(t/topher Columbus) is evident throughout The Reluctant Fundamentalist, 
and I would posit that Erica’s repeated references to her dead lover signify the religious and 
cultural origins of the modern United States. I would also and suggest that her eventual 
rejection of Changez highlights the threat that multiculturalism faces on American soil in the 
future.10 Before he leaves for Manila, Changez and Erica are relatively close. He even meets 
her family and spends a considerable portion of his free time attempting, but ultimately failing, 
to woo her. In the same way that 9/11 catalyses Changez to question his position as a Pakistani 
in America, the attacks drive Erica into a deep and introverted search for meaning in her life 
without Chris. The protagonist’s attempts at unifying his sense of identity in the wake of 9/11 
are therefore metaphorically linked to Erica’s longing for stability and unity in her life without 
Chris.
Changez recalls that the destruction of the World Trade Centre “churned up old 
thoughts [in Erica’s mind] that had settled in the manner o f sediment to the bottom of a pond,” 
and he notes that “the waters of her mind were murky with what previously had been ignored” 
(Hamid, Reluctant 83). As Erica retreats further into herself, he wonders just how profoundly
9 I feel that now would be a good opportunity to note that Hamid’s rather heavy-handed allegorical approach may 
not sit well with some readers, especially his personification of America as a rudderless and vulnerable young 
woman.
10 America’s current president, Donald Trump, best embodies the present and future threat to multiculturalism in 
the United States. Amongst the many inflammatory statements made during his electoral campaign, one of the 
more polemical was his December 2015 call for a “total an d complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United 
States” (qtd. in Jeremy Diamond). Muslims, in fact, have been a part of America’s population for many 
centuries. This is due to the slave trade from West Africa as well as a large number of Moroccans who 
immigrated to the United States in the early seventeenth century. See Edward E. Curtis’s book, Muslims in 
America (2009), and Jonathan Curiel’s Islam in America (2015).
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his relationship with both the nation and his lover will be affected following the attacks. Despite 
finding himself compromised and now having to play the ‘good’ Muslim far more consciously, 
he continues to pursue both Erica and his Underwood Samson career, albeit clad in his “armour 
of denial” (95). He registers the steady “crumbling of the world around [him] and the 
impending destruction of [his] personal American dream,” but his determination to court Erica 
remains resolute (93).
After 9/11, the protagonist is not the only Muslim who feels out of place in New York. 
In the same way that he is subjected to rigorous examinations of his loyalties by those 
controlling international borders, Muslims within the United States, as a result of their 
multifaceted ethnicities and religious affiliations, are also being exposed to America’s 
“historical myths o f nation” (Aldalala’a 12). Changez tells the America n that he ignored the 
rumours emanating from New York’s Muslim community, thinking nothing of the fact that 
“Pakistani cabdrivers were being beaten to within an inch of their lives” or that “the FBI was 
raiding mosques, shops and even people’s houses” (Hamid, Reluctant 94). He refuses to 
acknowledge that “Muslim men were disappearing, perhaps into shadowy detention centres for 
questioning or worse,” and reasons that these claims are being “exaggerated” (94). In fact, so 
immersed is Changez in his Underwood Samson role that he believes “such things invariably 
happened, in America as in all countries, to the hapless poor, not to Princeton graduates earning 
eighty thousand dollars a year” (94-5). Islamophobia, as it happens, does affect the protagonist 
on a personal level, leading him to question his belief that he is nestled safely in the upper- 
echelons of American society. 11
A few months after 9/11, Changez and several other Underwood Samson employees 
are evaluating a television cable company in New Jersey. On his way to the parking lot, a man 
he does not know confronts him. Changez remembers that the man “made a series of 
unintelligible noises [. . .] and pressed his face alarmingly close to [his own]” (Hamid, 
Reluctant 117). Fearing that the man might be drunk, Changez prepares to defend himself. The 
aggressive stranger is joined by another man, who diffuses the tense situation; taking his friend 
by the arm and telling him that it is “not worth it” (117). Having been discouraged by his 
acquaintance, the instigator settles for a verbal insult, and calls Changez a “‘Fucking Arab’” 
(117). The anger that the protagonist has been suppressing up until this point is finally 
unleashed and, as the “blood throb[s]” in his temples, he retrieves the tire iron from the boot of
11 Islamophobia is a complex term. Islam is not a race, but its detractors often frame the religion in ethnic and 
racial terminology. See Chris Allen’s book, Islamophobia (2010), for a discussion of the limitations of this term.
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his car and squares up to the first man, feeling “fully capable of wielding [the iron] with 
sufficient violence to shatter the bones o f his skull” (118). After a tense moment, the two men 
depart, leaving Changez “unsteady” (118). Despite having has his fair share of fights on the 
soccer field during his time at Princeton, he recalls, “this encounter had an intensity that was 
for me unprecedented,” adding that it was “some minutes” before he was able to drive home. 
(118).
Hamid asserts that Islamophobia “seeks to minimise the importance of the individual 
and maximise the importance of the group” (Discontent 183). In the mind of Changez’s 
unnamed attacker, Arab Muslims were responsible for 9/11. The fact that Changez is a 
Pakistani, and most likely an ethnic Pashtun, does not matter to his assailant, as the 
protagonist’s somatic Otherness ascribes to him the label of ‘Muslim.’ Regardless of his 
ethnicity and nationality, Changez, in the mind of his attacker, is complicit in the atrocity of 
9/11.
In the same way that Hamid makes Changez’s interlocutor a suspicious American in 
narrative A, the author includes the parking lot incident as a means of representing a 
manifestation o f American distrust, perhaps even hatred, of any person who displays an ethnic 
affiliation to Islam in the aftermath o f 9/11. It is clear that -  just like his Princeton companions’ 
inability to understand Changez’s humorous attempt to depict himself as a future despot -  
distrust and ignorance of the Muslim Other go hand in hand. The protagonist’s personal 
experience o f Islamophobia angers him, but it is only once he visits his family back in Lahore 
that he begins to consider seriously the purpose of his being in New York. Prior to his visit, 
however, he pursues Erica relentlessly, despite her evident pining for Chris.
On an October evening in 2001, Changez and Erica are drinking champagne in the 
former’s apartment. Erica removes her t-shirt to show him a bruise that she received at tae 
kwon do practice earlier in the day and, “without thinking,” Changez kisses her lips, to which 
she neither “respond[s]” nor “resist[s]” (Hamid, Reluctant 88-9). As his advances increase in 
intensity, he notes that he “found it difficult to enter her; it was as though she was not aroused” 
(90). He continues: “She said nothing while I was inside her, but I could see her discomfort, 
and so I forced myself to stop” (90). This failed attempt at lovemaking is an awkward 
allegorical device. If  Changez’s actions are supposed to mimic al Qaeda’s very literal 
penetration of America’s airspace in the attacks of 9/11 then Hamid’s rather heavy-handed 
metaphor aligns the protagonist indubitably with the figure of the ‘terrorist.’ Changez tells the 
American that Erica’s “body had rejected [him],” hinting at the dismissal of Islam in favour of 
a kind of American exceptionalism (90). Erica’s physical denial o f anyone who is not Chris -
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especially a Muslim -  suggests that the way in which this exceptionalism manifests itself is as 
what Anna Hartnell calls an “isolationist streak that turns its gaze away from the rest of the 
world” (344).
Despite his rejection by Erica, Changez attempts to sleep with her again, telling the 
American that he “wanted to hold onto us” (Hamid, Reluctant 104). The “us” that he wants 
desperately not to lose is suggestive of both his sense of belonging in the United States, and 
his dysfunctional relationship with the nostalgia-ridden Erica. In the build up to his second 
sexual encounter with Erica, he asks her to “pretend” that he is Chris (105). He recalls: “I did 
not seem to be myself. It was as though we were under a spell, transported to a world where I 
was Chris and she was with Chris [. . .]. Her body denied mine no longer; I watched her shut 
eyes, and her shut eyes watched him” (105, emphasis original). Clearly, Changez is only 
recognisable as a lover to Erica by simulating Chris. In a desperate attempt to quite literally 
integrate himself into (Am)Erica, he undermines his own sense of self. He admits: “by taking 
on the persona of another, I had diminished myself in my own eyes,” signalling the continual 
fracturing of his own identity (106).
Delphine Munos describes Changez’s second sexual encounter with Erica as a moment 
of “un-being” for the protagonist, in which Erica’s gaze “reflect[s] back to him only Chris” 
(403). By mimicking Chris, in other words, Changez is neither himself nor the person he hopes 
to emulate. The protagonist may be able to pretend, to pose briefly as Erica’s dead lover, but 
he can never fully assimilate into the role that she desires him to fill.12 Unsurprisingly, Changez 
describes the post-coital shame he feels as “confusing,” as he comes to terms with what he 
must sacrifice in order to be with Erica. Furthermore, by participating in such an intimate 
moment with someone so vulnerable, he feels that he has “done Erica some terrible harm” 
(106).
As Erica’s past remembrances draw her deeper into herself, America’s “undeniably 
retro” outlook in the months after 9/11 puts Changez’s sense o f loyalty to his adopted nation 
in question (Hamid, Reluctant 115). He wonders whether the New York which he feels ought 
to be “viewed not in Technicolour but in grainy black and white” contains a “part written for 
someone like” him (115). This increasing uncertainty of his place in New York is matched by 
his failing relationship with Erica, and he admits that the love between her and Chris was a 
“religion which would not accept me as a convert” (114). Erica’s rejection of Changez is
12 For an in depth analysis of the symbolic relationship between Erica and Changez and its implications for a 
racialised reading of Hamid’s novel, see Munos’s article, “Possessed by Whiteness” (2012).
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described deliberately in quasi-religious terms, as it coincides with the seemingly unstoppable 
cracks developing between the United States and the Islamic world. If Changez is to continue 
his attempts at courting Erica, then it is clear that he has to shed his ‘Muslimness’ in order to 
be recognisable as Chris(tian) -  his “dead rival” (106). Regardless of the “Old World’ 
similarities between the protagonist and Chris, as well as the former’s representation of himself 
as a ‘good’ Muslim, Erica cannot accept Changez for who, or what, he is (emphasis original 
27).13
Despite concerns over his “selfish” behaviour towards Erica, a more urgent matter 
usurps Changez’s deliberations: the first military campaign of the War on Terror, Operation 
Enduring Freedom (Hamid, Reluctant 106). America’s politico-military campaign in 
Afghanistan is a significant event that encourages Changez to distance himself from the 
“fundamentals’’ of Underwood Samson, and he struggles to reconcile his job in the United 
States with his growing awareness of the precarity that characterises life on his home continent 
(98, emphasis original).
1.7 Machines as “Heroes”: The War on Terror through Changez’s Eyes
The war in Afghanistan, which began on October 7, 2001, was a potent illustration of the 
lengths to which the American government would go in order to bring al Qaeda -  and their 
Afghan Taliban hosts -  to justice. President Bush encouraged his nation’s public and armed 
services to occupy the moral high-ground in a war which would see the United States embark 
on a “self proclaimed mission to ‘spread democracy’ globally” (Mamdani 202).
Peter Morey notes that after 9/11 “one particularly persistent myth made itself felt: that 
of the nation as primary guardian o f life and property, which would, when necessary, resort to 
violent measures to safeguard those things” (137, emphasis added). Owing to the fact that the 
United States felt that it was the gatekeeper of Western democracy, the war in Afghanistan was 
entrenched in the rhetoric of “humanitarian intervention” (Blum, America’s 161). Judith Butler 
takes direct exception to the rhetorical premises on which Operation Enduring Freedom was 
built, and asserts that, while there are certainly cases in which military intervention is vital, it
13 Between Changez’s resignation from Underwood Samson and his departure from the United States, Erica’s 
“dangerous nostalgia” has reached a climax, and she is admitted into a private clinic in the Hamptons (Hamid, 
Reluctant 93). When Changez attempts to visit her, however, he discovers that she has gone missing, presumed 
dead. Once again, Hamid uses Erica -  and her disappearance -  as a means of emphasising the slow but steady 
decay of Changez’s American dream.
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would “be a mistake to conflate such an intervention with a global mission” (Frames 37). She 
suggests that the form of “global responsibility” that the United States assumed after 9/11 has 
been nothing short of “irresponsible, if not openly contradictory” (37). For Changez, such 
contradictions are deeply personal, as the first phase of the War on Terror places his Pakistani 
family directly in the firing line o f a “nation who cares” (Bush, qtd. in Blum, America’s 108).
The protagonist recalls: “As I cavorted about with Erica; the mighty host I had expected 
of [America] was duly raised and dispatched -  but homeward, towards my family in Pakistan” 
(Hamid, Reluctant 94). He remembers that the movement of American forces to Pakistan -  in 
order to carry out operations in Afghanistan -  did not initially worry him, and he reasoned that 
his family would be “just fine” (94). Within a matter of weeks, however, he begins to witness 
the true impact of the global War on Terror, and his naivete is shattered. He observes the 
unfolding of the bombing campaign in Afghanistan on the local television news, but prefers 
“not to watch,” telling the American that he found something profoundly distasteful in the 
“[p]artisan and sports-like coverage given to the mismatch between the American bombers 
with their twenty-first-century weaponry and the ill-equipped Afghan tribesmen below” (99). 
His attempts to avoid the media, Changez concedes, were not always successful: “On those 
rare occasions when I did find myself confronted by such programming -  in a bar, say, or at 
the entrance to the cable company’s offices -  I was reminded of the film Terminator, but with 
the roles reversed so that the machines were cast as heroes” (99).
Hamid is at pains to point out the pervasiveness of these images of destruction, 
emphasising the fact that the live-feed of the war was available for the American public to 
indulge in on a daily basis, as one might with a fictional television programme. The campaign 
in Afghanistan perturbs Changez, as does its ease of access and commodification.14 Recalling 
Roy’s assertion that “there are only ways o f seeing,” then it is clear that the frame through 
which Operation Enduring Freedom was mandated appears exclusively American (1). In other 
words, the use of “embedded reporting” permitted the news media to focus specifically on one 
side of the conflict between America’s highly advanced military and their rudimentarily armed 
Afghan counterparts (Butler, Frames 64).
According to Butler, throughout George W. Bush’s tenure in the White House, there 
was “a concerted effort on the part of the state to regulate the visual field” (Frames 64). Not 
only does this mean that the portrayal of Operation Enduring Freedom was restricted to the 
perspective of the American government and military, but it also indicates the ability of those
14 This is something on which the series Homeland has capitalised -  as I shall explore in my third chapter.
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control of the media to design a suitable narrative about, as well as a justification for, the war 
in Afghanistan. One could therefore argue, along with Butler, that if those lives claimed by 
American weaponry have no meaning as lives, then surely their destruction appears as nothing 
more than a spectacle that plays an auxiliary part in the grand narrative. This narrative, of 
course, is framed almost exclusively from the perspective o f those American forces waging the 
war itself.
Changez relates his own smiling response to the collapse of the World Trade Centre to 
the pleasure that he suspects the American stranger must have felt while witnessing his 
country’s retribution for 9/11. The protagonist rhetorically asks: “Surely you cannot be 
completely innocent of such feelings yourself. Do you feel no joy at the video clips -  so 
prevalent these days -  of American munitions laying waste to the structures of your enemies?” 
(Hamid, Reluctant 73). One should remember that the smile Changez adopts during the 
televised collapse o f the Twin Towers stems from the “symbolism” of the atrocity itself (73). 
From the perspective of the nameless American, however, the United States’ actions in 
Afghanistan might appear as justifiable. As Butler reminds us:
If just or justified violence is enacted by states, and if unjustifiable violence is enacted 
by non-state actors or actors opposed to existing states, then we have a way of 
explaining why we react to certain forms of violence with horror and to other forms 
with a sense of acceptance, possibly even with righteousness and triumphalism.
(Frames 49)
The air of triumphalism which saturates the United States during Operation Enduring Freedom 
begins to trouble Changez, and he finds himself overcome with resentment at the “the rhetoric 
emerging from [America] at that moment in history -  not just from the government, but from 
the media and supposed critical journalists as well” (Hamid, Reluctant 167). He witnesses on 
television the behaviour of America’s military on the battlefield, and the indiscriminate nature 
of their campaign leaves him with angry “embers glowing within” (100). The protagonist is 
astounded at how little value an Afghan life appears to have in the eyes of the United States 
military, and is taken aback at the asymmetrical nature of the conflict. Bombing and other 
forms of aerial warfare have been America’s modus operandi since 1945, and the war in 
Afghanistan was no different.15 It is no surprise that Changez describes the “machines [. . .] 
cast as heroes” in the eyes of the American public since, throughout Operation Enduring
15 Blum goes so far as to claim that, since the Second World War, the United States only goes to war with a 
country if “it is virtually defenceless against aerial attack” (Rogue 34).
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Freedom, drone operators were often awarded the “Distinguished Warfare Medal” as a formal 
recognition of their contribution to the War on Terror (Hamid, Reluctant 99; Darda 107).
Despite the fact that the Taliban and al Qaeda are non-state actors, they were hiding in 
Afghanistan, a state. And, as President Bush stressed: “If  you harbour terrorists, you are 
terrorists” (qtd. in Blum, Rogue 106). Reasoning such as this conflates governments with rogue 
factions within their sovereign borders, and allows for only a thin margin o f distinction between 
‘terrorists’ and the civilians o f the war-torn nation of Afghanistan. It is important, here, to 
remember Changez’s experience in the cable company’s parking lot, and how his aggressor’s 
homogenous and hateful beliefs about Muslims potentially indicates how some soldiers in the 
American military might feel about the inhabitants of Afghanistan. Blum raises the crucial 
point that “out of the tens of thousands of people the United States and its NATO front have 
killed in Afghanistan, not one has been identified as having had anything to do with the events 
of September 11, 2001” (America’s 79). While the validity of this statement is difficult to 
ascertain, it is a reminder of the frame’s power to create and demarcate moral absolutes in the 
context of military conflict, and how it works to refute the heterogeneity of populations in order 
to configure them as two polarities: ‘friends’ or ‘enemies.’
Despite Changez’s indignation at the violence of which his adopted nation is capable, 
it is not until he watches American troops preparing for what the media describes as a “daring 
raid” on a Taliban stronghold that his anger reaches a climax (Hamid, Reluctant 100). He tells 
the American that, upon viewing the televised images of American infantry in Afghanistan, his 
ire swelled, and he remembers thinking: “Afghanistan was Pakistan’s neighbour, our friend, 
and a fellow Muslim nation besides, and the sight of what I took to be the beginning of its 
invasion by your countrymen caused me to tremble with fury” (100).
Considering that he makes no claim to be religious himself, it is interesting that 
Changez points out that Afghanistan, like Pakistan, is a Muslim nation. If, as I have argued, it 
is not specifically the umma with whom Changez identifies, then why does he feel it is 
necessary to mention that Afghanistan shares the same state religion as Pakistan? The answer 
lies not in the fact that both countries have a common connection to Islam, but rather that those 
in the Muslim world represent a particularly precarious demographic following America’s 
response to 9/11. As I posited earlier, the “fundamentals’” to which Changez adheres following 
his permanent return to Lahore are based in empathy and a desire to protect the weak from the 
strong (98, emphasis added). The fact that Pakistan and Afghanistan share the same religion is 
therefore not what prompts Changez’s anger at the latter’s invasion. Rather, it is his encounter
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-  albeit mediated through the frame of his television -  with the precarity o f Afghan life that 
instils in him a sense of solidarity.
His growing concern for his family and the steady evaporation of his American dream 
drive Changez to visit Lahore. The city itself has become a key front for the War on Terror and 
is situated near the Jammu and Kashmir border -  on which India’s growing and hostile military 
forces are stationed (Hamid, Reluctant 127).16 His confrontation with the daily risk and 
uncertainty of life in Pakistan marks another significant rupture in his belief in the 
“fundamentals” of corporate America, as he witnesses the vulnerable position in which the 
country’s population finds itself (98, emphasis original).
1.8 Lahore: The Reverberations of America’s War
Changez recalls the “Americanness” of his own gaze upon returning to Lahore (Hamid, 
Reluctant 124). The “lowliness” of his family’s conditions remind him of where he comes 
from, and he feels both frustrated and humbled (Hamid, Reluctant 124). Upon spending more 
time with his family, he admits that it was not the run-down house which had changed in his 
absence, but rather himself. The lifestyle he leads in New York has affected him so profoundly 
that he concedes he was “looking about [. . .] with the eyes of a foreigner, and not just any 
foreigner, but that particular type of entitled and unsympathetic American” (124).
During his time as an Underwood Samson employee, Changez’s frames o f perception 
are informed purely by profit. His return home, however, signals a change in the manner in 
which he reads the world. He tells his interlocutor that, as he reacquainted himself with Lahore, 
he began to realise just how “myopic” are the “blinders” imposed around his perceptions by 
his ingression into the United States (Hamid, Reluctant 97, 93). This growing awareness about 
the limitations of his own interpretative frames prompts him to “exorcise the unwelcome 
sensibility by which [he] had become possessed” (124). Changez’s sense of being “possessed” 
reminds the reader about the assimilative process through which he has had to go in order to 
prosper in the United States. If he is to be true to himself, he reasons, he must adopt a “different
16 Often overlooked by the world’s media, the Kashmir region has been the site of devastating violence ever since 
the British Empire’s partition of India and Pakistan in 1947. Karen Armstrong observes that “[t]he brutal process 
of partition caused the displacement of over seven million people and the death of a million others who were 
attempting to flee from one state to another to join their co-religionists in the other” (Fields 279). Simply put, the 
majority of Kashmir’s residents were Muslim, but the maharaja of the region was Hindu. Britain therefore 
allocated the land to the new Indian state (279). The ‘line of control’ drawn out by the British Empire is still the 
site of bloody disputes between the two nations.
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way of observing’ upon his return to America (124, emphasis original). Witnessing the aura of 
uncertainty permeating the lives of his family acts as a stark reminder to Changez of the 
conditions from which he hails, and his misgivings about his purpose in America are only 
fortified during his short stay in Pakistan.
Throughout his time in Lahore, Changez encounters the double standards of American 
foreign policy and, as India begins massing troops along the Kashmir border, it becomes clear 
to him that his adopted nation will not assist in defusing the animosity between Pakistan and 
its “much larger neighbour to the East” (Hamid, Reluctant 128). He recounts that over dinner 
one night his family agreed: “India would do all it could to harm us, and that despite the 
assistance we had given America in Afghanistan, America would not fight by our side” (127). 
The protagonist asks the American to imagine what it might be like “residing within 
commuting distance of a million or so hostile troops,” but then suggests sarcastically that, for 
the American, it will be difficult to empathise as he comes from a country which has “not 
fought a war on its own soil in living memory” (127). Both America’s action and inaction 
infuriate Changez and, as the threat of an invasion by India becomes an increasing possibility, 
he admits to feeling overcome by “weakness” and “vulnerability” (128). Wracked with guilt 
before flying back to the United States, he feels like a “traitor” and a “coward” for leaving his 
family at a time when they need him most (128). He questions his own motives for returning 
to America, and asks himself “what sort of man abandons his people in such circumstances” 
(128).
Upon his arrival back in New York, Changez’s guilt slowly begins to ebb and, in a 
manner similar to way in which the American media soliloquises about the humanitarian deeds 
its military is performing in Afghanistan, he persuades himself that his work at Underwood 
Samson is an “endeavour that [will] be of ever-greater importance to humanity” (Hamid, 
Reluctant 97). But Changez’s belief in capitalism’s philanthropic properties is misguided. As 
Blum notes: “The more you care about others, the more you’re at a disadvantage competing in 
the capitalist system” (America's 257). Changez’s complicity in America’s ability to wage its 
War on Terror is not yet fully apparent to him. This realisation occurs only once he is in Chile 
-  in his capacity as an Underwood Samson employee -  and it materialises thanks to a man by 
the name of Juan-Batista, whose influence on the protagonist’s divided loyalties will be 
discussed in the following section.
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1.9 “How I Left America”: Changez the (Ex) Janissary
While visiting his family, Changez decides to grow a beard. Despite his mother’s protestations, 
he refuses to shave prior to his return to New York. As he tells the American, he decides to 
keep it as “a form of protest,” and as a “symbol o f [his] identity” (Hamid, Reluctant 130). For 
Changez, the beard acts as a reminder of “the reality [he] had just left behind” in Lahore, and 
it denotes his growing disillusionment with Underwood Samson and corporate America (130).
Given the “cosmopolitan” nature of New York, Changez does not expect what he 
regards as the “physical insignificance” of his beard to cause him problems (Hamid, Reluctant 
130). The protagonist, however, has underestimated the American public’s capacity for lashing 
out at a signifier of its ostensible enemy. When travelling on the subway he is “subjected to 
verbal abuse by complete strangers” and, even at Underwood Samson, he becomes the “subject 
of whispers and stares” (130). Changez’s presentation of himself therefore ruptures the reading 
of him as a ‘good’ Muslim and, because o f his ethnicity and nationality, his beard imposes a 
politically charged frame of recognition around his external appearance. His adoption of a 
visible symbol of the ‘bad’ Muslim unnerves some of New York’s inhabitants and, in the face 
of such prejudice, Changez begins to court their rejection actively: “I would find myself 
walking the streets, flaunting my beard as provocation, craving conflict with anyone foolhardy 
enough to antagonise me” (167). Despite his non-religious beliefs, the reactions he receives in 
public lead him to assert him Muslim exterior as a defining feature -  a clear contrast to the 
manner in which his “Pakistaniness” was “cloaked” before 9/11 (71). The “affronts” provided 
by the American media prompt Changez to invert his previous playing of the ‘good’ Muslim, 
and he desires to evoke fear in the citizens of New York by sharing an external cultural signifier 
with those who were responsible for 9/11 (130).
In spite of knowingly portraying himself as a ‘bad’ Muslim, Changez is still one of 
Underwood Samson’s most valued employees, and is offered the opportunity of evaluating a 
book publisher in Valparaiso, Chile.17 This journey is his final one as an employee of 
Underwood Samson, and a few well-chosen words from the chief o f the publishing company, 
Juan-Bautista, act as the final nail in the coffin for his waning belief in the “fundamentals” of 
American finance (98, emphasis original).
17 Valparaiso, Changez tells the American, “had been in decline for over a century; once a great port fought over 
by rivals because of its status as the last stop for vessels making their way from the Pacific to the Atlantic, it had 
been bypassed and rendered peripheral by the Panama Canal” (144). By using Valparaiso as the site in which 
Changez undergoes his final refutation of Underwood Samson, Hamid offers the reader an example of a previously 
successful region which has been damaged by the effects of globalisation.
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While flying from New York to Santiago, Changez admits that his “thoughts were caught up 
in the affairs of continents other than the one’s below [him]” (Hamid, Reluctant 140). He is 
“moved” by the beauty of Valparaiso, but the picturesque town does little to remedy his 
troubled state (146). As both the war in Afghanistan and the India/Pakistan standoff intensify, 
his devotion to his work begins to fade. His non-committal attitude prompts his manager to 
request he “pull it together” (144), but the “fundamentals’” of corporate success are becoming 
more insidious for Changez, and he continues to neglect his duties as he is “clearly on the 
threshold o f great change” (98, 150). The “final catalyst” which concretises Changez’s 
ideological alienation from Underwood Samson takes the form of an informal meeting with 
Juan-Bautista, who was, the protagonist believes, “gifted with remarkable powers of empathy 
and had observed [him] in a dilemma” (146).
Over a lunch o f wine and sea bass, Juan-Bautista asks Changez if it troubles him to 
“make [his] living by disrupting the lives of others” (Hamid, Reluctant 151). The protagonist 
defends his company’s position and practices, arguing that they do not make the ultimate 
decision in the hiring or firing of employees. Juan-Bautista nods in contemplation and asks him 
if he has “ever heard of the janissaries,” to which Changez shakes his head (151). The 
publishing chief enlightens him: “They were Christian boys [. . .] captured by the Ottomans 
and trained to be soldiers in a Muslim army, at that time the greatest army in the world. They 
were ferocious and utterly loyal: they had fought to erase their own civilisations, so they had 
nothing else to turn to” (151). After a pause, Juan-Batista looks the protagonist in the eye and 
pointedly asks him “how old” he was when he went to America (151). On learning that he only 
arrived in the United States at the age of eighteen, Juan-Bautista responds: “Ah, much older [. 
. .] the janissaries were always taken in childhood. It would have been far more difficult to 
devote themselves to their adopted empire, you see, if they had memories that they could not 
forget” (151).
Juan-Batista’s words plunge Changez into a “deep bout of introspection,” and he spends 
the night “considering what [he] ha[s] become” (Hamid, Reluctant 152). His contemplations 
lead him to a disturbing realisation: “I was a modern-day janissary, a servant of the American 
empire at a time when it was invading a country with a kinship to mine and was perhaps even 
colluding to ensure that my own country faced the threat of war” (152). Because “finance [is] 
a primary means by which the American empire exercise[s] its power,” Changez is implicated 
in spreading precarity throughout Afghanistan and Pakistan, and he remembers thinking: 
“Thankyou, Juan-Batista [. . .], fo r helping me to push back the veil behind which all this ha[s] 
been concealed’ (156, 157, emphasis original). His conversation with Juan-Batista assists in
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cracking the narrow frame of his perspective, and he admits: “I was dazzled and rendered 
immobile by the sudden broadening arc of my vision” (145, emphasis added).
From this point onwards, Changez no longer perceives the world through the 
constrictive lens of capital, and can scarcely believe that he had “thrown [his] lot in with the 
men of Underwood Samson, with the officers of the empire” (Hamid, Reluctant 97, 152). The 
fracturing o f the frames that governed his dedication to corporate success prompts him to 
recognise the vulnerability o f life for those who are at the mercy of companies like Underwood 
Samson, and he realises that he is actually “predisposed to feel compassion for those, like Juan- 
Batista, whose lives the empire thought nothing of overturning for its own gain” (152). As he 
comprehends the damage that his line of work has wrought on individuals such as Juan-Batista 
-  as well as many faceless and nameless others -  he resolves to leave Underwood Samson and 
the United States behind him.
The news of Changez’s impending departure is hardly welcomed by his co-workers, 
and Jim, his boss, urges him to reconsider his decision. Changez’s mind, however, is made up, 
and he believes that remaining in the United States would make him an “indentured servant 
whose right to remain was dependent upon the continued benevolence of [his] employer” 
(Hamid, Reluctant 157). In leaving the firm, the protagonist challenges the “benevolence” of 
Underwood Samson, and he uses the skills that the company taught him to observe the United 
States with what he calls “an ex-janissary’s gaze” (157). Put simply, the “focus on the 
fundamentals” instilled in him by Underwood Samson becomes his formula for scrutinising 
the character of the United States, and he uses these analytical frames to “consider the whole 
of [American] society” after his departure (98, 157, emphases original). His observations on 
the childish egoism of the nation he might have called home lead him to a devastating 
conclusion -  one that he has no qualms about sharing with the American stranger:
As a society, you were unwilling to reflect upon the shared pain that united you with 
those who attacked you. You retreated into myths of your own difference, assumptions 
of your own superiority. And you acted out these beliefs on the stage of the world, so 
that the entire planet was rocked by the repercussions of your tantrums, not least my 
family, now facing war thousands of miles away. (168, emphasis added)
It is not that Changez does not understand the damage inflicted on America’s sense of 
nationhood by 9/11, nor it is simply the fact that the War on Terror jeopardises his family. 
Rather, he is angered by the nation’s inability to acknowledge that the attacks were simply 
another -  albeit iconic and symbolic -  example of violence which is routinely enacted around 
the globe. Keith Spence describes the American response to 9/11 as “direct and paradoxical: a
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recognition of shared vulnerability accompanied by the pledge to eradicate it without 
remainder” (288). Hamid’s protagonist has seen the damage of which the United States is 
capable, and he acknowledges that he has been a proponent of this damage through his 
contribution to America’s financial power. It therefore comes as no surprise that he attempts to 
shed both the financial frames through which his Underwood Samson self perceives the world 
and the American sense of identity which characterises his experiences in the country. As 
Changez returns to Pakistan on a permanent basis, he acknowledges that his “inhabitation” of 
America did “not entirely cease,” and confesses that he remains “emotionally entwined with 
Erica” (Hamid, Reluctant 172). Nevertheless, he maintains that he has made the “right 
decision” in coming home (172).
Despite the diffusion of animosities between India and Pakistan by the time Changez 
has settled in Lahore, the War on Terror is only just beginning, and the United States has 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq firmly in its crosshairs. Once the invasion of Iraq is underway, the 
protagonist resolves to do all he can to prevent the United States from inflicting further damage 
on both the umma and on all populations for whom precarity is normalised. What he witnesses 
from coverage of the war in the Levantine state appals him, and he once again berates 
America’s approach to warfare:
A common strand appeared to unite these conflicts, and that was the advancement of a 
small coterie’s concept of American interests in the guise of the fight against terrorism, 
which was defined to refer only to the organised and politically motivated killing of 
civilians by killers not wearing the uniforms of soldiers. I recognised that if this was to 
be the single most important priority of our species, then the lives of those of us who 
lived in lands in which such killers also lived had no meaning except as collateral 
damage. (178, emphasis original)
The military campaign in Iraq spurs Changez’s resistance against the same nation that brought 
him the televised “mismatch” of a war in Afghanistan (Hamid, Reluctant 99). His reference to 
the perceived disposability of Muslim lives also echoes his own past attitude toward the “soon- 
to-be redundant” third-world workers, whose personal lives and losses he had earlier seen as 
nothing more than “distractions” (99). Evidently, Changez has changed, whereas Hamid makes 
it seem implausible that the same could ever be said of the American military. The coverage of 
the Iraq War makes Changez realise that “no country inflicts death so readily upon the 
inhabitants of other countries, frightens so many people so far away, as America,” and he tells 
his interlocutor that “America had to be stopped in the interests not only o f the rest of humanity, 
but also your own” (182, 168).
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Crucially, Changez is concerned about the fate of those living in the Muslim world as well as 
the impact that the violence of the War on Terror might have on the American public. Despite 
his open criticism of the conduct of the United States, Changez implores his interlocutor to 
believe that he is “not at war with America” (Hamid, Reluctant 73). He is, after all, “the product 
of an American university” who lived and worked in the country for nearly five years (73). In 
fact, he admits that, despite his “not insubstantial financial constraints,” he still orders and reads 
the Princeton Alumni Weekly “cover to cover” (174). His newly adopted ‘fundamentals” 
require him to care about the fate of humanity as a whole and, in a growing atmosphere of 
global violence, Changez must surely consider the United States as part of humanity (98, 
emphasis original).
By labelling himself as an “ex-janissary,” Changez seems to be implying that his 
intimate experiences of the actions o f the United States, both domestically and abroad, make 
him better equipped to undermine their efforts to gain influence in his home country Hamid, 
Reluctant 157). In the same way that the “United States created, trained, and sustained an 
infrastructure of terror” during the Afghan War (Mamdani 234), Underwood Samson has, in a 
sense, trained and armed Changez in the “fundamentals’” of the American system, and he uses 
his knowledge and experience to put the power he once served in question (Hamid, Reluctant 
98, emphasis original). Unlike those of Osama bin Laden and the mujahedeen, however, the 
“fundamentals” to which Changez adheres on his return to Pakistan are avowedly pacifist (98, 
emphasis original). He becomes a thinker and a teacher. He does use his personal experience 
as a tool to teach his students about the problems caused by the United States but remains a 
firm believer in non-violence,” asserting that “the spilling of blood is abhorrent” to him 
(Hamid, Reluctant 181).
Conceding that there are a small number of his students who have adopted violence as 
an act of protest, Changez nevertheless defends his group of “well-wishers,” who are, for the 
most part, “bright, idealistic scholars possessed of both civility and ambition” (Hamid, 
Reluctant 181, emphasis original). The attempted assassination of an American aid worker, 
however, leads to the disappearance o f one of the protagonist’s students, and he assumes that 
the boy must have been “whisked away to a secret detention facility, no doubt, in some lawless 
limbo” (182). It is against this uneasy backdrop that the anonymous American arrives in 
Pakistan in narrative A, lending credence to the protagonist’s concerns that he feels an 
“intermittent sense that [he is] being observed” (183). Whether or not the American’s presence 
in Lahore is as a result o f Changez’s antagonistic stance towards the United States is never 
clarified but, as the protagonist escorts the stranger to his hotel, the latter reaches into his jacket
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to retrieve an object that “glint[s] of metal” (184). Changez tells the American that he hopes 
the object in question is the “the holder of [his] business cards,” but one should also consider 
that it could be firearm (184). The novel ends, then, as it began, on a note of potential violence 
that is neither manifested nor diffused, unlike the very real War on Terror which continues to 
this day.
1.10 Reluctant Fundamentalism as an Ethical Position
At its heart, The Reluctant Fundamentalist is a novel premised on coming to terms with one’s 
allegiances in a confusing and destabilising world. The aftermath of 9/11 ruptures Changez’s 
sense o f self, and Hamid shows the reader that circumstances -  no matter how concrete they 
may appear -  are always subject to change. Changez’s attempts at singularity in his points of 
identification inevitably fail, and he has to concede that he is not just a Pakistani, a Muslim, or 
a conduit for American financial dominance, but all of these things at different times in his life. 
The fact that he experiences a significant shift in what he considers to be his “fundamentals’’ 
emphasises the notion that anyone, no matter where they find themselves in the global order, 
can be forced to reconsider the frames through which they perceive the world (Hamid, 
Reluctant 98, emphasis original).
As well as the realisation that he has been complicit in America’s ability to wage war, 
it is also the protagonist’s awareness of the uncertainty that character ises life for those who 
occupy spaces of unimaginable precarity that drives him back to Pakistan. He seems to be a 
‘bad’ Muslim from the American’s perspective but, at the same time, he cares more, and is 
more self-reflexive and aware than during his time as a “janissary” for the United States 
(Hamid, Reluctant 151). Changez is only perceived as a ‘bad’ Muslim because of his rejection 
of, and anger at, the United States, yet the non-religious “fundamentals’” to which he admits 
being “predisposed” are based in empathy, and force him to acknowledge that the powerful act 
with impunity upon the powerless (98, 152, emphasis original). In this sense, his humanitarian 
reasons for leaving America destabilise George W. Bush’s binary o f the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
Muslim. As an individual, Changez is neither a ‘good’ nor a ‘bad’ Muslim; neither a ‘friend’ 
nor an ‘enemy.’ He refutes these labels, whilst simultaneously serving as a reminder that 
essences and absolutes are worthless -  even dangerous -  in a world in which points of 
identification are in a constant state of flux.
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Chapter 2: “The Age of Interruption”: Cracking the Frames of Nation, 
Race, and Precarity in the Work of Ishtiyaq Shukri
I ’ve always felt that one eye was focussing on the subject in fro nt of me while the other 
considers home. So I constantly have a sort of blurring of contexts whereby I imagine 
superimposing the international context I ’m in onto the national context I ’m from.
(I See You 66)
It takes the onset of the War on Terror for Changez, the protagonist of The Reluctant 
Fundamentalist, to realise how precarity is differentially distributed by the United States and 
its allies, and he returns to Pakistan in an act of defiance against those who have the power to 
decide whether or not a life is “grievable” (Butler, Frames 14). For the protagonists of Ishtiyaq 
Shukri’s novels, The Silent Minaret (2005) and I  See You (2014), however, the recognition of 
precarity is a fundamental aspect of what it means to be human. As I will demonstrate, the 
South African author’s inclusive narrative scope positions his characters in vulnerable and 
violent locations -  both factual and fictional -  in order to demonstrate the global reach of the 
War on Terror. Through the use of interruptive and unconventional novelistic techniques, he 
constantly shifts the spatial and temporal dimensions o f his narratives, and the overall effect of 
this “blurring of contexts” results in encounters with precarity across numerous historical 
situations (I See You 66).
In The Silent Minaret, the reader is required to conduct an investigation into the 
disappearance of Issa Shamsuddin, a South African PhD student who mysteriously vanishes 
from London shortly after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The only information the reader gathers 
about Issa is through his past interactions with other characters -  in London and apartheid 
South Africa -  as well as excerpts of his thesis, which concerns the historical settlement of the 
Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) at the Cape of Good Hope in the seventeenth 
century.1 The motives behind Issa’s disappearance are never made apparent in the novel, and 
Shukri leaves the reader to reach his/her own conclusion about the fate of his enigmatic 
protagonist. Perhaps he has been forcibly ‘disappeared’ by the British authorities, or maybe his 
vanishing is an act of his own volition. Regardless o f the verdict one reaches, the unstated
I Issa is voiced in italics to emphasise his absence. When quoting him directly, I will not make use of the “emphasis 
added/original” convention.
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causes of Issa’s departure stand as a stark contrast to conditions under whic h Tariq, the South 
African photojournalist, who is the protagonist of I  See You, goes missing.
As I  See You progresses, the reader learns that Tariq is being forcibly detained in an 
unnamed “Somewhere.” His predicament is a result of his attempts to expose the unsavoury 
connections that South Africa’s ruling political party, the African National Congress (ANC), 
has fostered with a large private security company called ZARCorps.2 Tariq’s investigation 
into this corrupt relationship uncovers the “deep state” -  a term I will qualify shortly -  
controlling South Africa’s government, and he is punished harshly for his transgressions 
(Shukri, I  See You vii). Before his capture, he travels the world in an attempt to photograph 
individuals and populations “made vulnerable by conflict and war” (52). As well as journeying 
to Afghanistan, Darfur, and Libya, Tariq spends a large portion of his time working in both the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories and the fictional African nation of Kasalia -  the site of a 
catastrophic civil war.3
Judith Butler’s concept of the frame is well suited to my discussion of both The Silent 
Minaret and I  See You, for Shukri’s protagonists each question the totalising operation of the 
frame itself. According to Butler, the ability to “call the frame into question” allows one to 
“show that the frame never quite contained the scene it was meant to limn” (Frames 9). In 
Issa’s case, he reorients the frame o f recorded history through the content of his PhD thesis, so 
that the reader might take into account lives, events, and perspectives that have “gone missing” 
in the European master narrative (Shukri, Silent 164). Although Tariq has a unique talent for 
photographing the “essence o f a thing,” his work does not surrender itself to the ontological 
function of the frame (I See You 181). Rather, his photography is an effort to “overcome the 
uninformed mind,” and show the “essence” that he photographs to be vulnerability itself (135).
1 argue that, in questioning the frames that govern both historical and photographical 
conventions, Shukri’s protagonists force their readers and viewers to recognise and be 
cognisant of the precarity that characterises the lives of subjects and populations who have 
been, and continue to be, perceived as “ungrievable” (Butler, Frames 24).
Before I begin my analysis of The Silent Minaret and I  See You, I will demonstrate 
how Butler’s notion of the frame complements my examination of Shukri’s work. I will then 
define the concept of the deep state, and explain how this “invisible cabal o f deep power”
2 It is worth postulating that Shukri has named the company ZARCorps so that it might sound similar to Armscor: 
a South African parastatal and weapons manufacturer.
3 The author notes: “So many African countries, including South Africa, manifest the issues of Kasalia, it seemed 
to me prejudicial to name one -  hence the fictional name of Kasalia, which is an amalgam of many African 
contexts” (“Ten Questions”).
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acts across space and time -  dramatically reducing personal and political freedoms (Shukri, I  
See You 27).
2.1 Shukri’s “Trans-Global” Frame and the Global Deep State
Rather than relying on a single narrator, as is the case in Hamid’s novel, Shukri’s narratives 
make use of diverse metatextual strategies. Aside from various character interactions, The 
Silent Minaret and I  See You also contain excerpts from television shows, radio broadcasts, 
newspaper articles, emails, speeches, novels, interviews, and a doctoral thesis. By the author’s 
own admission, his use of these narrative devices is a means of depicting what he terms the 
“age of interruption,” in which one’s attention and loyalties are subject to continuous 
competition (“Ten Questions”). Shukri reasons that, because “our lives are constantly 
crisscrossed by different narrative styles,” novels with a single plot, a linear narrative and an 
all-knowing narrator” are inadequate reflections o f the “chaotic and disordered” natur e of the 
world (“Ten Questions”).
Chaos and disorder are core features of Shukri’s writing in both form and content and, 
for this reason, his narrative techniques work to problematise the ontological frame of the 
traditional novel itself. It is therefore unsurprising that The Silent Minaret and I  See You refuse 
to be drawn into a simple ‘uninterrupted’ setting. Shukri situates his narratives in a variety of 
spaces, both past and present, and he draws on historical events and individual perspectives to 
tell his stories. For example, in “A Road Map into Our Past,” a chapter in The Silent Minaret 
(91-104), the reader encounters excerpts from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Report, as well as memories that other characters have of Issa. Throughout this chapter -  
indeed, throughout the novel as a whole -  Shukri alternates between these contrasting modes 
of narrative expression to blur the boundaries between fact and fiction, and between history 
and the literary text. The reader is refused the opportunity to differentiate between the two 
worlds, and is thrust into a narrative in which South Africa’s legacy of violence, characters’ 
perceptions of the War on Terror, and the disappearance of Issa are bound intimately together.
Due to the amalgamation of history and fiction that Shukri employs, his work might 
potentially be read as an example of what Linda Hutcheon calls “historiographic metafiction” 
(4). This genre “works to situate itself within historical discourse without surrendering its 
autonomy as fiction” (Hutcheon 4). While the lens of “historiographic metafiction” is a useful 
means of engaging with Shukri’s interweaving of history and fiction, the author’s refusal to fit
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his narratives into a single time and space means that it might be too prescriptive to draw his 
work into any single literary category. As Shukri himself asserts, his novels “collapse and blur 
the boundaries between past and present, so that everything happens at once,” and the reader 
is offered only fragmented depictions of people and places. (“Ten Questions”). Thus, I will 
argue, his novels may be read in terms of their relationship with But ler’s notion o f the frame. 
Shukri’s fiction consciously exploits the frame’s capacity for “perpetual breakage,” and 
presents an overlapping of distinct historical and geopolitical situations in which oppression 
and violence are commonplace (Butler, Frames 10).
Just like Tariq, from whom the epigraph of this chapter is borrowed, Shukri’s 
positioning as a South African writer is fluid. Despite the author’s nationality, the geopolitical 
perspective of his fiction is at once local and global. His work evades restriction by a national 
perspective, and he writes both as a South African and as a citizen of the world. In this sense, 
the author’s work, according to Jane Poyner, displays a crucial tenet of postcolonial literature, 
in that it “embed[s] anxieties that profoundly tie the local to the global” (313). However, I 
would argue that the global outlook of Shukri’s narratives makes the genres of ‘post­
colonialism,’ ‘post-apartheid’ and ‘post-9/11’ inadequate descriptions of his fiction, as the 
author takes issue with these particular literary categories and notes that they appear to 
“organise the world around a single event and imply some kind of resolution, achievement or 
progress” (“Ten Questions”). For Shukri, the need for literary criticism to define and allocate 
specific genres seems “deceptive in [its] camouflaging of more complex realities” (“Ten 
Questions”).
According to Ronit Frenkel, Shukri’s narratives are saturated with a “transnational 
South African-produced consciousness” -  a way of seeing that considers South Africa’s 
historical and contemporary positioning in the global community (“Reconsidering 15”). To 
extend Frenkel’s observation into the language of Shukri’s work itself, I posit that his fiction 
communicates from a perspective that embodies the “trans-global.” The term itself comes from 
The Silent Minaret, and is used by Kagiso -  Issa’s adopted brother -  to describe the 
unconstrained degree of mobility afforded to an aeroplane at Heathrow International Airport 
(29). Kagiso explains the movement of the aeroplane as a “forwardbackward thrusting,” 
signifying the aircraft’s capability to penetrate the borders of any nation on the globe (29).
Unlike the genres of ‘post-apartheid’ and ‘post-9/11,’ the “trans-global” is more a mode 
of interacting with the world that it is a literary taxonomy. It is concerned not only with the 
literal crossing of geographical borders but with understanding seemingly disparate historical 
situations as interrelated and influenced by one another. The “trans-global” requires the reader
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to adopt a sense of geopolitical and historical proprioception, and persuades one to recognise 
the connections between the individual and broader society. Unlike the structuring signifiers 
of nation, race, and religion -  which have often been used to justify violence against those who 
fall outside of their narrow parameters -  my reading of the “trans-global” is that it attempts to 
eliminate any frame whatsoever. Although it is -  as a mode of observing -  inseparable from 
frame itself, the “trans-global” is broad and inclusive, and is a way of reading humanity in its 
materiality. Like the aeroplane that Kagiso describes, it is an enabler of mobility -  a form of 
historical, geographical, and literary nomadism. It requires the reader to move imaginatively 
through Shukri’s texts, comparing in some detail one context to another, and thus observing 
patterns and similarities in conditions of precarity across the history of the globe. The “trans­
global” is linked to a rejection of the “fabrication” of national identity, as well as the national 
history around which it is centred (Shukri, Silent 64), and ushers in a new and alternative means 
of recognising our shared humanity: statelessness.
In a stateless world, one has “no flag to wave, no anthem to echo, no eternal enemy 
against which to perpetually defend, no God-chosen nation for which to die in gory glory” 
(Shukri, Silent 222). Without the frame of nation to govern one’s allegiances, one is able, like 
Tariq and Issa, to recognise that the local and global are intimately bound up with one another, 
and that precarity stretches beyond the borders of one’s own country and out into the ongoing 
history of the world. Shukri’s appeal to statelessness complements the “blurring o f contexts” 
that characterises his fiction and, by drawing together supposedly unrelated situations, he 
makes the reader aware of the endurance of oppressive political power -  regardless of its 
location (I See You 66).
Predominant examples of political discord that the author touches upon are the War on 
Terror; the ongoing struggle between Palestinians and the Israeli state; the historical 
establishment of a penal colony at the Cape of Good Hope; and the states of emergency during 
the 1980s in South Africa. In drawing together these different cases of dispossession and 
subjugation, Shukri depicts them not as isolated historical epochs but as ideologically 
refashioned manifestations o f political authority and historical prejudice. Only once these 
situations are read in conjunction with one another might one understand how the “politically 
induced condition” of precarity has been, and continues to be, unevenly distributed by the 
historically powerful (Butler, Frames 25).
Although The Silent Minaret and I  See You are attentive in their narratives to the 
authority o f the nation-state, Shukri’s second novel uses the model of contemporary South 
Africa to question the degree of power that elected governments have over the running of their
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respective countries. In Shukri’s estimation, what controls many ostensible democracies is not 
a visible and accountable government but a shadow state -  a “deep state” (I See You vii).4 This 
‘ state, ’ according to T ariq’s wife, Dr Leila Mashal, is the “deep force behind the ‘ elected’ force, 
the deep power behind the elected power” (32). In a deep state, corporate governance is the 
status quo and, rather than serving and being accountable to the electorate, the government is 
manipulated by “private agents [who] are accountable only to shareholders” (30). A deep state 
does not concern itself with the welfare of a nation’s citizens, and it uses “indiscriminate 
power” to concentrate on the “protection o f its own [private] interests” (27). Although the 
“private force” that influences governmental bodies is something Shukri explores in relation to 
South Africa, he also characterises the deep state as an historical and transnational force (30). 
In doing so, he stresses that the ANC is “no nobler than governments the world over who have 
been left paralysed by the power of profit and held ransom by the profit of privatisation” (32). 
The deep state at work in South Africa is therefore not the South African deep state but the 
deep state as it has manifested itself in South Africa. This distinction is crucial, because it 
allows the reader to recognise that this form of indiscriminate power is a global phenomenon 
that, as Shukri seems to indicate, has existed at least since at least the VOC’s regime at the 
Cape of Good Hope.
Both corporate conglomeration and reliance on force characterise the sinister inner 
workings of the global deep state, and Leila claims that the number of “privatised military and 
security expertise” in South Africa actually “exceed that of the state by five to one” ( Shukri, I  
See You 29). It is significant that Shukri uses the example o f a Private Military/Security 
Contractor (PMC) to emphasise the power and reach of the deep state as, throughout the War 
on Terror, the United States has often relied on PMCs to carry out operations which could also 
have been achieved by their military.5 Much like the fictional ZARCorps, these corporations 
profit from violence, and are not restrained by governmental policies or the forms of 
transparency that these policies legally require.
4 The “deep state” is not Shukri’s term, and is the name given by many journalists and academics to the 
powerful private interests that have infiltrated democratically elected governments the world over. In the 
prologue to I See You, Shukri quotes Sina Odugbemi, a senior communications official at the World Bank, to 
define the concept of the deep state (vii). See Peter Dale Scott, The American Deep State (2014), and Mike 
Lofgren, The Deep State (2016), for a contextualisation of how the deep state enacts itself in the United States, 
and how the American model has provided the blueprint for a type of global deep state.
5 A fitting example of one of these PMCs is the notorious Blackwater -  now Academi. This American-owned 
institution assisted the United States in the War on Terror, mostly in Iraq. For more information on Blackwater, 
see Peter Singer’s book, Corporate Warriors (2003), and Jeremy Scahill’s book, Blackwater: The Rise o f  the 
World’s Most Powerful Mercenary Army (2007).
57
For Shukri, as it was for Ruth First, “‘Power lies in the hands of those who control the means 
of violence’” (qtd. in I  See You 32). So, while state-sanctioned violence is a prominent theme 
in both of Shukri’s novels, the author also draws attention to the sinister forces that act through, 
above, and beyond governmental channels. Because it hides behind the guise of the nation­
state, the deep state is, in effect, able to remove itself from the public frame -  making itself all 
but invisible to those excluded from its inner workings -  whilst simultaneously imposing itself 
through recognisable governmental outlets. Those who threaten to expose or disrupt the 
ominous alliance between private enterprise and civic society, as Tariq does, are framed as 
enemies to state interests, and are therefore at risk of being ‘disappeared.’
The forced removal o f individuals who oppose the deep state’s power, Shukri wants the 
reader to acknowledge, is nothing new. In The Silent Minaret, Issa makes it clear that the 
practice of extrajudicial incarceration is well established, and has been honed throughout 
history due to its use by various powerful institutions. For example, he sees the VOC’s punitive 
use of the Cape of Good Hope as an historical illustration of deep state activity. In his thesis, 
Issa claims that, in the latter part of the seventeenth-century, the VOC’s
Company directors decided to import slave labour -  already illegal in the Netherlands 
-  to the Cape; in a global corporation that was, in effect, ‘a state outside the state,’ the 
attainment of economic profit and the power to pursue it, unchecked, superseded any 
obligation to an already acknowledged and adopted ethical policy.
(69, emphasis added)
An insatiable drive for the “attainment of economic profit” means that anything standing in the 
way of the deep state is either overlooked or is purposefully silenced. The VOC’s power to 
ignore the illegality o f the slave trade, as well as its ability to ‘disappear’ supposedly 
threatening individuals -  such as Indonesian and Malaysian civilians opposed to the VOC’s 
practices in their respective homelands -  exemplifies the punitive and indiscriminate manner 
in which the deep state conducts itself. It is also crucial to note that the operation of a “state 
outside the state” is something that has not altered significantly since the VOC’s rule at the 
Cape (Shukri, Silent 69). As I shall demonstrate, the infamous American military base at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, is a location that Issa sees as being almost identical to the VOC’s 
seventeenth-century penal colony. Frenkel remarks that Shukri uses the colonial history of the 
Cape “as a microcosm for the continued history of violence and domination that shapes our 
world” and, in the process, he links “colonial history, apartheid, and the present-day ‘war on 
terror’” together (“Reconsidering” 14). To draw further parallels between the Cape colony and
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Guantanamo Bay, it is also important to consider that both house predominantly Muslim 
prisoners. Moreover, both locations exist as colonies of sorts, therefore enabling them to 
operate outside the jurisdiction of the state.
Not only does Issa’s thesis reveal the ideological influence that the unaccountable 
actions of the VOC have had on the contemporary state of global power relations, but he also 
argues that European historiography -  supported by conquest and colonialism -  is itself a 
means of removing some lives and populations from the frame of history. As a result, Issa’s 
research aims to uncover knowledge about those who have been erased from recorded history 
so that his reader might come to understand that there are lives and voices deemed too 
insignificant to be included in the European master narrative.
2.2 Issa’s Challenge to the Metanarrative
In his thesis, Issa attempts to combat the supposedly concrete status of what Kerwin Lee Klein 
calls the historical “metanarrative” (282). Klein describes this narrative as “[institutionalised, 
canonical, and legitimising,” and he notes that it is in “a position o f intellectual mastery” (282). 
The power of the metanarrative, he observes, stems from the fact that “it pretends to represent 
an external object and then pretends not to be a narrative” (282, emphasis original). To counter 
the dominant and totalising frame of the metanarrative, Klein also argues that there is another 
form of historical narrative: “local narrative,” which is “told by the subaltern” and therefore 
“cannot easily be inserted into a master narrative” (282). In the same way that Butler suggests 
that the frame of the media interprets in advance whether or not a life may be considered 
“grievable,” the frame of the historical metanarrative governs perceptions about the legitimacy 
of smaller histories (Frames 14). If one controls the recording of the metanarrative, then one is 
able to decide who -  or what -  may be included in its formation. Much like a novel, then, an 
historical narrative both includes and excludes for the sake of its agenda. In its occlusion of 
‘lesser’ histories from its interpretative frame, the metanarrative allocates ontological labels to 
certain individuals or populations. History therefore represents a means of defining who, or 
what, is a ‘friend’ or an ‘enemy.’ It acts as a dividing line between ‘us’ and ‘our’ history, and 
‘them’ and ‘theirs.’ For the protagonist of The Silent Minaret, this divide is deeply problematic.
From an early age, Issa wants to revise the scope of the metanarrative, and his 
nickname, “dreamer, schemer, history’s cleaner,” is well-earned (Shukri, Silent 26). His high 
school classmates give him the name after he argues that the role of the so-called Black Watch
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proved to be the catalyst for a British victory during the Siege of Mafikeng, in May 1900 (26). 
The narrator, however, states, “[h]istory was not intended to capture this part of the story,” and 
that “Baden-Powell went to great lengths to omit it from his report and from his diaries” (24). 
Issa’s twelfth-grade teacher, Mr Thompson, dismisses the protagonist’s challenge to the 
recorded narrative as “mere speculation by a new-age bunch of leftists at Wits” (26). The 
teacher frustrates Issa even more by declaring that “History cannot be re-written [. . .] History 
is, and at St Stephens, we accept only the thorough, rigorous and sanctioned historical version 
outlined in the syllabus” (26, emphasis original). Issa’s disagreements with the authority of St 
Stephens’s colonised curriculum do not pay off and, in his final examinations, he receives five 
A ’s and one solitary B -  for History, of course.6
Mr Thompson’s denigration of Issa’s historical transgression is not surprising. In fact, 
Neelika Jayawardane points out that when an effort is made to bring to light forgotten histories 
and cultures, one is usually met with “boredom and indifference at best, or militant, state - 
sponsored aggression at worst” (“Disappearing Bodies” 55). Rather than making him 
despondent, Issa’s examination results stimulate his sense of duty to record, and argue for, the 
lives that are permitted no space in the narrow confines of the dominant historical 
metanarrative.
One local narrative that Issa uncovers in his PhD research is the VOC’s 1694 rendition 
of Sheik Yusuf (Tjoesoepp) -  the “father of Islam in South Africa” -  from his native Makassar, 
Indonesia, to the Cape (Shukri, Silent 71).7 Yusuf, argues Issa, “represented a symbol of 
resistance to European colonialism” and was the “most influential” exile to the Cape (71, 72). 
He became a symbol for “Islamic resistance to colonialism and apartheid” and, Issa believes, 
assisted in framing Islam as “synonymous with the struggle against oppression” (72). Frenkel 
observes that the “‘alternative’ history of Islam” that Shukri employs in relation to South Africa 
is a form of “strategic historic revisionism” (“Local Transnationalisms” 124, 128). She 
continues: “Faced with the overwhelming demonization of Islam in the West, The Silent 
Minaret can be considered an attempt to associate Islam with the more positive as aspects of 
its history” (128). I agree with Frenkel’s claims, and posit that Shukri’s interventionist 
historiographic approach is precisely the venture of both he and his protagonist: to redraw -  or 
reframe -  smaller histories deemed to have no significance in a contemporary metanarrative.
6 Historians no longer dispute the role of the Black Watch in the Siege of Mafikeng. See, for example, Peter 
Warwick’s chapter, “Mafikeng and Beyond,” in Black People and the South African War 1899-1902 (1983), 28­
46.
7 For an exemplary reading of how the figure of Sheikh Yusuf encapsulates the VOC’s exploitation of the Indian 
Ocean, see Tina Steiner’s article, “The Indian Ocean Travels of Sheikh Yusuf and Imam Ali Ali” (2012).
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Bringing to light “whatever shards o f [. . .] bastard truth” that the metanarrative has attempted 
to erase is at the forefront of The Silent M inaret s thematic concerns, and the novel itself is 
interspersed with numerous examples of marginalised cultures that have fallen victim to the 
“literal whitewashing of history” (Shukri 64, 65). The author prompts the reader to raise a 
metaphorical glass in a “toast to all the folks that live in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, El 
Salvador [. . .] to all the folks living on the Pine Ridge reservation under the stone cold gaze of 
Mount Rushmore” (222-23). Both Shukri and his protagonist write histories of the forgotten, 
and seek to carve out a place in history for those whose stories have been subsumed by the 
master narrative.
If one acknowledges that both fiction and historical discourse are forms of narrative, 
then it might be worth considering that Issa’s disappearance from The Silent M inarets frame 
implies the ease with which smaller histories can go missing from the metanarrative. Issa, 
however, is not utterly erased from history, and the reader is permitted to interact with the 
“shards” that he leaves behind (Shukri, Silent 64). In the same way that the protagonist attempts 
to uncover the smaller histories of the Black Watch and Sheikh Yusuf, the reader is encouraged 
to follow the traces of Issa that Shukri has intentionally included in The Silent Minaret. The 
protagonist is therefore both inside and outside the novel’s narrative frame, and his missing 
voice claws at the borders that separate the local narrative of what the reader knows of his life 
from the metanarrative of the novel itself.
Not only does Issa question the limitations of historiography, but he also attempts to 
demonstrate how past acts of subjugation inform and influence present day forms o f violence. 
“History [. . .] includes the present,” Issa wants his reader to understand, and he emphasises 
that the capacity of the powerful to learn from historical techniques of domination is what 
allows them to remain in control of both individuals and the metanarrative itself (Shukri, Silent 
63).8 As the protagonist claims in the opening sentences of his thesis:
The history of early European exploration and settlement at the Cape of Good Hope 
remains universally and eternally pertinent. The procedures of dispossession and 
domination implemented [t]here in the fifteenth century would be repeated around the 
globe for the rest of the millennium, and then again at the start of this new millennium. 
To declare these events over is the recourse of perpetrators, collaborators, benefactors, 
and perpetuators. (63)
8 “History therefore includes the present” is a quotation taken from an essay by Erich Auerbach, titled, 
“Philology and Weltliteratur” (1969). The full quotation reads as follows: “History is the science of reality that 
affects us most immediately, stirs us most deeply and compels us most forcibly to a consciousness of ourselves. 
It is the only science in which human beings step before us in their totality. Under the rubric of history one is to 
understand not only the past, but the progression of events in general; history therefore includes the present” (4­
5). This quotation is the epigraph to Issa’s PhD thesis.
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Just as Shukri’s fiction eludes containment by a single geopolitical context, Issa ruptures the 
epochal frame that governs recorded history. The protagonist’s emphasis on the bearing that 
historical forms of colonial violence have on the present links the VOC’s exploitative actions 
to present day imbalances of political power, such as the War on Terror and the Israeli 
occupation o f Palestine. Where some might see individual, decontextualised situations -  
uninfluenced by material realities entrenched by history -  Issa sees the residue that 
unaccountable and indiscriminate forms of power instil in the present. I therefore claim that 
history, for Issa, represents what Achille Mbembe calls a process of intricate “entanglement’ 
(Postcolony 16, emphasis original). Rather than perceiving historical acts of subjugation in 
isolation, the reader is encouraged to understand that they represent an “interlocking of 
presents, pasts and futures, [with] each age bearing, altering, and maintaining the previous one” 
(Mbembe, Postcolony 16, emphasis original). By problematising the divide between past and 
present, Issa, like Tariq in I  See You, offers the reader a “blurring of contexts” (Shukri, I  See 
You 66). This “blurring” seeks to acknowledge the ways in which South Africa’s history of 
oppression is mirrored on a global scale in the twenty-first century.
Issa’s thesis scrutinises both the “fallacy o f race” and the “synthetic fabrication of [an] 
inviolate national identity” (Shukri, Silent 64). These two concepts, the protagonist stresses, 
were instrumental in the configuration of South Africa’s historically racist policies as well as 
in the formation of many oppressive contemporary ideologies. Echoing Mbembe’s concept of 
“interlocking’ situations, David Theo Goldberg asserts that it is the ability o f the racially- 
oppressive state to be “reproduced, extended, and sustained,” which allows it to “exist over 
time” (253). When read in conjunction with Shukri’s “blurring of contexts” ( Shukri, I  See You 
66), Goldberg’s claims highlight the eternal pertinence of South Africa’s racially-established 
apartheid state, and suggest why and how current power structures continue to subjugate, even 
erase, individuals and histories deemed to be threats to a racially and/or nationally-configured 
metanarrative. Throughout The Silent Minaret, Shukri and his protagonist demonstrate that, in 
order to comprehend present-day forms of political violence, one should turn to seemingly 
lesser -  yet undeniably vital -  historical narratives.
Just like Shukri himself, Issa’s frames of perception are both local and global. The protagonist 
is able to reach out across the void that the metanarrative has formed so that he might redraw 
the boundaries that separate ‘our’ history from ‘theirs.’ Accordingly, it is understanding the 
similarities between people, cultures, and histories which is crucial for Issa’s conception of the
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world, and his writing obliges one to realise that recorded history need not function in a divisive 
or absolutist manner.
2.3 “Trans-Cultural Exchange”: Frances, Katinka, and Karim
If one understands that the operation of the frame determines how certain populations and 
individuals have been perceived (or not perceived) throughout history, then, as The Silent 
Minaret progresses, it becomes clear that Issa’s refocusing of the frame is also a means of 
bringing to light connections across the gulf o f history. Elements of his thesis, for example, 
examine the fifty years leading up to the first Dutch settlement at the Cape of Good Hope, as 
well as the VOC’s reliance on the indigenous population in order to realise its colonial 
ambitions. Issa declares that he is interested in the
Hybrid dynamic, the complex trans-cultural exchange and fusion that, though fragile 
and uneven, nevertheless formed an integral feature of the early settlement and ensured 
its development; the heterogeneous bartering, which, by the time of the disaster of 1948, 
had been almost entirely obliterated from memory.
(64, emphasis added)
In the same way that Changez longs for the American public to acknowledge the “shared pain” 
which unites them with their 9/11 attackers (Hamid 168), Issa aims to convince the West of a 
past that it shares with those who have been historically subjugated by its various empires. 
Through Issa’s interactions with other characters, the reader is presented with a protagonist 
who has stories to tell, lessons to teach, and frames to disturb. Unlike Changez, who yearns for 
singularity in his origins and points of identification, Issa “never resorts to identity politics” 
(Jayawardane, “Forget Maps” 13). In fact, all of the central characters in The Silent Minaret 
exemplify the connections across allegedly distinct cultures, classes, and religions, lending 
credence to Pallavi Rastogi’s claim that the novel “demonstrates the impossibility of 
constructing absolutist identities” (21). For example, Issa’s adopted brother, Kagiso, and his 
mother Gloria are black, but are offered sanctuary from the apartheid state by Issa’s mother, 
Vasinthe. Katinka, a “left-handed nooi” from Ventersdorp and a friend to Issa and Kagiso, 
relocates to the Occupied Palestinian Territories to be with her lover, Karim (Shukri, Silent 
107).
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Exposing the “trans-cultural” similarities between seemingly diverse populations is not limited 
to Issa’s work on his thesis, and the protagonist’s understanding of history influences the lives 
of other characters (Shukri, Silent 64). The most notable o f these characters is Frances, Issa’s 
upstairs neighbour in London. As an Irish-Catholic living in the metropolitan heart of a former 
global empire, Frances is herself an embodiment of cultural hybridity. Issa -  whose name is 
the Arabic word for “Jesus” -  teaches her a great deal about the biases of recorded history, and 
she uses her newly found knowledge to interrogate the assumed cultural uniqueness of Britain 
and her Christian faith.
In the first chapter of The Silent Minaret, there is a conversation between Frances and 
her priest, Father Jerome, a Frenchman. Since Issa’s vanishing, these regular conversations 
have become opportunities for Frances to scrutinise the way in which Christianity has 
endeavoured to distance itself from Islam in both history and practice, especially in the years 
after 9/11. Upon handing him a quotation from the Qur’an, which praises the historically 
Christian figure of Mary, Frances asks Father Jerome whether he knew that Mary was 
considered to be a prominent figure in Islam, and whether he finds it at all “peculiar [. . .] how 
one religion remembers things another doesn’t” (Shukri, Silent 16). Father Jerome does not 
respond and, rather than engaging with her, his mind wanders to his next appointment: “Mrs 
Anderson on Stroud Green Road” (17). This is precisely the “boredom” or “resistance” with 
which revisionist accounts of history are usually met, according to Jayawardane 
(“Disappearing” 55). The priest’s indifference does not deter Frances, and she tells him, 
“Christ’s grandfather on earth [. . .] was called Imran” (17). While this revelation makes 
geographical sense -  as Jesus of Nazareth was born in what was, and still is, historic Palestine 
-  the clearly Arab name does not produce a response from Father Jerome, and he ignores these 
seemingly contentious bits of information in the same way that Mr Thompson, Issa’s 
schoolteacher, refutes the historical validity of the Black Watch.
In overlooking Frances’s claims, Father Jerome, a Christian, demonstrates an 
unshakeable belief in his particular version of history, as well as his unwillingness to engage 
in any counternarrative that might draw Christianity and Islam together. He therefore rejects 
the “trans-cultural” dimensions of his own religion and, by doing so, shows the reader that the 
frame enclosing his understanding of history is too narrow, too rigid, to be altered by Frances’s 
discoveries (Shukri, Silent 64). His conception of Christianity, it seems, has been
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“whitewashed” (65). To him, the religion appears as an exclusively European in vention -  free 
of Arabic connotations (65).9
Father Jerome’s denial of the scriptural and geographical similarities between Islam 
and Christianity only makes the title of The Silent Minaret more appropriate. The minaret in 
question is attached to the Finsbury Park Mosque in London, across the road from Frances’s 
apartment, and it stands “silent, like [a] blacked out lighthouse’ (Shukri, Silent 76). The mosque 
itself has been “boarded up [. . .]. Shut down, like a shipyard, because o f the threat it poses” 
(79). If one acknowledges that the abandoned mosque and its muted minaret represents what 
Dubrota Pucherova calls, the “speaking position of Muslims in post-9/11 Britain,” then I would 
argue that Father Jerome and his stoic silence figures as the listening position of British 
Nationalists and Europeans towards Muslims, either at home or abroad (941). The fact that he 
is a Catholic immigrant from France and, therefore, an embodiment of Britain’s own hybrid 
cultural make-up, does not influence the frame through which he perceives the precarious 
position of Muslims in Britain. Unlike the Irish Frances, Father Jerome is unable -  or simply 
reluctant -  to recognise the similarities between the historical persecution that his own religion 
suffered and the vulnerability o f Muslims living in twenty-first century Britain. Put simply, he 
does not remember what it was like to be “at the bottom of the pile” and, for this reason, has 
no qualms with the literal silencing of Muslim places of worship -  the removal of them from 
the frame of cultural and religious significance (Shukri, Silent 222).
Frances’s desire to eliminate the binary o f Islam and Christianity sets her apart from 
the figure of Father Jerome. As Paul Ricoeur, in The Reality o f the Historical Past (1984), 
notes: “when curiosity takes over from sympathy, the foreigner becomes foreign” (20). By 
familiarising herself with the ostensible foreignness of Islam, and questioning the frame 
through which the religion is perceived in Europe, Frances opts for “sympathy.” Jerome, 
however, adopts an ideology that fosters not even “curiosity,” but ignorance. Thanks to Issa, 
Frances has come to realise that the substance of the two faiths is more alike than either religion 
would like to admit. That is to say, their Abrahamic roots, dedicated monotheisms, 
geographical histories, and reliance on scripture, are aligned uncannily.
9 Father Jerome’s inability to accept that Christianity is itself a religion of Mesopotamia, Arabia, and Assyria -  
founded by a Judean -  is emblematic of European attempts to render Christianity unique to Europe. One need 
only look to the long history of anti-Semitism in Christian Europe to understand that Father Jerome’s perspective 
is informed by an inability to acknowledge the connections between his religion, Islam, and Judaism. For more 
on the erasure of Jewish proponents in the Christian faith, see William Nicholls’s, Christian Anti-Semitism (1993), 
Edward Flannery’s The Anguish o f  the Jews (2004), and Karen Armstrong’s Fields o f  Blood (2014).
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During one of his visits to Frances’s flat, Issa gives her a traditional Islamic tasbeeh (prayer 
beads), which a friend of his has brought back from a “pilgrimage” ( Shukri, Silent 13). Issa 
would “never use them,” but Frances treasures this gift, and keeps it in her 
“satinpouchcottonpocket” alongside her Catholic rosary (13, 15). When the time comes for her 
to pray, however, she notices that “the two strings of prayer beads always get tangled in [her] 
pouch [. . .] so that she has to peel the beads apart” (15). She admits that “her gnarled fingers 
struggle and, when the light is bad, she has to start with the cross to help her identify which of 
the almost identical beads belong to which string” (15, emphasis added). She imagines that the 
two objects create a “troseberry,” a linguistic blending of the two words “tasbeeh” and 
“rosary,” to create a kind of hybrid entity o f devotion to both Christianity and Islam -  a tribute 
to the religions’ similarities (15).
One cannot help but think that this subtle interweaving of Islamic and Christian 
iconography is part of what Issa desires for Frances. He has opened her eyes to the undeniable 
connections that the two religions share and, by acknowledging the “foldedness” of the two 
faiths, she begins to question the singularity that the European metanarrative has ascribed to 
Christianity (Frenkel, “Reconsidering” 14). Significantly, Frances requires “the cross” to begin 
her unpeeling of the beads from one another (Shukri, Silent 15). She has quite literally started 
with the cross as a beacon of spiritual fulfilment in her life but as she slowly blends the two 
religions into one another -  both symbolically and literally -  she moves further away from her 
initial point of recognition. Issa’s influence on Frances has allowed her to reorient the frame 
through which she perceives the world, therefore prompting her to rethink the historically 
erected binaries between ‘them’ and us.’ He has awakened her conscience to the vulnerable 
political position in which Islam finds itself after 9/11, and she develops a keener understanding 
of the religion’s inexorable links to her own comprehension of Christianity.
Frances’s growing awareness of the parallels between Islam and Christianity coincides 
with the onset of the War on Terror. As the 2003 invasion of Iraq gets underway, she begins to 
lose hope that the two religions might ever see eye to eye. She is quick to chastise Britain’s 
readiness for war, and complains to Issa that the public “don’t know what war is really like [. . 
.]. They think it’s all fireworks on TV” (Shukri, Silent 147). As someone who survived through 
the Second World War, Frances is well qualified to criticise “how quickly” Britons have 
forgotten the damage to both individuals and infrastructure wrought by previous wars (147). 
This is not to say that she actively chooses a ‘side’ in the conflict so often portrayed as being 
between East and West, but that she comes to recognise the precarity of the Iraqis and Afghans 
who are suffering the consequences of 9/11.
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Another character who seeks to rework the binaries created by the metanarrative is Katinka du 
Plessis. She first meets Issa and Kagiso when the brothers are travelling down to Cape Town 
to celebrate the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990. Katinka had been hitchhiking down to the 
Cape until someone she describes as a “racist doos” kicked her out of his car (Shukri, Silent 
106). Issa and Kagiso see Katinka standing on the roadside after this acrimonious exchange, 
and they offer her a lift. Once in the car, she explains that by journeying to the Cape for such 
an auspicious occasion, she has abandoned her familial ties. She states that her father’s reaction 
to her departure was aggressive, racist, and final: “You are not my daughter any more. What 
do you think the people will say? How do you expect me to face them with a daughter who 
runs after a communist terrorist kaffir” (113). Katinka’s decision to reject her Afrikaans 
family’s entrenched belief in the apartheid system is similar to the way in which Frances 
abandons the comforts of her Christian faith to reach out across the void that the master 
narrative has fashioned. Unlike Issa’s neighbour, however, Katinka does not require the 
protagonist -  to quite the same extent -  to reconfigure her framing of the world.
Like Issa, Katinka moves to London. While she is there, she meets Karim, a Palestinian 
from the West Bank who is seeking asylum in Britain. His appeal for asylum is rejected, and 
he returns home to his family in Qalqilia, where the West Bank Wall has “separate[ed] their 
house from their decimated olive-grove, their last remaining trickle of income” (Shukri, Silent 
185). Rather than mourn the loss of her lover “behind The Wall,” Katinka resolves to join 
Karim in Qalqilia (188). Her remarkable denunciation of her historically and racially allotted 
position in the world is another example of Shukri’s ability to create what Frenkel calls 
“transnational solidarities” (“Reconsidering” 14). Moreover, one has to consider that Katinka’s 
identification with the Palestinian cause is not reducible simply to her relationship with Karim. 
In fact, long before she journeys to the West Bank, she thinks of “Afrikaners and Arabs as 
brethren,” as they are “the two tribes it is still acceptable to denigrate and berate” (Shukri, Silent 
194). Katinka’s capacity to recognise the “trans-global” dimensions of precarity is therefore 
informed by her own experiences in apartheid South Africa, her interactions with Issa, and her 
love for Karim (29). She is a character who embraces the concept of statelessness, and she 
chooses to occupy a place of precarity with her lover.
Before joining Karim in Palestine, Katinka submerges herself in the world she will soon 
call home by learning Arabic. As her familiarity with the language grows, the narrator notes 
her delight: “a veil is being lifted and slowly, a whole world -  its symbols, its rules, its logic -  
is beginning to reveal itself to her, right here, in London. Where once she was blind, she can 
now do so much more than see. She can read” (Shukri, Silent 176). As an Afrikaner living in
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London, her perceptual frames are already bifurcated and, by learning Arabic, she adds yet 
another layer to the manner in which she reads the world. She can think and speak in a language 
that brings her closer to Karim and his Palestinian family, and her growing awareness of a 
world previously hidden prompts her to question the legitimacy of national, racial, religious, 
and cultural signifier.
Katinka’s increasing understanding of Arabic coincides with her learning more about 
the history of the Arab world itself. Her knowledge on the subject is apparent when, at a dinner 
party in London, a fellow guest declares that “the sum total of Arab contribution to modern 
culture [. . . is] zero” (Shukri, Silent 175). Katinka takes exception to this uninformed statement 
and tells her interlocutor that the survival of both Plato and Aristotle’s work was the result of 
Arab scholars’ translations being “kept safe in the libraries of Baghdad” -  a stark contrast to 
Europeans who “deemed it best to burn the thoughts of their Greek forebears” (175, emphasis 
original). In one deft move, Katinka undoes both the ignorance of her colleague and the 
assumed scarcity of cultural similarities between the West and the Arab world. Like Issa and 
Frances, she disposes o f the superficial labels o f ‘us’ and ‘them,’ and her claims emphasise 
human beings’ entangled historical relationship with one another -  regardless of nation, race, 
or religion.
Through the experiences of Frances and Katinka, Shukri alerts the reader to the 
similarities, exemplified in both religion and knowledge, between Islam and Christianity -  even 
between Britain, South Africa, and the Arab World. These small moments of intercultural 
connection become beacons of hope in The Silent Minaret but, as the invasion of Iraq takes 
centre-stage, the reader is reminded that, irrespective of how ardently one tries to bring to light 
histories that challenge or question the metanarrative, these narratives are all too often occluded 
from its frame.
As well as advocating for connections across disparate cultures and religions, The Silent 
Minaret -  as previously mentioned -  also fuses together different historical and geopolitical 
realities. Before I offer an interpretation of Issa’s perspective of the Iraq War -  and the power 
of those in control of the war’s metanarrative -  I feel it necessary to analyse a short chapter of 
The Silent Minaret in which Shukri’s “blurring of contexts” is most apparent (I See You 66).
Midway through The Silent Minaret, in a chapter titled “Finsbury Park Mosque” (170­
74), Shukri delicately interweaves two distinct moments from Issa’s life. The chapter opens 
with Frances recalling to Kagiso how she and Issa had seen several police helicopters circling 
the mosque of the soon-to-be-silent minaret (in Finsbury Park), in the early hours o f the January 
20, 2003. As Francis and Issa watch, the latter recalls a similar scenario from his days as a
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student at the University of the Western Cape, when South African riot police attempted to 
stymie student protests on “the first day o f Ramadan” (171). The helicopters and the heavy 
police presence surrounding the mosque in London remind him of when “Hollywood Vietnam 
descend[ed] into view from over the Union building [of the university]” and how, instead of 
cowering under its imposing presence, he and a comrade ran into the university’s buildings 
(171). Issa and his friend find safety in the building, but the same is not true for the men hiding 
in the mosque. Frances recalls that, during the raid on the mosque, “the police had shut down 
the whole area, more than a hundred, hundred and fifty of them [. . .]. And for what? A toy gun 
and a couple of gas canisters” (174). In her opinion, the actions of the British police made 
“more enemies” than they had caught, and she claims that the arrested “foreigners” posed little 
to no threat to the police (174).
For Frenkel, this particular chapter works to connect “different types of political 
repression,” in that it “forms links between apartheid South Africa’s attempted suppression of 
dissent and the precarious position of Muslims in the West post- 9/11” (“Reconsidering” 13). 
Frenkel’s pertinent point about Shukri’s emphasis on the similarities between forms of state 
violence echoes my assertion about the “trans-global” frame of the author’s work, and also 
resonates with Tina Steiner’s claim that The Silent Minaret “asks the reader to consider the 
politics of contemporary Britain as a continuation of the politics of the past” (Silent 29; 
“Pockets” 62). By writing these two states of emergency alongside one another, Shukri 
encourages the reader to rethink the geographical and temporal gulf between acts of 
government-sanctioned aggression. The author frames contemporary modes of containment 
and control as ideologically analogous with historical forms of subjugation, and he does so by 
connecting distinct situations in which supposedly “ungrievable” lives are subjected to 
oppressive and violent treatment (Butler, Frames 24).
Control and containment are also two notions that exemplify the function of the 
metanarrative. As I mentioned previously, in order for it to be read as the objective and 
totalising historical account of the past, the metanarrative necessarily occludes or destroys 
smaller histories. Nowhere is this destruction more evident than during the bombing of 
Baghdad, as viewed by Issa and Katinka in Cafe Baghdad, London.
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Operation Iraqi Freedom is depicted delicately in The Silent Minaret and, as is the case in The 
Reluctant Fundamentalist, the footage of the war is relayed to the reader from the protagonist’s 
point of view as he observes these events on television. In Shukri’s novel, the war is projected 
onto an “enormous screen [. . .] the size o f a fucking Piccadilly Circus billboard” in Baghdad 
Cafe: a location popular with West London’s Muslim population ( Shukri, Silent 192-93). The 
screen, as is the case in Hamid’s text, operates as the frame through which the actions of the 
Coalition of the Willing are viewed. It is therefore vital to remember Butler’s assertion that the 
“critical instrumentalisation” of the camera during wartime becomes a means of documenting 
those populations caught in its gaze as “ungrievable” (Frames 10, 24). Moreover, if we recall 
Butler’s claim that George W. Bush’s regime attempted to “regulate the visual field,” then it is 
clear that the frame employed by those filming the invasion of Baghdad informs the viewer 
that what is depicted on the screen denotes a target, while it neglects simultaneously to stipulate 
who those individuals really are (Frames 64).
In the same way as Changez recounts the “mismatch” between the Afghani tribesmen 
and the United States military (Hamid, Reluctant 99), Shukri’s depiction o f the bombing of 
Baghdad emphasises just how asymmetrical the initial phases of the -  predominantly aerial -  
invasion were.10 The vulnerability of those Iraqis considered to be collateral damage is also 
recognised by Frances and Katinka and, while the older woman acknowledges that “war is no 
longer reciprocal,” Katinka is the one who actually views the preliminary stages of the invasion 
with Issa (Shukri, Silent 147).
Katinka describes the night of March 20, 2003, to Kagiso. She remembers that Issa 
convinced her to join him at the cafe by sending her a text: “Kids r dying here. Get u gat ova 
here asap” (Shukri, Silent 192). Unbeknownst to her, it is the last time she will see the 
protagonist before his disappearance, and she duly makes her way to the cafe. She recalls:
Issa wasn’t in our usual seat, so I had to search among the dazed observers to find him. 
It was a strange feeling. The whole room was caught up in the screen -  the shock and 
awe of the bombs, the explosions reverberating around the world, all the way here, into 
this room. It felt as though I was walking through a war, looking for my friend amongst 
the dazed and stunned. (192)
2.4 Watching the War: The Destruction and Detention of the ‘Enemy’
10 Full footage of the “shock and awe” campaign is available on YouTube.com, courtesy of CNN.
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The devastation inflicted on the Iraqi capital reaches out through the frame of the screen and 
holds its stunned audience in rapture. This willingness to watch is in stark contrast to Changez’s 
response to Operation Enduring Freedom, which is characterised by his avoidance of television 
and other forms of media. Rather than shy away from the violent images, Issa and his cafe 
contemporaries are in a sense living the war itself. They are so “caught up in the screen” that 
the footage actively affects them, as if they were on the ground in the besieged city (Shukri, 
Silent 192). Shukri’s emphasis on the immediacy of the Iraq invasion is an apt example of a 
“blurring of contexts,” as he collapses the spatial and temporal boundaries that separate the 
individuals in the cafe from those in Baghdad. In the process, he turns Cafe Baghdad, even 
West London itself, into a warzone. The author’s depiction of the invasion is more potent than 
the one that Hamid offers, as the war’s audience quite simply cannot look away. They surrender 
themselves to the frame of the screen and, as the aerial annihilation continues long into the 
night, the libraries that Katinka pointedly references at the dinner party become some of the 
first infrastructural casualties in the ancient city (175-76).
Although the libraries and museums in Baghdad were not targeted deliberately, their 
partial destruction fractured the interwoven history of which both the United States and the 
Arab world are a part.11 Ignorant of the fact that many items housed in those buildings 
contributed to the rise of the West, the allied-Coalition widened the gap between them and their 
‘enemies,’ therefore making it easier to see the damage to Iraqi -  yet also global -  cultural 
knowledge as a form of collateral damage. Jayawardane goes so far as to posit that the 
destruction of shared cultural heritage “allow[s] one to fashion one’s enemy into all that is not 
the ‘self,’ into the repository of barbarity: something one can justify destroying” 
(“Disappearing” 51).12 The destruction of Iraqi infrastructure allowed the Coalition to alienate 
themselves from their Iraqi counterparts, and thus the bombing formed a corollary to the 
rhetoric employed by the American mass media during the build-up to Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.
11 See Patrick Martin’s article, “The Sacking of Iraq’s Museums,” World Socialist Website (2003). Martin notes 
that, despite the fact that the Coalition knew the locations of the museums and libraries, bombs, missiles, and 
rockets still damaged some of these ancient buildings. To add insult to injury, many of the sites that were partially 
destroyed by the Coalition were looted and burned down by Iraqi arsonists and insurgents during the American 
occupation. See Nasser Al-Shawi’s conference paper, “Burning Libraries in Baghdad” (2008) for details on the 
specific sites that were targeted during the initial phases of the occupation.
12 This is something the Islamic State has attempted to do since its rise to prominence in June 2014. Its obliteration 
of various Shiite shrines, Christian churches, and Jewish iconography suggests the group’s hatred for anything 
that represents the Other. In the Syrian city of Palmyra, for example, the Islamic State has destroyed or severely 
damaged all six UNESCO Heritage Sites in the region. For more information on the damage wrought to cultural 
heritage by the Islamic State, See George Richards’s article, “The Future of Ancient Sites in the Middle East,” Al 
Jazeera (2015).
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Before the invasion of Iraq, George W. Bush and his administration made it clear that they 
believed Saddam Hussein to be leading a regime “that ha[d] something to hide from the 
civilized world” (“State”). In his now infamous “State of the Union Address” (2002) -  in which 
Bush described Iran, North Korea and Iraq as an “axis of evil” -  the American president 
accused the Iraqi leader both of sponsoring al-Qaeda and of harbouring weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD). When Bush declared that he would “not permit the world’s most 
dangerous regimes to threaten us [presumably the United States and its allies] with the world’s 
most destructive weapons,” he deliberately ignored the fact that America is a nation in 
possession of one of the largest quantities of deadly weapons on the planet (“State”).13 
Furthermore, in the minds of many Iraqis, it may well have been the United States, and its 
superior military arsenal, which represented the greatest threat to the existence of their state, 
indeed, to civilisation itself.
As the bombs rain down on Baghdad, Issa and Katinka “see the view from underneath,” 
witnessing what it must be like to be under “the descending heel o f George and Tony’s fe e t” 
(Shukri, Silent 193). After growing weary of the “shock and awe” footage (Woodward 102), 
Katinka decides to leave the cafe. She offers Issa a lift but he declines, preferring to absorb the 
war a while longer. As she departs, Katinka looks at him and is concerned that, caught between 
his thesis and the footage of the war, Issa “found it impossible to drag himself from the present 
and into the past” (Shukri, Silent 67). His soon-to-be-abandoned thesis is a painful reminder to 
the protagonist of the enduring power of imperial violence, and he recalls admitting to his 
supervisor that a piece of work that “started o ff as history now reads like current affairs’” (67). 
This disturbing realisation prompts him to leave but, as he stands, he is “detained by new 
footage on the screen -  a horrendously maimed boy” -  a victim of the Coalition’s campaign 
(67).14 The appalling image of the damage inflicted upon precarious Iraqi bodies is followed 
by Issa’s encounter with the most significant reminder of the parallels between the VOC’s 
methods of incarceration and those adopted by the United States during their War on Terror.
As the protagonist remains glued to the frame of the screen, he sees “blurred pictures [.
. .] of heavily shackled men in orange overalls behind high security fences, their arms chained 
behind their backs to their feet” (Shukri, Silent 68). In this moment, “time buckled, history
13 The United States and Russia possess ninety-three percent of the world’s nuclear weapons. See Eleanor 
Ross’s article, “The Nine Countries that Have Nuclear Weapons,” The Independent (2016).
14 The image that Issa sees is possibly the infamous photograph of Ali Ismail Abbas: a twelve-year-old Iraqi 
civilian on whose house two American Hellfire missiles landed. Abbas lost both of his arms and suffered third- 
degree burns over large areas of his body. Although the photographer remains unknown, a photograph of Abbas’s 
injuries is available on The Future o f  Freedom's website.
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flipped and the 17th century became indistinguishable from the 21st” (67). The interlocking of 
the two eras is made more apparent to Issa by the fact that the prisoners’ overalls are the same 
colour as the Dutch Royal Family, the House of Orange (Jayawardane, “Forget Maps” 8). Issa 
continues to watch as “history [rises] up from the open manuscript on his table and [comes] to 
hover between him and the images on the screen” (Shukri, Silent 68). He is reminded of Sheik 
Yusuf and the countless other Muslims who were removed, detained, and erased by the VOC.
The use of the Cape penal colony for Muslim dissenters of the past is, for Issa, 
remarkably similar to the United States’ contemporary use of Guantanamo Bay. The American- 
administered military base has been the subject of much scrutiny yet, at the time of writing, 
remains open.15 Many Guantanamo detainees have never received a trial and are not protected 
by the Geneva Conventions’ guidelines as to how prisoners of war should be treated. ‘Gitmo’ 
(as it is colloquially called) can be understood as a colony o f sorts; and the colony, according 
to Mbembe, “represents the site where sovereignty consists fundamentally in the exercise of 
power outside the la w  (“Necropolitics” 162, emphasis added). With Mbembe’s idea in mind, 
it is clear that from the VOC’s illegal use of the Cape to the American government’s 
questionable utilisation of Guantanamo Bay, the W est’s treatment of ‘threatening’ Muslim 
bodies has not substantially changed in the last 300 years.
As Issa pages through his manuscript, he looks up to the screen to see the “ancient city 
now [lying] decimated, smouldering,” and decides to leave the cafe (Shukri, Silent 71). While 
making his way to the exit, he attempts to make eye contact with the waiter but receives no 
response, for the Iraqi immigrant, “staring at his ruined home town, does not notice the silent 
departure” (71).
In the depiction o f one “violent night,” Shukri alerts the reader to the devastation caused 
by Operation Iraqi Freedom, whilst simultaneously illustrating the almost identical modes of 
detainment used by the VOC and the United States (Shukri, Silent 72). Those prisoners who 
Issa sees on the cafe’s television are framed as guilty until proven innocent. They are perceived 
to be threats to “freedom” -  something that America is “honour bound to defend,” at least 
according to a sign hanging on the fence at Guantanamo Bay (61). The irony of this notice 
should be evident, as it clearly implies freedom for some but not for others. It signifies that 
freedom is specific to those who are more “grievable,” and therefore worthy of more protection, 
than those who are shackled up in the state-outside-a-state (Butler, Frames 14).
15 See Daniel DePetris’s opinion piece, “Why Obama’s Plan to Close Guantanamo is All Talk,” Al Jazeera (2016), 
as well as James Reinl’s article, “Obama Readies for Showdown on Guantanamo Closure,” Al Jazeera (2016).
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Shukri’s depiction o f the bombing of Baghdad, as well as Issa’s viewing o f the first inmates to 
be received at Guantanamo Bay, makes the reader aware of the United States and its allies’ 
double-pronged approach to safeguard themselves. On the one hand, there is the destruction of 
civilisational and cultural history that provides links between the West and the Islamic world; 
and on the other, there are documentary and visual frames -  provided by forms of media -  
which furnish those Guantanamo inmates with the near-ontological status of ‘terrorists.’ 
During the War on Terror, then, the simultaneous destruction and production of documentary 
frames work together to produce a subject who is rendered unequivocally dangerous, and 
worthy of containment or worse.
2.5 Borders, Control, and “Islands of Interrogation”
Two months after 9/11, Issa returns to South Africa to attend his mother’s inaugural lecture for 
her Emeritus Professorship. When he arrives back in London, however, Border Control 
Officers at Heathrow International Airport subject him to an interview. Despite his student 
visa, “or perhaps because o f it,” Issa’s luggage is searched, and he is led into a “small 
windowless room” (Shukri, Silent 160). Having been in the room for over an hour, he begins 
to feel “suspect,” and he writes in his journal, “I  am being observed. I  am being described. I  
am being investigated” (161). When he is eventually interviewed, he loses his patience. He 
takes exception to his interrogators’ continuous documenting o f his every word, and when 
asked what he is doing in Britain, he defends himself vehemently:
I  need you to write this: PhD Yes, Big P, small h, stop. Then big D. Because that’s what 
I  am doing here. Now let me out o f this fucking place before I  start reciting my thesis 
fo r you to write in that fucking little book o f yours. You might fin d  it interesting. Bits o f 
it have to do with islands o f interrogation, a little like this one. (161)
Issa’s phrase, “islands o f interrogation,” is a clear reference to his academic work on the 
VOC’s punitive use of the Cape, but it is important to note that the “island” on which the 
protagonist finds himself is Britain (Shukri, Silent 161). He is not on Robben Island or in 
Guantanamo Bay, but at the border of one of Europe’s most culturally diverse cities. Despite 
the fact that he is permitted to live and study in the United Kingdom, the clearly Muslim name 
emblazoned in his South African passport renders Issa Shamsuddin a potential threat, at least 
in the eyes of those at Heathrow Border Control. The protagonist recognises that his 
interviewers are no more than, “minion[s],” who “have no charge’ over him, and his frustration
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with having to verify his otherwise uneventful story is understandable (161). Issa is not the first 
African Muslim subjected to unjust treatment at the hands of those guarding Britain’s borders, 
and he is certainly not the last. As I will demonstrate shortly, Shukri himself is no stranger to 
the biased forms o f immigration control in practice in the United Kingdom.
The difficulty of life for immigrants is something that Issa recognises throughout his 
time in London. He sees them, “absent and preoccupied’ as they wander the streets (Shukri, 
Silent 121). They are the “invisible” and “unwanted’ members o f Britain’s population, and are 
frequently reminded so (121). While sitting on “Derek Lane’s bench” in the “affluent heart’ of 
London, Issa observes them as they “roam the city” (121). He imagines them thinking: “ffow 
could I  have imagined that here, this, would be better [. . .] did I  leave to live with mocking 
reflections? Waiting on tables with an apron cut from a graduate’s hood; mending shoes [. . .] 
with the skilful hands o f a surgeon” (121). As a doctoral student, Issa is fortunate enough not 
to be in a position defined by as much precarity as one of “Europe’s untouchables,” but his 
experience at Heathrow makes him fully conscious of his outsider status (121).
After his release from the airport, Issa makes his way home to his flat. His contact with 
the security apparatus of Britain’s borders has left him feeling “sick” and wanting to “puke” 
(Shukri, Silent 162). As he begins to stabilise, he turns over the pages o f Salman Rushdie’s The 
Satanic Verses, thinking to himself: “Yes. I t ’s me. I  am Salahuddin” (162). Salahuddin (or 
Saladin) is the name of one of Rushdie’s protagonists who is severely beaten by British police, 
who believe him to be an illegal immigrant. Considering the predicament in which Issa finds 
himself at Heathrow, his identification with the protagonist of Rushdie’s novel is hardly 
surprising. Just like the historical figure of Sheikh Yusuf, the fictional Issa and Salahuddin are 
thought of as potential security risks. Because of the visual frames through which they are 
perceived, all three are forced into the position o f the ‘enemy.’ Their Otherness is a primary 
fact of their “enforced’ circumstances (Mamdani 39, emphasis original).
It is notable that Hamid’s portrayal of Changez’s detentions in both Manila and New 
York are not as detailed as Shukri’s depiction of Issa’s experience at Heathrow. Hamid assumes 
that the specificities of Changez’s detainment can be taken for granted, in that one should be 
familiar with the kinds o f questions asked by the “petty sovereigns” of Border Control (Butler, 
Precarious 56). In contrast to Changez’s incident, Issa’s brief incarceration is highly detailed 
and explicit, and allows the reader to occupy the confined space with the protagonist. When 
compared to the experiences of many other individuals who have been on the receiving end of 
Border Control protocol, Issa gets off lightly, and is eventually permitted to re-enter the United 
Kingdom. Regrettably, the same cannot be said for his author.
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It can be both immensely satisfying and deeply unsettling when life imitates art. On July 15, 
2015, the award-winning author, Ishtiyaq Shukri, was deported from the United Kingdom, his 
home for the last 19 years. His wife is British. His home is in London. He has studied, lectured, 
and worked in the epicentre of this once-great empire for just under half of his life. In his first 
essay following his deportation, “Losing London,” Shukri meticulously details the processes 
that led up to his humiliating exile. He recalls that he was detained for “nine hours and then 
deported, [his] residence stamp of nineteen years cancelled” (“Losing”). Having been outside 
the United Kingdom between 2012 and mid-2015 -  during which time he journeyed to both 
South Africa and Yemen -  the officers at Heathrow Border Control deemed it appropriate to 
erase the life that he had built in London with one deft motion of a stamp. His wife works for 
Oxfam in Yemen, the current site of a civil war between Shiite Houthi militias (backed by 
Iran), the former Sunni government (supported by Saudi Arabia), and al Qaeda operatives 
waging a low-intensity conflict.16 Shukri believes the Yemeni entry and exit stamps on his 
passport played a considerable part in the Border Officials’ decision to deport him.
In his essay, Shukri cites the significance of names in modes of ethnic and racial 
profiling practiced at the airports of Europe and America’s major cities.17 As I explained with 
regards to The Reluctant Fundamentalist, it is both Changez’s Pakistani passport (his alleged 
origins) and the name inscribed on this document that cause those manning international 
borders to second-guess the protagonist’s intentions, especially in a world reeling from the 9/11 
attacks. Similarly, in The Silent Minaret, the man next to Issa during his detention at Heathrow 
assures the protagonist that he and his fellow suspects all have “such names” (Shukri 160). 
Back in the real world, fiction appears to be coming to life, and Shukri concedes that had his 
name been “John Smith,” he would more than likely have been permitted access back into the 
United Kingdom. Instead, his life in London was “cancelled on the spot” (“Losing”).
As argued by Jayawardane, “passports not only record all movements across barriers, 
but also serve as permanent markers of individual origins, indelibly inking and advertising the 
body’s trajectories for public view” (“Disappearing”55). These documents thus become tools 
of control to be exercised by the nation-state to whom one is supposedly beholden. To extend 
Jayawardane’s argument in a direction that takes cognisance of the terms deployed by Butler,
16 For insight on the nature of the proxy war in Yemen, see Hakim Almasmari’s article, “Yemen Conflict Devolves 
into Proxy War,” The Wall Street Journal (2015).
17 Racial profiling is a legitimate protocol of the American Transport Security Administration (TSA), and is 
endorsed by Barack Obama and his administration. See Brian Stone’s article, “Why Racial Profiling at Airports 
Is Surrender to Terrorism,” The Buffington Post (2014), as well as Charles Swift’s article, “Barack Obama’s 
Trumpesque Policies,” A l Jazeera (2016).
76
as well as Derrida, I would suggest that the passport becomes a means of framing an individual 
subject as either belonging or not belonging; an insider or outsider; a ‘friend’ or an ‘enemy.’ 
Once again, the frame operates to create and sustain a specific ontology of the subject. Shukri’s 
experience at Heathrow underlines how control is maintained over outsiders through the 
rigorous documentation of individuals by virtue of their citizenship, ethnicity, or religion. That 
one requires all manner of documents to cross over invisible, manmade borders seems, to the 
author, counterintuitive to the eternal human tradition of “migration” (“Losing”).
One might assume that in the globalised landscape of the twenty-first century, 
movement across international borders would be untrammelled. Unfortunately, restrictions on 
freedom of movement have never been more stringent.18 Mobility -  like freedom itself -  is 
afforded to some but not to others, and it appears that only those who are citizens o f the world’s 
most powerful states reserve the right to infiltrate international borders virtually at will. 
Because of his nationality, as well as the assumed political and cultural position that his Muslim 
name connotes, Ishtiyaq Shukri is understood as a potential threat to be managed and controlled 
-  just like Issa, just like Sheikh Yusuf, and just like those orange-clad figures in the world’s 
most notorious detention centre in Cuba.
The Silent M inarets narrative closes at a location synonymous with restriction and 
control: the Wall in the Palestinian West Bank, where Katinka is preparing for her new life in 
Qalqilia with Karim. It should therefore come as no surpr ise that the “walled in” setting of the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories is where Shukri begins his second novel (Silent 186). The 
material conditions for those who occupy this politically fractured region have only worsened 
since the onset of the War on Terror and, by offering the reader a literary depiction of this 
embattled land, Shukri provides a glimpse into the “trans-global” and trans-historical 
dimensions of precarity (Silent 29).
2.6 “Beginning Are for Fools”: The Ceaseless Cycle of Violence in I  See You
The critical challenge posed by the multifaceted narrative of The Silent Minaret is even more 
apparent in Shukri’s second novel. As I have suggested, Shukri’s fiction is interruptive in its 
format, and the author offers the reader a number of different narrative frames through which
18 For more information regarding the security protocols instituted at airports following 9/11, see Peter Andreas’s 
article, “Redrawing the Line,” International Security (2003).
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to read his novels’ contents. In I  See You, interactions between characters combine with a 
diverse range of texts, such as speeches, interviews, emails, journalistic relays, radio 
programmes, and even an opera. For example, the reader encounters a relay sent from Kasalia 
to Johannesburg by Tariq on page fifty yet, on the next page, is thrust into a radio broadcast by 
ANA, the pan-African radio station.
It is fitting that Shukri has chosen a photojournalist as the protagonist of I  See You, as 
the novel’s staccato-like structure is more akin to a series of snapshots of politically precarious 
situations than a clearly composed linear narrative. Together with Tariq, the reader witnesses 
“Afghanistan colliding with Kasalia, Afghanistan and Kasalia crashing into Palestine, 
Afghanistan and Kasalia and Palestine merging with Darfur” (Shukri, I  See You 147). These 
interlocking tableaus are apt illustrations o f the interruptive effect of Shukri’s work as, 
throughout I  See You, the author refuses to allow the reader enough time to focus on any one 
location. Indeed, it is the level of discomfort and dislocation -  of constantly moving from 
context to context -  felt by both the reader and Shukri’s characters that represents the author’s 
means of communicating humanity’s shared experiences in the twenty-first century; where 
structures of imperialism, cohered in the fifteenth century, continue in guises bolstered by new 
forms of technological communication. In the same way that Tariq experiences a “blurring of 
contexts” when he photographs his subjects, the reader observes, and is made complicit in, the 
trauma of war and conflict as it resonates around the world (Shukri, I  See You 66).
A prominent political concern that the disparate locations in I  See You all share is that 
freedom -  political, economic, and physical -  is compromised. Shukri observes that his latest 
novel is deeply concerned with “apparent freedoms in a world characterised by conflict and 
war” (“Ten Questions”). The very fact that Tariq is ‘disappeared’ because of his investigation 
into South Africa’s deep state emphasises just how easily one’s freedom is subject to the whims 
of political authority. As it is for so many South Africans, the pro tagonist’s sense of freedom 
is an “illusion” which has been “force-fed” to him by the “deeply powerful” (Shukri, I  See You 
24). Because he exercises his democratic rights by demanding accountability from the 
machinations that underpin South Africa’s ostensible democracy, he is framed as a threat to 
the status quo, and is thus punished by the deep state.
As well as using Tariq’s rendition to an undisclosed “Somewhere” to emphasise the 
dearth of freedom that characterises the operation of the deep state in South Africa, Shukri’s 
depictions o f both the fictional Kasalia and the Occupied Palestinian Territories also underline 
the precarity of political freedom on a global scale. In I  See You, the most evident barrier to 
freedom is Israel’s Wall in the Occupied West Bank. This is the same structure that, by the end
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of The Silent Minaret, “surrounds [Karim and Katinka’s] town on three sides” (Shukri 185). 
Before I analyse Shukri’s depictions o f Palestine, however, I will examine Tariq’s focus as an 
investigative journalist, including how he uses his skills to expose the links between the South 
African Private Security Contractor, ZARCorps, and the “horror of the civil war in Kasalia” (I 
See You 41). It is, after all, his uncovering of this nefarious relationship that leads to his 
disappearance.
2.7 Tariq the Framer: Kasalia, ZARCorps, and the Deep State in South Africa
Tariq’s photographic talent lies in “his intimate depictions of people made vulnerable by 
conflict and war” (Shukri, I  See You 52, emphasis added). One should therefore think of Tariq, 
in the Butlerian sense, as a capturer of precarity. He is not the type of “embedded journalist” 
to whom Butler takes exception (Frames 64), nor is he of the ilk of the “government 
propagandist” photographers whom Chomsky criticises in Imperial Ambitions (34). Rather, 
Tariq’s unique approach to photography is informed by a “subtle agreement between [himself] 
and his subject” (Shukri, I  See You 60). This “fine balance,” this “consensual” mode of 
‘capturing’ his subjects is what enables the protagonist to frame the human cost of war (60). 
By humanising his subjects within the frames of his photographs, Tariq forces his viewers to 
acknowledge, in Butler’s terms, those rendered invisible and “ungrievable” within the 
dominant frame (Frames 24). He observes that, if given the choice, his “ideal superpower” 
would be “to transport people into contexts they wouldn’t normally be exposed to, to transfer 
people into the lives and contexts of others” (Shukri, I  See You 66).
This sense o f transportation is something that Shukri achieves in his fiction. Through 
his writing, the reader encounters intimate illustrations of lives and histories deemed too 
insignificant to be included in the frame o f the mainstream media. If  one acknowledges that it 
is “only by challenging the dominant media that certain lives may become visible or knowable 
in their precariousness” (Butler, Frames 51), then it becomes clear, as I  See You progresses, 
that Tariq’s “extraordinary eye for seeing through the surface” is what sets him apart from other 
photographers (Shukri 181). The protagonist inverts his viewers’ frames of recognition to show 
his subjects for who rather than what they are. He not only makes his subjects recognisable as 
innately precarious individuals but, more significantly, shows them to be figures who represent 
the embodied state of precarity. His most famous work is a poignant example o f this type of 
exposure.
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The photograph, taken during the spiralling civil war in Kasalia, is described in the following 
way:
Deceptive -  a girl and a man, silhouetted against a red desert background, hovering 
above a mirage [. . .] the kind of idealised depiction of rural privation so indulgently 
romanticised in banal watercolours and sentimental greeting cards. But in this deception 
lay its command; it seems to be one thing while really it is something else completely, 
its apparently facile surface lowering your guard, drawing you in, before its gruesome 
details devour your neutered assumptions and spit them out: the girl, scantily clad, 
leading the man through a scorched blistering wasteland, the lap of her torn dress 
stained red, rivulets of coagulated blood encrusted down the inside of her legs, the 
man’s swollen lids pierced through with thorns. (41)
This disturbing photograph wins Tariq the prestigious Platinum Lens photography award, and 
a Kasalian expat even claims that the picture “did more to stop [the Kasalian war] than the UN 
did with a hundred toothless resolutions” (Shukri, I  See You 42). Butler notes, “Photography 
has a relation to intervention,” but concedes it is “not the same as intervening” (Frames, 84). 
The relationship between photography and intervention, as Butler envisions it, is not material, 
but ideological. To ‘intervene’ as a war photographer is therefore an act of capturing conditions 
of precarity and making them accessible to a wide and influential audience. As Tariq notes, the 
power of Malcolm Browne’s “iconic photograph of the Buddhist monk Thich Quang Duc, who 
set himself alight in protest against the US-backed government of South Vietnam,” actually 
“forced President Kennedy to change American policy in South Vietnam” ( Shukri, I  See You 
65).
Like Browne’s photograph, Tariq’s delicate framing of precarity is manufactured to 
evoke both an affective and an effective response from its viewers. To this end, one should 
consider Butler’s observation that, in order for a photograph to “communicate effectively,” it 
must have a “transitive function” (Frames 68). That is to say that a successful photograph 
“act[s] on viewers in ways that have a direct bearing on the kinds of judgements those viewers 
will formulate about the world” (68). With this point in mind, one could argue that what makes 
Tariq’s award-winning photograph so successful is not only its capacity to generate a visceral 
response from its viewers but, more importantly, its capacity to articulate and impress upon 
said viewers a specific kind of message about the world. For Tariq, I argue, the message that 
his photograph imparts is the need to recognise precarity. He aims to convince others that the 
human suffering that characterises Kasalia demands of them a response -  an ideological shift 
in the manner in which they interpret the world. The protagonist “usurps all the mind-numbing 
techniques of blinkered portraiture” to present his subjects in their utmost vulnerability and, in
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this sense, he more than captures the catastrophic proportions of the Kasalian War (Shukri, I  
See You 42).
Despite its success, this much-celebrated photograph is by no means Tariq’s only vivid 
depiction of lives made exceedingly precarious by war and conflict, and his ability to create an 
“ambush in a frame” is not limited to his work in Kasalia ( Shukri, I  See You 41). In fact, his 
ambition to destabilise his viewers’ perceptions is evident in both his photography and his 
research and he, like Issa, is concerned with making visible structures of power that prefer to 
remain unseen. As such, the metatextual narrative of I  See You includes many articles written 
by Tariq about his experiences in spaces of precarity. The protagonist is also interviewed by 
ANA radio, on a programme called “Your Most Precious Things” (51-71), and he informs 
listeners about the bloodshed being committed in Kasalia, as well as those who are abetting 
this violence.
Having spent six months in Kasalia, in a village called Degongu, Tariq has experienced 
enough of the war to know that “the base instinct in Kasalia is not Kasalian greed, but human 
greed” (Shukri, I  See You 63). He describes the conflict zone as “cosmopolitan,” in that it has 
attracted “people from all over the world, whether to fight, or fuel, or profit” (63). The vested 
interests various parties have in the war are apparent to Tariq, and he claims “one of the most 
striking features of [the conflict] is the extent of South African involvement in it, especially at 
the covert level, where crisis is being fuelled for profit” (67). Tariq reasons that South Africa’s 
involvement in Kasalia “has everything to do with the insidious relationship between [its] 
government and big business, particularly private military and security corporations” (67). In 
revealing the shadowy links between the ANC, ZARCorps, and the war in Kasalia, he uncovers 
a component of the deep state that governs South Africa. He debunks the notion that the 
Kasalian war is a specifically Kasalian problem and, by implicating the private interests of the 
South African government in the conflict, he draws them into the frame of culpability.
During his time in Kasalia, Tariq discovers that, rather than providing security for those 
in desperate need of it, ZARCorps is actually fuelling the war in the nation. The corporation is 
supposed to provide “security for foreign embassies, major financial institutions and mineral 
and oil fields in almost all o f the world’s major conflict zones,” yet its revenues from the 
Kasalian conflict are in the region of $300 million (Shukri, I  See You 142). ZARCorps’ 
involvement in the war, according to the evidence gathered by the protagonist, includes the 
arming of militias, the inciting of violence, and the controlling of vital resources -  most notably 
the mineral “tantalum” (67). This naturally occurring substance, “used in the manufacture of 
electronic devices -  cellphones, DVD players, and so forth,” is the source of profit over which
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Kasalian warlords, with the assistance of ZARCorps, have been fighting (62). In making the 
source o f the conflict something that is so ubiquitous in everyday life, Shukri refuses the reader 
a chance to “dislodge [him/herself] from the tangled mess of implication” (74). Everyone who 
lives during the technological age, the author seems to be implying, is complicit in the atrocities 
that plague Kasalia.
Naomi Klein has developed a term for those who profit from crises -  manmade or 
otherwise. Echoing Dwight Eisenhower’s 1961 assertion that the United States should p revent 
itself from acquiring a “military-industrial complex,” Klein notes that in an era characterised 
by globalisation and multinational conglomeration, a new complex has emerged: “disaster 
capitalism” (50). In this model of profiteering:
All conflict and disaster-related functions (waging war, securing borders, spying on 
citizens, rebuilding cities, treating traumatised soldiers) can be performed by 
corporations at a profit. And this complex is not satisfied merely to feed off the state, 
the way traditional military contractors do; it aims, ultimately, to replace core functions 
o f the government with its own profitable enterprises. (50, emphasis added)
Although Shukri’s example of deep state activity takes the form of a Private Security 
Contractor, Klein’s work highlights just how pervasive the privatisation of governmental 
bodies has become in the years following 9/11.19 The fictional ZARCorps is an establishment 
premised on tangibly restructuring the ways in which power is recognised, achieved, and 
executed in a democratic Republic. It orchestrates violence and political chaos so that the 
company might boost profits for both itself and its shareholders in the South African 
government. Just like the non-fictional Blackwater, an institution such as ZARCorps actively 
diminishes the power of the South African electorate to call into question the steady 
privatisation of their civic institutions. Tariq’s wife, Dr Leila Mashal, observes that the state 
has “transformed [its] responsibilities into market opportunities from which only a small elite 
profits” (Shukri, I  See You 30).
ZARCorps’ kidnapping of Tariq has interrupted Leila’s life as a doctor and “quiet wife” 
(Shukri, I  See You 23). Following his abduction, she decides to use the facts that Tariq has 
gathered about ZARCorps -  as well as the example of his kidnapping itself -  as a platform 
from which to launch her own political campaign against “the most serious threat to [South 
Africa’s] constitutional democracy” -  the “secret and unaccountable cabal” of the deep state
19 For a full account of the manner in which “disaster capitalism” transforms the civil liberties in supposed 
democracies, see Klein’s book, The Shock Doctrine (2008).
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(23, 24). Leila’s campaign is not designed to achieve political victory so much as to make the 
South African public aware that what happened to Tariq “could happen to anybody” (27). Like 
her husband, she has come to realise that “there are forces of deep power now at work in [South 
Africa], manipulating its institutions, its systems and its structures” (27).20 For Leila and Tariq, 
the veneer of governmental authority behind which the deep state hides means that the notion 
of freedom -  both economic and political -  in contemporary South Africa, remains a “myth” 
for most of the population (27). Leila even mentions the examples of the ANC spending thirty- 
billion rand on Arms,21 as well as twenty-seven-billion rand on hosting the FIFA World Cup,22 
to emphasise her point about the powerlessness o f the electorate in a deep state. Those private 
agents, who, together with the government, spend such profligate sums of money, are not 
accountable to the public, and the same is true for an institution like ZARCorps.
Prior to Tariq and Leila’s damning revelations, ZARCorps’ involvement in Kasalia had 
been excluded from media reports on the civil war. Because the frame works “in silence, 
without any visible sign o f its operation,” the power of the deep state lies in its ability to remove 
itself from view (Butler, Frames 73). Tariq and Leila’s commitment to exposing the unethical 
and undemocratic forces that control South Africa’s government renders them ‘enemies’ o f the 
state and, conjunction with the ANC, ZARCorps executes a “meticulously planned” 
kidnapping o f Tariq (Shukri, I  See You 28). When Leila attempts to reveal ZARCorps’ 
complicity in Tariq’s capture, she is placed under house arrest, or “administrative internment” 
(7). While Leila’s fate is certainly not as dire as Tariq’s, her arrest illustrates how forcefully 
the deep state silences its detractors.
20 On November 2, 2016, South Africa’s Public Protector, Thuli Mandosela, released a report titled “State of 
Capture,” which alleges that the country’s president, Jacob Zuma, wilfully broke the Prevention of Corruption 
Act by allowing private interests undue influence in the selection of cabinet members. See Pierre De Vos’s 
article, “Analysis: Review of State Capture Report,” The Daily Maverick (2016).
21 According to Andrew Feinstein, in securing the Arms Deal (finalised in 1999), “about $300 million was paid 
in commissions and bribes to middlemen, senior politicians, officials, their associates, and the ANC itself’ (176). 
Feinstein continues: “Thabo Mbeki and his inner circle were happy to undermine key institutions of the new-won 
democracy, including parliament and important components of the judicial system, in order to safeguard the 
interests of the party and protect its senior leaders” (182). The figure of thirty-billion rand that Shukri provides 
may be, in fact, a severe underestimation: Feinstein claims that the total cost of the Arms Deal rose to seventy- 
one-billion rand by 2011. This amount is nearly double the forty-one-billion spent on public housing, and nine 
times higher than the nine-billion spent on the country’s HIV/Aids programme (187).
22 The FIFA World Cup in South Africa represented a major financial opportunity for South African private 
security companies. Johan Burger notes that FIFA’s budget for the 2010 event was in the region of thirty-six- 
million dollars (R250 million). For more information, see his article, “A Golden Goal for South Africa,” South 
African Crime Quarterly (2007). The South African government’s budget for private security was actually a great 
deal higher than the one outlined by FIFA, and it is estimated that the ANC spent approximately 250-million 
dollars (R1.5 billion) on private security between June and August 2010. See Christopher McMichael’s article, 
“Hosting the World,” City Journal (2012).
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Unlike his wife, Tariq is not afforded the comforts of house arrest, and his attempt to make 
visible the deep state costs him his own place within the frame itself. The timeless, ominous 
“Somewhere” to which Tariq has been removed, much like the space Issa occupies after his 
sudden disappearance, holds no clues as to where it is located. In contrast to Issa, however, 
Shukri grants Tariq a narrative voice in the present, and the reader is permitted unmediated 
access to his thoughts and memories. Another significant difference between Issa and the 
protagonist of I  See You is that the reader knows exactly why, and by whom, Tariq has been 
‘disappeared.’
Following his abduction in Johannesburg, Tariq is “stripped naked with only [a] hood 
still covering [his] face” (Shukri, I  See You 172). He is then dressed in “a jumpsuit” and 
“boarded onto a plane” (172-73). In being forced to don the attire of a captured ‘terrorist,’ he 
becomes a faceless and featureless threat, stripped of his individuality -  nothing more than a 
body to be controlled. For this reason, he exemplifies the terrorist automaton; another version 
of the iconic “bagman” photograph taken from the now infamous Abu Ghraib archive, or any 
one of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay (Mitchell 101).23 Rather than mirroring Issa’s 
disappearance, then, Tariq’s capture appears to echo the images o f the Afghani and Iraqi 
prisoners that the protagonist of The Silent Minaret sees on Cafe Baghdad’s enormous screen. 
By depicting ZARCorps employing similar rendition techniques to those used by the United 
States during the War on Terror, Shukri offers the reader yet another example of a “blurring of 
contexts” (I See You 66). In the same way that the Kasalian conflict “mirrors other wars like 
it,” the deep state’s means of silencing its critics resonates with modes of control utilised by 
other historical forces, such as the VOC and the CIA (63).
Although Tariq makes his discoveries about South Africa’s deep state while working 
in Kasalia, he also travels to many other locations to document “the experiences of people 
displaced by war and conflict” (Shukri, I  See You 70). Of all the spaces of precarity to which 
Tariq ventures, the Occupied Palestinian Territories is one that “looms large” in his mind, and 
his journeys to this region are filled with painful encounters with the oppressive realities that 
its inhabitants face on a daily basis (70). With this in mind, it is interesting to note that the so-
23 The “bagman” picture is only one of an estimated 2,100 photographs taken at Abu Ghraib prison during 
America’s occupation of Iraq. While all of the photographs depict Iraqi suspects under extreme physical, mental, 
and emotional duress at the hands of American military personnel, the iconic “bagman” photograph is perhaps the 
most unnerving of those images made accessible to the public. The man in question has a hood over his head and 
is standing on a box, arms outstretched, with electrodes taped onto his palms -  almost as if he is preparing to be 
crucified. For more commentary on how this photograph became a symbol for the American public’s resistance 
to the Iraq War, see Butler, “Sexual Politics, Torture, and Secular Time,” in Frames o f War (2010); W.J.T. 
Mitchell, Cloning Terror (2010); and Mark Danner’s book, Torture and Truth (2004).
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called “Appendix” to the novel is comprised of Tariq’s var ious articles written in Palestine, 
which I understand to be a final tribute to a location -  and a people -  suffering under the 
hardships of occupation (191-99). Before I begin my analysis o f Shukri’s portrayal of 
Palestine, it is necessary to provide some context as to how it is that this location has become 
yet another front for the global War on Terror.
2.8 Our Terrorists and Yours: Israel, Palestine, and the War on Terror
While Shukri’s most recent novel only references the War on Terror itself obliquely, the 
author’s preoccupation with precarity is particularly demonstrable in his framing of Palestine. 
His ability to offer the reader depictions of both local and global concerns is what permits him 
to comment -  as both a South African and a citizen of the world -  on issues pertaining to 
Palestine and beyond. That being said, it is vital to acknowledge how the ongoing politico- 
military struggle between Israel and Palestine is a focal point not just of Shukri’s work but the 
War on Terror itself.
In his book, Border Walls, the political geographer, Reece Jones claims that:
In the ten months between the 9/11 attacks in the United States and the beginning of 
the construction of the barrier [the Wall], Israeli leaders repositioned their conflict as 
not simply a local territorial dispute, but also as a key front in the global conflict 
between evil terrorists and modern, civilized democracies. In this narrative, [Yasser] 
Arafat is the same as bin Laden, attacks in Israel are the same as attacks in America, 
and crucially, as a democratic member of the international community, Israel has an 
obligation to do everything in its power to prevent the spread of terrorism. (77)
Jones’s point, in the above passage, is that the state of Israel -  at that stage led by Ariel Sharon 
-  inserted itself into the War on Terror by virtue of its close political relationship with the 
United States. This relationship, according to former American Vice President Joe Biden, “has 
been and will continue to be, a centrepiece [. . .] of American foreign policy” (qtd. in Josh 
Ruebner 87). Aligning the United States and Israel in a fight against the threat of global 
terrorism permitted Sharon and his government to equate acts of Palestinian violence with the 
actions of which Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda were capable. Three months after 9/11, Sharon 
even claimed: “America, we [Israel] are with you, because the struggle against terrorism is also 
our struggle. We have been facing it for many years” (qtd. in Jones 93). In Sharon’s reasoning, 
acts of Palestinian aggression aimed at the state of Israel are no different to the horrendous
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attacks of 9/11. This logic both strips Palestinian resistance of its geopolitical context and also 
allows the Israeli military to frame its conduct in the Occupied Territories as “the actions of a 
valiant protector of freedom and democracy” amidst a mass of Muslim ‘enemies’ (Jones 77).
Although there can be no doubt that Palestinian violence is an issue for Israel -  and 
should not be condoned regardless o f the precarious situations in which those who commit acts 
of terror find themselves -  it is important to acknowledge its root cause: the ongoing Israeli 
military occupation of Palestinian land. David Theo Goldberg argues that “the more [state] 
violence becomes a norm, the readier those within and without the state are loosened, if not 
licensed, to resort to forms of personalised and anonymous violence” (“Racial States” 249). 
While Goldberg’s emphasis on the “license” afforded to subjugated populations to use violence 
may be rather too accommodating of such methods of opposition, his claim reflects a political 
context out of which violence-as-resistance may arise. If one applies Goldberg’s argume nt to 
the case of the Palestinian people, then it is clear that, rather than treating their resistance as a 
by-product of an irrational hatred for the state of Israel itself, it should be understood as the 
result of decades of “colonial subjugation” (Butler, Parting Ways 50).
What aids Israel’s repression of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories is the material 
and ideological support that the Israeli military receives from the government of the United 
States. According to Barack Obama, “Israel’s security is sacrosanct. It is non-negotiable,” and 
he even states that the “military and intelligence cooperation [between America and Israel] has 
never been closer” (qtd. in Ruebner 178). The large Christian-Zionist contingent present in the 
American Congress makes the sustained Israeli occupation of Palestine a relatively 
uncomplicated business in the corridors of American political power.24 So ingrained is the 
United States’ fiscal support for Israel, notes Andrew Feinstein, that the American government 
provides “Israel with aid, mostly militarily, to the tune of $3bn annually” (374). This figure, he 
claims, “cover[s] a third of Israel’s defence budget” (377).25
Israel’s prevailing military power is only one manifestation of the Jewish state’s 
infrastructural superiority and, throughout I  See You, Tariq describes the contrasting fortunes
24 “Christian-Zionist” is not a contradiction in terms. It is merely the term used to describe Christians who believe 
that Israel is the true home of the Jewish people, and should be occupied exclusively by Jews. Zionism reaffirms 
many American Christians’ belief in the Biblical notion that Israel should always be Jewish, and legitimises the 
religious claims of both the American Christian-Right and the Israeli state. Nevertheless, anti-Semitism in the 
United States remains a serious social issue, at least according to Ryan King and Melissa Weiner, who note that 
at least 12 percent of Americans view Jews unfavourably. For more information, see their article, “Group Position, 
Collective Threat, and American Anti-Semitism,” Social Problems (2007).
25 As of 2018, the United States will provide Israel with thirty-eight-billion dollars in military aid over a ten-year 
period. This is the single largest military deal that the United States has conducted in its history. See Marwan 
Bishara’s article, “Five Reasons Why US-Israel Military Deal Stinks,” A l Jazeera (2016).
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of Palestinians and Israelis in candid terms. The precarity he witnesses in the Occupied 
Territories lends credence to Butler’s assertion that Israel and Palestine cannot be understood 
as ‘“two sides’ of a conflict” (Parting Ways 120), and the protagonist observes first-hand how 
Palestinians “struggle with catastrophe at almost every turn” (Shukri, I  See You 8).
2.9 Precarity and Immobility: Those Who Live in the “Shadow of the Wall”
Many o f Shukri’s depictions of Palestine take the form of Tariq’s journalistic relays, which 
include details from organisations such as the United Nations and War on Want (Shukri, I  See 
You 48, 50). This medium of narrative expression makes the reader aware of the enormity of 
Palestinian suffering, and Tariq utilises facts and figures to emphasise that “Palestinian 
refugees now constitute the largest and oldest single refugee community in the world” (95). 
Other than excerpts from Tariq’s work, Shukri also employs the protagonist’s memories of 
people and places in Palestine to provide the reader with vignettes of smaller, more personal 
encounters with the precarity that characterises life in the Occupied Territories. For instance, 
Tariq’s Palestinian acquaintances, such as Yahya, Zach, Marwan, Said, and Fadi, become 
familiar to the reader. These individuals “have always shape-shifted their way through 
tragedy,” and they, together with Tariq, form a “circle” o f friends (80).
Despite the protagonist’s desire to document Palestinian life, he finds that its traumatic 
dimensions actually exceed the limits of his photographic frame. He admits: “My camera can’t 
capture what I see or what I’m told, and the pictures I take during the day only end up in my 
recycle bin at night” (Shukri, I  See You 78). Tariq’s inability to capture the day-to-day suffering 
of those in the Occupied Territories may have something to do with the static frame of 
photography itself, and he notes that “circumstances have become too large to be contained in 
a single frame, too rapid even to be captured at all” (75). The fact that the photographic frame 
is necessarily imposed around a context that eludes containment is no doubt an issue for Tariq, 
but what is not a problem for him is how he writes about Palestine and its people. As a 
journalist, this is something he does in much detail, and many of his articles focus on the impact 
that Israel’s Wall in the West Bank has had on Palestinians’ already precarious sense of 
freedom.
The “anti-terror fence,” or what Palestinians call the “Apartheid Wall,” currently 
measures 708 kilometres (Jones 11). It comprises both fences and portable concrete blocks,
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and is “eight metres high -  or more than double the height of the Berlin Wall” (95).26 Originally 
erected as a deterrent to Palestinian terror attacks in Israel, the Wall’s endurance as a political 
boundary has encouraged “the supposedly temporary to manifest increasingly as the potentially 
permanent” (Shukri, I  See You 107).
I  See You opens with Tariq in Atouf: a fictional village in which “everything is on the 
brink” as a result of the “enormous abuse and suffering” that has accompanied the construction 
of the Wall (Shukri 9-10). He tells the reader that this “place of desolate splendour is the setting 
for a quiet faraway tragedy of termination,” as Atouf’s residents “are being pried from their 
ancestral land, livelihood and way of life by organised and sustained Israeli military force” (9). 
Tariq has come here to document the lives of those who live in this little hamlet “while it is 
still there” (10). The Wall, he claims, “will stampede everything in its path and places like 
Atouf will cease to exist” (9). In the guise of this dilapidated village, Tariq views but one 
example o f the Palestinian dispossession that the Wall has abetted, since the latter’s function 
is not merely to keep Israeli settlers safe but also acts as a means by which Israel can capture 
Palestinian land. In fact, Tariq notes that “[m]ore than 60 per cent of farmland stretching from 
[Atouf] to the Jordan River has been seized” (9). This “domino process of land confiscation” 
would not be realisable without the Wall, as its “potentially permanent” boundaries prevent 
Palestinians from accessing their arable lands, whilst simultaneously making these lands 
available to Israeli settlers (107, 9). Availability is perhaps too tame a term to use when 
describing Israeli access to this area, for when Tariq looks past the Wall at A touf s “confiscated 
southern slopes” he sees Israel’s “grand scheme” for the region (10, 9). On the other side of 
the Wall, “Israel’s project lies in full, lush bloom -  vineyards flourishing in settlements 
irrigated by water redirected from seized Palestinian wells” (10).
Not only are the inhabitants of Atouf unable to access the lands that they need in order 
to survive, but they are forced to witness Israel’s incremental colonisation of the West Bank. 
The Wall therefore acts as a border between the soon-to-be-eviscerated Atouf and the Israeli 
settlement on the hill, as well as a reminder to Palestinians as to who has the real control over 
this region. As Karim says to Katinka in The Silent Minaret, the Wall is there to “make us 
[Palestinians] feel small” (Shukri 185).
During her time in Palestine, Katinka recognises the segregationist tactics employed by 
the state of Israel. Although she grew up in apartheid South Africa, she admits to Kagiso that
26 Jones notes that, “despite the rhetoric of globalization and a borderless world, the 1990s saw almost as much 
border fencing globally as the previous four decades of the Cold War combined” (6).
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life for many in the West Bank is “far more horrendous than anything you’ve seen in the 
homelands [of apartheid South Africa]” (Shukri, Silent 242). She conveys stories about “kids 
who have to travel for hours around The Wall to get to school (and who can draw helicopter 
gun-ships with their eyes closed),” and declares that, in Qalqilia, “death is everywhere; every 
day an anniversary, every day a future one assured” (240).
The practice of security-through-dispossession is a fact of military occupation, as well 
as a significant trait of settler-colonialism. Mbembe observes that “Colonial occupation itself 
[is] a matter of seizing, delimiting and asserting control over a physical geographical area -  of 
writing on the ground a new set of social and spatial relations” (“Necropolitics” 164, emphasis 
original). By asserting control over the region of historic Palestine, successive Israeli 
governments have embarked on a process of “Israeli reterritorialisation [. . .] through a 
simultaneous Palestinian deterritorialisation” (Jones 85). “Downsizing the number of 
Palestinians all over historic Palestine” is, according to Ilan Pappe, still the “Zionist vision,” 
and the Wall represents only one example of this t ype of “incremental genocide” (On Palestine 
151, 174).27
While the Wall undoubtedly has made many Israelis safer, the underlying cost for 
everyday Palestinians cannot be overstated.28 The concept of security used to justify the 
erection of the Wall is heavily disputed by one of Tariq’s subjects, who lives in the village of 
Zbouba. This location “has no functioning electricity supply and its alternative source of water 
in the Al-Gard Valley has been polluted by overflowing effluent from a nearby Israeli military 
camp” (Shukri, I  See You 194). From his rooftop, Tariq’s unnamed subject points to a distant 
hill on the other side of the Wall: “All the land from here to that hill is ours. But this wall has 
taken it. I can’t go there any more” (93). The same fate that Atouf is suffering has thus already 
befallen Zbouba and, to make their shared precarity more apparent, Shukri situates both 
villages in the shadow of Israeli settlements. As Tariq’s colleague and he gaze upon the Wall, 
the former gestures towards the Israeli side o f the barrier, and comments: “Their lights are on 
but here we are in darkness. Our roads are broken from their tanks, but see how their cars fly 
by on their motorways” (93). Although the precarity of Palestinian life is made tangible by a 
structure such as the Wall, Tariq’s unnamed host in Zbouba also touches on another form of
27 Mbembe notes that instrumental to Israel’s control over Palestinian land are techniques such as “demolishing 
houses and cities; uprooting olive trees; riddling water tanks with bullets; bombing and jamming electronic 
communications; digging up roads; destroying electricity transformers; tearing up airport runways; disabling 
television and radio transmitters; smashing computers; ransacking cultural and politico-bureaucratic symbols of 
the proto-Palestinian state” (“Necropolitics” 167).
28 See Dion Nissenbaum’s article, “Death Toll of Israeli Citizens Killed by Palestinians Hit a Low in 2006,” 
McClatchy Newspapers (2007).
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political and economic oppression when he notes that when “Israel makes war -  Bush and Blair 
say nothing” but, if “Palestinians vote,” they “get sanctions” (93).
Tariq’s acquaintance is referring to the American, Israeli, and European Union 
sanctions imposed against the Palestinian National Authority (PA) following the 2006 
legislative democratic election of Hamas in the Palestinian Parliament. Democracy and the 
promotion thereof is something that both the United States and Israel consider fundamental to 
their respective states. In fact, one of the reasons George W. Bush gave for his country’s 
invasion of Iraq was so that its Shiite majority -  oppressed under Saddam Hussein’s regime -  
might have the democratic opportunity to elect their next head of state. Even if one ignores the 
fact that “installing democracy” among a people “over whom [America] has no jurisdiction” 
is itself an “undemocratic process,” it is important to acknowledge that it was not the fact that 
Palestinians were exercising their voting rights that led to sanctions in 2006 (Butler, Frames 
36, 37). Rather, according to Chomsky, the problem was that Palestinians “voted the wrong 
way” (On Palestine 159). In other words, rather than voting for Fatah,29 the party o f which 
present-day PA president, Mahmoud Abbas, is the leader, Palestinians voted in favour of 
Hamas.
Scholar of the Abrahamic religions, Karen Armstrong, describes Hamas as a 
“disturbingly nihilistic” manifestation of political Islam, noting that this “violent movement” 
was “born o f oppression” at the hands of the Israeli military occupation (352 Battle). The group 
sees the “Arab-Israeli conflict in religious terms” and some members of its military wing have 
even “attacked Palestinians whom they judge to be collaborators with Israel” (352). According 
to Anton La Guardia, “Hamas wants to create an Islamic society,” an ambition which 
differentiates them from the secular-minded Fatah and the former Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation (281). The extrajudicial murder of non-Muslims -  amongst other acts of terror 
committed in the Occupied Territories, the Gaza Strip, and Israel itself -  for which Hamas has 
claimed responsibility since its inception in 1987 is perhaps more comprehensible given the 
zealous branch of political Islam to which this organisation adheres.30 Notwithstanding the fact 
that Hamas has been designated a “terrorist organisation” by the United States and others, it is 
significant that they won the 2006 election democratically (Chomsky On Palestine 159). What 
followed their election victory were the aforementioned economic sanctions, as well as a
29 Founded by Yasser Arafat in 1965.
30 Hamas has been accused of appalling conduct, such as the use of human shields during wartime and the 
torture of prisoners. For more detail, see Renee Lewis’s article, “Are War Crimes Being Committed in Gaza?” 
A l Jazeera America (2014).
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“debilitating battle between Fatah and Hamas” over control of the Gaza Strip (Shukri, I  See 
You 194).
During Tariq’s travels throughout Palestine, he “counts the cost” that the sanctions have 
entailed for “ordinary Palestinians already burdened by decades o f Israeli military 
occupation,” and he sees that the sanctions “don’t punish Hamas. They punish all the 
Palestinian people” (Shukri, I  See You 191, 34, emphasis original). Despite the tragedies that 
Tariq witnesses in the Occupied Territories, it is his visits to some of the “nineteen officially 
recognised [refugee] camps in the West Bank, and fifty-nine in haemorrhaging Gaza and the 
Middle East,” which illustrate to him -  and the reader -  the true extent of Palestinians’ suffering 
(95). If the derelict villages of Atouf and Zbouba are suggestive of the impact that the Wall has 
had in the West Bank, then Shukri’s depictions of these camps stand as a testament to the 
historical struggle that Palestinians face.
In the same way that the Wall restricts Palestinian mobility in the West Bank, the 
boundaries around refugee camps are “strictly defined” (Shukri, I  See You 107). Tariq tells the 
reader that “while Israeli settlements continue to mushroom and swell illegally across the West 
Bank, refugee camps, whatever their population increase, are not allowed to expand outwards” 
(107). Because the borders of the camps cannot be extended, Palestinian refugees “live in 
concrete labyrinths three storeys high, one for each generation born in exile” (107). “As 
sanctions claw deeper into empty pockets,” Tariq witnesses the extreme precarity of life in 
various refugee camps but, for the protagonist, one camp stands out from the rest (194).
It is in Al Fara’a refugee camp that Tariq understanding of Palestinian despair is at its 
most acute. This rural camp, he writes, is “one of Palestine’s oldest traumas” and, as is the case 
in many other camps, “half [of its] population is under eighteen” ( Shukri, I  See You 95, 107). 
Al Fara’a’s age demographic is significant, especially when one considers that children and 
teenagers are all too often victims o f Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) operations in the camp. To 
emphasise the indiscriminate nature of the IDF’s conduct, Tariq cites the death of Mohammad 
Eshtewi, an eleven-year-old resident of Al Fara’a. Mohammad, Tariq remembers, lost 
consciousness after being “struck by a tear-gas canister fired from an Israeli tank,” after which 
he needed oxygen to be resuscitated (95). Due to the many “road closures and checkpoints,” it 
takes “one and a half hours to travel seventeen kilometres to Nablus” and, “by the time an 
ambulance arrived, Mohammad was dead” (95). Just like Tariq’s friend Fadi Soboh -  killed by 
Israeli soldiers during a raid on Al Fara’a -  Mohammad “died as he was born, a refugee in his 
own land” (110).
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So tight are the restrictions placed on Palestinian mobility that what should be a short drive to 
save Mohammad’s life is made unfeasible, even impossible. In the same way that the Wall 
controls the movement of those in the Occupied Territories, Palestinian refugees “remain 
captive, tied to their camps” (108). The “road closures and checkpoints” that Tariq references 
are additional measures employed by the state of Israel to clamp down on Palestinian mobility 
and, throughout I  See You, Shukri and his protagonist describe in intimate detail the damaging 
effects of these restrictive tactics, with the most striking example taking the shape of an 
interaction between Tariq and his Palestinian friend, Yahya.
2.10 “The Forbidden Horizon”: False Passports and the Limitations of Solidarity
On one of his visits to Ramallah, Tariq and Yahya, an old friend of the protagonist, are 
driving out of the city to meet a trio of Gazan students who are studying in the West Bank 
“illegally” (Shukri, I  See You 73). Suddenly, they encounter a military checkpoint -  
comprised of heavily armed IDF soldiers and a hovering helicopter -  and Tariq instinctively 
slows down to join the queue of Palestinians waiting to have their papers checked. Yahya, 
however, encourages Tariq to keep on driving. Despite the protagonist’s obvious trepidation, 
he obeys his friend’s command. As they approach the soldiers at the checkpoint, Yahya tells 
Tariq to “[s]low down [. . .] and flash the headlights once” (75). To Tariq’s surprise, the 
soldiers step aside, and Yahya encourages him to “wave at them” (76). The vehicle is let 
through the checkpoint without further incident -  a stark juxtaposition to the many 
Palestinians who have been “made to stand by the side of the road [. . .] waiting to have their 
papers inspected by the soldiers” (75).
Military checkpoints are tools in the “routinisation” of restrictive Israeli policies, and 
it is their “repetition [that] hints at their presumed naturalisation” (Goldberg 245, emphas is 
original). Because o f the ubiquity o f checkpoints in the West Bank, “they are taken as a given 
and therefore (in the collapse of social imperative into the natural) conterminously unalterable” 
(245). The dehumanising effect that checkpoints have on Palestinians is also referenced in The 
Silent Minaret, when Katinka tells Kagiso the tragic story o f her Palestinian neighbour, who 
“went into labour while waiting at a checkpoint” (Shukri 240). Despite her desperation, the 
“soldiers wouldn’t let her through [and] the baby, a girl, died with her mother by the roadside” 
(240). That the IDF soldiers at the checkpoint refused to allow someone who -  regardless of 
nationality or religion -  was so clearly in distress to receive the care she needed only reinforces
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the framing of Palestinian life as “ungrievable” (Butler, Frames 24). Katinka’s story registers 
that even a pregnant woman going into labour represents too great a threat to Israeli security to 
be permitted freedom of movement.
Like Katinka’s former neighbour, the Palestinians Tariq and Yahya drive past are 
unable to move freely. How then, one must wonder, is Yahya able to bypass Israel’s security 
protocols? When asked by Tariq how it is possible that they passed so easily through one of 
the IDF’s notorious checkpoints, Yahya gestures to the front of the rental car and replies, 
“Israeli plates” (Shukri, I  See You 76). This rationale incenses Tariq: “Israeli plates? That’s 
your explanation? You are Palestinian. I am South African. But you made us drive past a queue 
of Palestinians waiting at a checkpoint because we have Israeli plates? Fuck, Yahya. There 
were women and children back there” (76).
Despite being a Palestinian, Yahya is allowed to pass without hindrance through the 
checkpoint, simply because Tariq’s rental car has the appropriate licence plates -  the plates of 
the ‘friend.’ The Israeli plates are both indicators and enablers of mobility. They act as Tariq 
and Yahya’s passport through territory in which they would otherwise be stopped. As with 
similar scenarios in The Silent Minaret and The Reluctant Fundamentalist, this incident 
illustrates the importance of documentation in ascertaining the threat level of certain groups 
since 9/11. Unlike Changez, Issa, and Shukri himself however, Tariq and Yahya -  at least 
temporarily -  are permitted the freedom of movement that they would otherwise be denied, 
simply because of the yellow plates on the front of Tariq’s motorcar. If Yahya’s indifference 
to those who are waiting on the side of the road for passage through their own land seems 
peculiar, then the argument he puts forward to Tariq following the protagonist’s outburst is 
truly astonishing.
The two of them are leaning on the bonnet of the car, waiting to meet the Gazan 
students, and a still-aghast Tariq asks his friend if he believes in solidarity with the Palestinian 
cause and whether, “togetherness and joining in the reality” is at all on his agenda (Shukri, I  
See You 77). Yahya swings around on the bonnet and points into the distance, saying:
You see way over there. That’s Tel Aviv. [. . .] And over there, that’s Jerusalem [. . .] I 
can’t go to either, but you have been to both. You want the real Palestinian experience? 
You want to demonstrate solidarity? Deny yourself those privileges, then come stand 
here and look at the forbidden horizon [. . .] surrender your travel documents and go 
live with them. Don’t fucking preach to me about solidarity. I don’t have time for this 
shit. (77-8)
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Yahya’s outburst underscores the degree to which Palestinians are made to feel unwelcome in 
both Israel and the Occupied Territories, and his candid exclamation highlights the hypocrisy 
of Tariq’s demand for solidarity. He asks if the protagonist would have felt “nobler for waiting 
in [the] queue” and if he considers himself “a collaborator for driving through, for taking 
abusive privileges” (Shukri, I  See You 77). Yahya even scorns the idea that he has “robbed 
[Tariq] of a ‘real’ Palestinian checkpoint experience” (77). The protagonist is dumbfounded by 
the extent of his friend’s willingness to disregard the suffering of his fellow Palestinians, but 
one has to remember that Tariq, as a South African, is granted a degree of mobility of which 
Palestinians can only dream.
Despite his best efforts, Tariq cannot comprehend the restriction of movement that 
Yahya and other Palestinians suffer on a daily basis. While he endeavours to be a capturer of 
their precarity, Tariq is still an outsider -  someone who is able to go to Tel Aviv and rent a car 
with Israeli licence plates. Yahya’s rejection of Tariq’s insistence on solidarity points to an 
uncomfortable truth for all those aligned with the Palestinian cause: sympathy and solidarity 
can only achieve so much. When Tariq’s time in Palestine is over, he can go home; he can 
leave behind the cruelty and begin working on his next project while Yahya and his 
contemporaries’ situation deteriorates. It can therefore hardly be considered surprising that 
Yahya capitalises on the opportunity afforded to him by Tariq’s rental car, as he is tempo rarily 
able to remove himself from the ontological frame of the Palestinian, and refigure himself, at 
least in the perceptions of those operating the checkpoint, as an Israeli. Yahya’s yearning for a 
sense of freedom is so strong that he even admits to Leila that Palestinians often “envy” South 
Africa’s apparent success story (87).
In a conversation that takes place in Egypt, while Tariq is working in Libya, Yahya tells 
Leila that he “expected Palestine would be free before South Africa” (Shukri, I  See You 86). 
When she asks him why, he responds: “Because the “PLO is so much richer than the ANC. 
Because the PLO funded the ANC [during apartheid]. I suppose with that came the 
assumption...” (86). Unfortunately, Yahya does not complete his thought, and he leav es Leila 
in a stunned silence. Yahya’s understanding of South Africa’s history of apartheid matches his 
experiences as a Palestinian struggling for his freedom. He sees the settler-colonialist model of 
apartheid South Africa spanning the globe and enacting itself in historic Palestine. Like Tariq, 
Yahya also suffers from a “blurring of contexts,” in which the transformation that he wishes 
for Palestine has already been implemented, or so he thinks, in South Africa (66). His reference 
to the ANC’s apathy towards the plight of the Palestinian people criticises the self-absorbed 
nature of democratic South Africa. The deep state appears to have sapped both the memory
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and the humanity from South Africa’s elected government and, as Palestinians continue to 
suffer under conditions worse than those during apartheid, their disappointment in the ANC 
might seem appropriate.
By virtue of their treatment at the hands of both the Israeli government and fellow 
Arabs, Palestinians have been conditioned to think of themselves as what Chomsky calls the 
“unpeople” of the world (Failed States 124).31 The desperation caused by decades of 
occupation lead to the use of survival tactics, such as Yahya posturing as an Israeli in Tariq’s 
car, as well as to an understanding that Palestinians, no matter where they turn, feel abandoned. 
Their situation, as it has been throughout history, remains fraught with precarity.
2.11 A Call to the “Trans-Global” Recognition of Precarity
Like The Silent Minaret, I  See You is an exceptionally intricate novel in both form and content, 
and it should be clear that attempts to offer a critical interpretation of the text might result in 
confusion and frustration. Shukri’s fiction is very much like Tariq’s famous photograph: the 
illusion of one thing leading the reader to investigate deeper, to pull apart the multitudinous 
layers that make up his novels and emerge with a fuller understanding of what life is like for 
people strangulated by precarity.
The author repeatedly and intentionally creates ruptures in his narratives in order to 
draw the reader into a disorderly, fragmented world characterised by violence and power, and 
the structure of I  See You actually mirrors the disjointed sense o f linearity that Tariq 
experiences during his incarceration “Somewhere.” Similarly, in The Silent Minaret, the reader 
experiences an overlapping of “trans-global” and trans-historical contexts, in which individuals 
are silenced, oppressed, and removed from the frame of recognition (Shukri 29).
Both novels cover a vast array of locations, people and settings, and are comprised of 
so many distinct narrative voices that it would be impossible to detail them all in just a few 
pages. By focusing on the specific examples that I have chosen, I hope to have imparted a better 
understanding not simply of the novels as a whole, but of their importance as literary responses 
to the War on Terror. The world since 9/11, in Shukri’s estimation, is at once similar and
31 Shukri pays attention to Muammar Gaddafi’s decision to expel at least 30,000 Palestinians from Libya in 1995. 
When Leila questions Yahya about this in Egypt, she is forced to rethink her assumption that “Arab support for 
the Palestinians would have been unanimous” (Shukri, I  See You 166). Once again, Shukri demonstrates that, to 
outsiders of the Arab world, those who occupy these lands appear to be a homogenous whole, and their individual 
complexities are not understood.
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radically different. While America, Britain, and Israel can claim that they are living in a world 
in which 9/11 has passed, those smaller lives that haunt the limitations of the metanarrative 
continue to be on the receiving end of those nations’ retribution for the actions of Osama bin 
Laden and his predominantly Saudi Arabian faction. Both Issa and Tariq recognise the 
importance of countering dominant perceptions of certain populations who are framed as 
“ungrievable” (Butler, Frames 24). Issa attempts to reorient the frame of history so that he 
might shed light on connections between disparate cultures that the metanarrative has 
eliminated, while Tariq’s ability to present his viewers with images and words that capture the 
humanity o f vulnerable populations is his method of exposing the asymmetrical distribution of 
precarity across the globe.
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Chapter 3: Homeland: Intelligence, Espionage, and Making “Intelligible” 
the Contemporary War on Terror
While Ishtiyaq Shukri’s novels encourage the reader to think beyond simplistic paradigms of 
identity politics by adopting inclusive frames of recognition, the politicised rhetoric 
underpinning the War on Terror has, for the most part, focused on differentiating ‘us’ from 
‘them’ in unambiguous and often deprecating terms. For instance, when President George W. 
Bush, on September 20, 2001, nine days after al Qaeda’s deadly attacks, addressed both houses 
of Congress and the world declaring: “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to 
make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists,” he attempted to arrange all the 
peoples of the globe into a simple binary o f friend or foe (qtd. in Blum, America’s 3). I 
examined Bush’s problematic framing of ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ Muslims in my chapter on The 
Reluctant Fundamentalist, where realities involved in responding to America’s War on Terror 
are shown to be far more complicated than any simple declaration o f allegiance. I now turn to 
the American television series, Homeland (2011—), produced by Showtime, to explore how the 
binary of ‘friend’/ ‘enemy’ is represented in one of the world’s most popular forms of 
entertainment.
Inspired by Gideon Raff’ s Israeli television series, Prisoners o f War (2010-2012), and 
created by Alex Gansa and Howard Gordon, Homeland (2011-) has run for five seasons -  each 
consisting of twelve episodes -  with a sixth season set to air in the United States in January 
2017.1 The show is a fictionalised interpretation of the CIA’s role in the War on Terror since 
both the death of Osama bin Laden and the inception o f Barack Obama’s presidency.2 
Throughout Homeland, viewers encounter -  and are asked to scrutinise -  the huge degree of 
influence that the CIA has over American foreign policy. From forced regime change in Iran 
to drone strikes in Pakistan, the Agency is presented as being intricately involved in the inner 
workings of American diplomacy and military tactics.
Homeland begins in 2011, eight years after the American invasion, and subsequent 
occupation, of Iraq. The chief protagonist of the show, a CIA case-officer by the name of Carrie 
Mathison (Claire Danes), who suffers from a severe bipolar disorder, is told by an Iraqi contact 
that a captured American Marine has been ‘turned’ by an al Qaeda leader, Abu Nazir (Nav id 
Negahban). The Marine in question is Sergeant Nicholas Brody (Damian Lewis), who was
1 “Episode” and “Season” will be capitalised in this chapter only in the case of the possessive. For example, 
“Season Three of Homeland,,’ or, “in its first season.”
2 The American president in Homeland is only ever alluded to -  he is neither named nor shown.
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taken prisoner by al Qaeda during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. He is held as their prisoner 
until he converts to Islam and is recruited into their ranks. Brody’s return to the United States 
-  under the guise of the long awaited return of a prisoner of war -  is marked by Carrie’s rising 
paranoia, and she spends the majority of Homeland's first two seasons attempting to prove 
Brody’s intentions to her superiors, Saul Berenson (Mandy Patinkin) and David Estes (David 
Harewood).
From the outset, then, Homeland asks some pertinent questions about the ‘friend’/ 
‘enemy’ binary, as the character of Brody -  the American Marine who returns to the United 
States as a converted Muslim to work for al Qaeda -  troubles such categories; mainly due to 
the personal motivations behind his decisions, which I will discuss in some detail later in the 
chapter. Unlike 24, created by Robert Cochrain and Joel Surnow -  and for which Gansa and 
Gordon were writers -  the early seasons of Homeland attempt to avoid a morally absolutist 
interpretation of the War on Terror, and seek to question, as Gansa notes in an interview for 
The Independent in 2012, “who the hero or villain might be” in the context of Obama’s 
Overseas Contingency Operations (“Beyond the Call”). Initially, the series succeeds in framing 
its narrative from the perspective of both those under the employ of the CIA and those who 
would seek to harm the United States, and asks viewers to consider the personal and political 
conditions that produce the figure of the ‘terrorist.’ As the show progresses, however, it 
becomes apparent that depictions of the CIA fighting terrorism are more important -  or merely 
more entertaining -  than any attempt to understand terrorism.
The murky waters of counterterrorism make for compelling television -  a fact to which 
Homelands Emmy Awards (2012, 2013), Golden Globes (2012, 2013), and copious other 
accolades and nominations attest.3 There have also been numerous public responses to 
Homeland, and the popularity of the series has been demonstrated by the decision of several 
newspapers, such as The Guardian,4 56The Wall Street Journal,5 and The New York Times,6 to 
provide their readers with episodic synopses and analyses of the show. Nevertheless, public 
opinion remains divided on Homeland's plausibility and political insight. The Guardian's 
Michael Cohen (2013) argues that the show peddles “a dangerous set of lies about terrorism, 
American omnipotence and the very nature of international politics” (“Bad TV”); whereas 
Mike Hogan (2015), of Vanity Fair, maintains that it would be “a mistake to
3 For a list of Homeland's extensive awards and nominations, see the IMBD website.
4 See “Homeland'. Episode by Episode” on The Guardian's website.
5 See Sarene Leeds: “Homeland: Weekly Nightcaps of the Showtime Espionage Thriller,” on The Wall Street 
Journal's website.
6 See Sarah Warner: “Homeland -  Television Recaps,” on the New York Times' website.
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confuse Homeland with some kind of journalistic or, god forbid, morally instructive enterprise” 
(“Why Season Five”). A lack of consensus as to whether or not Homeland oversimplifies the 
War on Terror has not hampered the show’s viewership. In fact, so popular has the series 
become that it has generated its own Wikia page, which includes intricate details from 
characters’ back stories, such as their addresses and tertiary education information. 7 The show 
has even spawned its own series of novels, Carrie’s Run (2013) and Saul’s Game (2015), 
written by Andrew Kaplan.
It is precisely because Homeland has generated so much public attention that it is an 
important inclusion in this thesis. The numerous responses to Homeland indicate both its 
intrinsic entertainment value and its capacity to shape public perceptions on the War on Terror. 
Gansa states that he and Gordon “try really hard not to be polemic or didactic in any way,” that 
they “choose to ask questions and not answer them” (“The Creators”). So, what are the 
questions that Homeland asks about the War on Terror and, more importantly, how does it 
frame these questions? How far is it willing to go to avoid a simplistic interpretation o f the 
‘friend’/ ‘enemy’ binary? Does the show’s “paranoid allure,” to use the words of Vanity Fair's 
Richard Lawson (2015), contribute to the public perception o f the United States as vulnerable 
to terrorism? Furthermore, if war is a means of “dividing populations into those who are 
grievable and those who are not,” how does Homeland frame the impact of the War on Terror 
on both Americans waging it and non-Americans caught up in it (Butler, Frames 38)?
This chapter attempts to discern the frame o f “intelligibility” that the series establishes 
around the War on Terror (Butler, Frames 6), and thus examines whether Homeland fulfils its 
potential as a critique of this war itself. As I will demonstrate, the show’s seasons are broken 
up thematically and geopolitically, and they each depict a certain facet of America’s Overseas 
Contingency Operations. It therefore makes sense to track Homeland's trajectory in a 
reasonably linear manner. If the series is indeed a representation of how the War on Terror has 
progressed during Obama’s presidency then it is clear that observing its seasonal development 
is paramount in gauging how its viewers’ contemporary perceptions of this war are framed by 
the show. Before I begin my analysis of Season One and Two, however, I will revisit Derrida’s 
concept of the ‘friend’ and the ‘enemy,’ and examine how this binary might be understood in 
relation to Homeland.
7 Available on the Wikia Fandom website.
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3.1 The ‘Friend’ and the ‘Enemy’: A Matter of Political Perspective
In my introduction, I noted Derrida’s conception of the ‘enemy’ as being crucial in the 
positioning of the political self. Without the figure of the definite ‘enemy,’ argues Derrida, one 
suffers from a “phobia [which] projects a mobile multiplicity o f potential, interchangeable, 
metonymic enemies, in secret alliance with one another” (84). Such a description is uncannily 
apt in relating the unfolding plot of Homeland itself. Potential alliances between the various 
‘enemies’ o f the United States, no matter how far-fetched some o f these possibilities may be 
in reality, are a recurring feature of the show’s depiction of the War on Terror.
In Season Two, for example, Gansa and Gordon go so far as to suggest that al Qaeda 
and Hezbollah are working with one another to attack America. This fictionalised coalition is 
illogical, fanciful, and offers viewers a misguided understanding of the Middle East and the 
internal politics of Islam. The concept of the Shiite Hezbollah giving sanctuary or assistance to 
the Sunni al Qaeda is highly unlikely, as the two organisations regard one another as apostates, 
and hold differing opinions on America’s role in the Middle East. Moreover, the groups are not 
simply opposed on religious grounds and can also be differentiated by their internal political 
structures and geographical positions.8 Homeland’s inability to outline distinctions between the 
two organisations draws them together in one common goal: the destruction of the United 
States. The religious, political, and practical differences between al Qaeda and Hezbollah are 
ignored in favour of aligning these two ‘bad’ Muslim groups together, therefore depicting the 
United States as threatened by a plethora of “unidentifiable” enemies (Derrida 84). If 
Homeland were to pay attention to the differences between these two groups, then perhaps 
viewers might develop a keener understanding of the reasons behind their respective qualms 
with the United States.
The dearth of research into the differences between al Qaeda and Hezbollah is 
characteristic of Homelands depiction of its ‘bad’ Muslim characters, and most of the CIA’s 
‘enemies’ in the series lack the dimension, detail, and background accorded to their American 
counterparts. A notable exception to this rule is the character of Nicholas Brody, who is 
permitted as much character depth as Homeland s CIA employees, such as Carrie Mathison
8 For more information on the hostile relationship between al Qaeda and Hezbollah, see Bilal Y. Saab and Bruce 
O. Reidel’s article, “Hezbollah and Al Qaeda,” The New York Times (2007), as well as Bernard Haykel’s “The 
Enemy of my Enemy is Still My Enemy,” The New York Times (n.d.). Haykel notes that Hezbollah is more 
accommodating towards the United States than al Qaeda, and has fought alongside American troops in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The two groups also differ in their political ambitions. Al Qaeda is a loosely affiliated network of 
operatives, whereas Hezbollah is more akin to Hamas, in that it comprises political, military, and civilian wings.
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and Saul Berenson, and is furnished with a concrete back story of the eight years leading up to 
his return to the United States.
In the very first episode of the show, while he is Abu Nazir’s prisoner, Brody is moved 
from his cell into a room in the al Qaeda leader’s house. Nazir feeds and clothes him, and 
requests that he teach English to his son, Issa (Rohan Chand). It is during this time that Brody 
converts to Islam, and he conducts his prayers under the watchful eye of the bin Ladenesque 
antagonist. Over time, a bond develops between Brody and Issa and the boy becomes like a 
son to him. But the child is killed when a drone strike, ordered by the CIA and the American 
vice president, demolishes a madrassa,9 killing 82 children, Issa included. “And they call us 
terrorists,” observes a devastated Nazir, as he and Brody mourn Issa’s death (Jeremy 
Nachmanoff, “Crossfire” 42:42).10 It is this incident that truly ‘turns’ Brody, who decides to 
seek vengeance for the premature death of his beloved student. He promises Nazir that he will 
return to the United States and kill those responsible for the strike -  Vice President William 
Walden (Jamie Sheridan) and David Estes, the director of the CIA -  with a suicide vest.
The inclusion o f Issa’s death at the hands of a drone -  or, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(UAV) -  is a significant aspect of Homeland’s plot for a number of reasons. First, it touches 
on some pertinent truths about the asymmetrical quality of drone warfare, such as the high 
number of civilian casualties that it produces.11 Second, by having viewers bear witness to the 
horror of the strike through Brody’s eyes, Gansa and Gordon remove us from the relative 
comfort of the United States and situate us in a location that is frequently on the receiving end 
of American military violence -  a region in which precarity is commonplace. This positioning 
allows us to see the War on Terror from the perspective of those who are considered ‘enemies’ 
of America. Third, and this is critical, Homeland demonstrates that the paramilitary actions of 
the CIA are directly responsible for turning Brody into an ‘enemy’ o f the American 
government. Before embarking on his suicide mission, he composes a confessional video, in 
which he accounts, quite deliberately, the motives for his attack:
People will say I was broken, I was brainwashed. People will say that I was ‘turned’ 
into a terrorist, taught to hate my country. I love my country. What I am is a Marine [.
. .] and as a Marine, I swore an oath to defend the United States of America against 
enemies both foreign and domestic. My action this day is against such domestic 
enemies: the vice president and members of his national security team who I know to 
be liars and war criminals; responsible for atrocities they were never held accountable
9 Madrassa is an Arabic term for an educational institution -  religious or secular.
10 When citing Homeland, my in-text references will appear as such: (Director, “Episode Title” Time of quotation). 
If the episode has been cited previously, the director’s name will be omitted.
11 See Gregoire Chamayou, Drone Theory (2015), 13-16.
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for. This is about justice for 82 children whose deaths were never acknowledged, and
whose murder is a stain on the soul of this nation.
(Michael Cuesta “Marine One” 03:45)
For reasons I will clarify in the next section of this chapter, Brody does not succeed in his 
mission. His statement, however, is a powerful antidote to the conception of the ‘terrorist’ as 
an irrational individual whose motives can only be explained in cultural or religious terms. 
Writing for the popular culture website, A.V. Club, Todd van der Werff (2012) agrees that 
Brody’s resentment is understandable, arguing that his “anger at the [America n] government’s 
drone programme and believing it abandons what makes [the] nation great is a completely 
justifiable position (“Review Q&A”). Indeed, in depicting Brody’s response and the 
explanation o f his actions as a result of Issa’s death, Homeland seems to be inviting viewers to 
acknowledge the deeply personal and political pains that motivate ‘terrorists.’ As we are 
prompted at this point to empathise with Brody, Gansa and Gordon provide a compelling 
counternarrative to Walden’s assertion that it “doesn’t matter why terrorists do what they do” 
(“Marine One” 34:20, emphasis added). Moreover, in framing the actions of the United States 
from Brody’s perspective, Homeland effectively blurs the lines between the ‘friend’ and the 
‘enemy. ’ Assumed ‘friends’ -  the CIA and the American government -  are rendered ‘enemies’ 
in Brody’s eyes, and viewers are encouraged to recognise the damaging effects that the War on 
Terror has wrought on populations in the Middle East.
As well as underlining the potential repercussions of American foreign policy, Brody’s 
decision to attack the United States also indicates Homeland's ability to play into its viewers’ 
biggest fears. That someone as patriotic as a Marine can be ‘turned’ -  by the actions of his own 
government no less -  is also a reminder that the categories of ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’ “intersect 
and ceaselessly change places” (Derrida 72). Those who were once ‘friends’ are now ‘enemies’ 
-  terror could strike at any moment and from the most unlikely o f places. No one, not even the 
CIA, can be considered safe.
Despite the show’s reliance on the figure of the ‘bad’ Muslim as a source of danger to 
the United States, there are also a number of characters within the CIA and American 
government whose militaristic and unilateral approaches to the War on Terror Homeland 
encourages viewers to scrutinise. Individuals such as Vice President Walden and CIA Director 
David Estes are ‘friends’ to the United States as a result of their commitment to American 
security, yet are also portrayed as myopic remnants of the Bush administration’s “shock and 
awe” military campaigns (Woodward 102). For example, Estes admits that the CIA is
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concerned with gathering crucial intelligence as well as “projecting American power” (“Marine 
One” 1:06:50). Walden is also framed as an unsympathetic and belligerent character, and his 
hawkish attitude is best exemplified in his derisive response to Brody’s question about the 
long-term effects of America’s support for Israel: “You really give a shit about the Arabs? They 
yell ‘death to America’ whatever we do” (Michael Cuesta, “Beirut is Back” 06:22). In the eyes 
of characters such as Estes and Walden, their ‘enemies’ are nothing more than obstacles to 
American hegemony. They see their harsh policies as justifiable, even righteous and, while 
these characters might occasionally appear as “cartoonishly malevolent,” they nevertheless act 
as reminders to Homeland’s viewers that even those who profess to be the most ardent ‘friends’ 
to America should not be exempt from criticism (Cohen, “Bad TV”).
For Derrida, justice as a pretext for the use of force is nothing more than a political ruse, 
and he claims that “the conviction of possessing the truth, the good, the just, is what sparks the 
worst hostilities” (113). Homelands volatile protagonist, Carrie Mathison, is no stranger to 
sparking hostilities in her role as a case-officer and, although she acknowledges the “fucked up 
business” of the CIA, she is -  at least initially -  uncompromising in her belief that she is 
fighting for the right reasons (Dan Attias, “Clean Skin” 44:23). Unfortunately, for Carrie, her 
belief in the virtue of her actions is misguided. Her actions and decisions sometimes have life 
threatening consequences for other characters, and her superiors often chastise her unorthodox 
methods of apprehending her targets. Even the morally questionable Estes tells her: “there’s no 
bridge you won’t burn, no earth you won’t scorch” -  succinctly summarising both her tenacity 
and sheer recklessness (“Crossfire” 19:56).
A method favoured by Carrie in her pursuit of gaining intelligence about her suspects 
is sexual seduction. She is, for example, so convinced that Brody is working with Nazir that 
she begins “fucking [him] for information” (Tucker Gates, “Achilles Heel” 42:31). To her 
disappointment, her tactics yield no tangible results, but she continues to sleep with him despite 
her suspicions. What Gansa calls Carrie’s “doomed romance” with Brody is only one instance 
of her readiness to exploit her sexuality (“What’s Alan”) .12 In Season Four, she sleeps with a 
young Pakistani student, Aayan Ibrahim (Suraj Sharma), in a bid to acquire information about 
his uncle, a Taliban emir. Carrie’s sexual strategies go largely unpunished not because her 
superiors do not notice her deeds but because she is regarded as an essential asset to the CIA. 
“Don’t think I can’t do whatever is required,” she tells her supervisors; emphasising that she is
12 Carrie has sex with Brody (or other characters) in all but a handful of episodes throughout Seasons One and 
Two, leading me to the conclusion that Gansa and Gordon’s depiction of Carrie’s frequent use of the bedroom 
for her intelligence gathering is an exploitation of Clare Danes’s sexual appeal in order to garner more viewers.
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not above using deceitful and dangerous tactics to keep the United States safe from potential 
‘terrorists’ (Seith Mann, “There’s Something Else Going On” 33:57).
Often, certainly in terms of her own self-understanding, Carrie’s successful career as a 
case officer seems intimately bound to her bipolar disorder. She admits: “the meds have saved 
my life. Literally. But something is lost, too” (Keith Gordon, “Super Powers” 41:53). That 
Carrie does her best work when she is not on her medication suggests her desire to be 
unrestrained in her actions, and stresses the extent to which she relies on what Rebecca 
Nicholson, of The Guardian (2012), describes as her “sixth sense” (“Season Two”). Anne T. 
Donahue, writing for The Guardian in 2013, goes further, arguing that Homelands portrayal 
of Carrie’s bipolar disorder is irresponsible, and teeters “on the edge of mental health shaming” 
(“‘Crazy Carrie’”). The fact that Carrie is in a constant process of trying to give up her 
medication -  which she feels “slows [her] down” -  in order to function ‘normally’ at the CIA 
makes Donahue’s observation difficult to discredit (“Marine One” 22:28).
At times, the series itself seems to suggest that Carrie’s condition -  in which her 
suspicions about Brody are dismissed as irrational by her CIA colleagues but are subsequently 
proved accurate -  acts as a powerful analogue to the paranoid character of the United States 
itself in the wake of the intelligence failures that lead to 9/11. In the same way that the Bush 
administration was “beyond hell-bent for action” against Osama bin Laden and Saddam 
Hussein, Carrie is obsessed with catching America’s ‘enemies’ (Woodward 175). Her 
unshakeable conviction that her hunches are accurate often drives her to make impulsive 
decisions that land the CIA in potential trouble. For example, her doubts as to Brody’s character 
lead her to begin an illegal surveillance operation, during which she installs cameras and 
microphones in his family’s home. She does so without consulting Saul or Estes and without 
attaining a FISA warrant.13 O f course, because Carrie’s misgivings about Brody -  and many 
other suspects -  prove to be correct, her employers frequently overlook her methodological 
transgressions. She is more than fallible; she is dangerous, and yet her actions provide results. 
Thus, her contribution to the CIA and the safety of the ‘homeland’ is characterised as an 
indispensible part of America’s counterterrorism strategy. According to her mentor, Saul, she 
is “the smartest and the dumbest fucking person” that he has ever known, and viewers are 
encouraged to agree with this sentiment (Michael Cuesta, “The Choice” 33:21). Regardless of 
the damage she causes in the interim, Carrie is representative of the “useful” ‘friend’ (Derrida
13 Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. The FISA warrant permits governmental agencies to spy on 
American citizens at the discretion of a High Court judge. See Suskind, “False Positives,” 11-41.
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23), and an example of the morally misguided but ultimately acceptable face of the War on 
Terror.
The foil to Carrie’s volatility is the character of Saul Berenson: a Jewish CIA veteran 
who prefers to “figure the problem out, not obliterate it,” and who is portrayed as 
compassionate (especially towards Carrie), even-keeled, and dependable (Guy Ferland, 
“Broken Hearts” 04:50). Saul is the type o f guardian that the American public could only wish 
for in a post-Bush landscape, and his moral clarity and wisdom persuade Homeland’s viewers 
to take solace in the fact that, although the War on Terror has been raging for over a decade, 
there are individuals taking charge of it who are measured and level-headed. Saul does not 
endorse state force to the same degree as someone like Estes, and only resorts to militaristic 
intervention when necessary.
Rachel Shukert, writing for The Tablet in 2015, suggests that Saul represents the “moral 
centre” of Homeland, adding that he is “a force for justice in the middle of a whirl o f changing 
allegiances and double-crosses; always loyal, always searching for the most ethical solution in 
a world where there are only bad options” (“Loyalties Lie”). Saul’s sensible demeanour frames 
him as the responsible face of the War on Terror -  the ‘good’ cop to Carrie’s ‘bad’ one -  and, 
unlike his protege, he never jeopardises the safety of the CIA or the ‘homeland. ’ He is portrayed 
as a virtuous character and, according to Derrida, “friendship based on virtue is, by definition, 
impeccable” (205). Throughout Homeland, the contrasting characters of Saul and Carrie work 
alongside one another at the CIA. These two ‘friends’ -  one “virtuous,” the other, “useful” -  
are relentless in their fight against America’s ‘enemies’ (Derrida 205, 23). Their ‘enemies,’ 
however, are depicted as numerous, cunning, and exceptionally difficult to catch. And 
sometimes, they are hiding in plain sight.
3.2 Season One and Two: The ‘Enemy Within’
Following his return to America, Brody is perceived by the public as more than just a soldier 
returning from the dangers of occupied Iraq, and the nation’s media insists on painting him as 
a veritable war hero -  the ultimate representation of the national ‘friend.’ The reason he is not 
seen as an ‘enemy’ is not merely because of the covert methods he employs to remain hidden 
as a ‘terrorist’ but, more significantly, because he lacks what Derrida calls the “practical 
identification” required to gauge who or what is the ‘enemy’ (116, emphasis original). That is 
to say that, because Brody’s appearance and status make him appear so firmly situated within
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the conceptual framework of the American ‘friend,’ he cannot be perceived as an ‘enemy.’ He 
is a white, American Marine, meaning that he destabilises the notion of the “friend or enemy 
qua citizen” (120). Brody’s status as a hero is so prevalent within the perception of the 
American public that he is encouraged by Walden to run for Congress. Getting close to the vice 
president and his team is part of Brody’s plan, and he accepts the offer in order to fulfil his 
obligations to Issa and Nazir.
Brody’s promise to kill the vice president and his staff (not to mention himself) with a 
suicide vest is an act of appalling violence. Homeland, however, appears to ask viewers to 
consider just how different Nazir’s idea of a “justifiable act of retaliation” is to the CIA’s drone 
strike on Issa’s madrassa (Michael Cuesta, “The Smile” 27:46). Both, the show implies, are 
morally reprehensible, but the question I would like to ask is, although Brody’s attempt at 
killing Walden is encouraged by Nazir and constitutes a definite political act of personal 
vengeance, would he still act the way he does if he were not a Muslim? Put simply, is his desire 
to avenge Issa’s death in some violent way related to his conversion to Islam?
Throughout Season One and Two of Homeland, viewers are frequently reminded that 
Brody is both a Muslim and an American. He takes great care to hide his conversion from his 
wife, Jessica (Morena Baccarin), and uses his garage to conduct his morning and evening salat. 
As he steps into the garage, ominous, oriental music lilts its way into the score. When Brody 
begins his prayers, there is a flashback to him walking out of his cell in Iraq. As the Brody of 
the past stumbles forward, he turns to see his al Qaeda guards at their morning salat. Prayer 
therefore represents a sense of emancipation for Brody, as his ability to leave his cell is 
entangled with his witnessing o f his captors’ commitment to Islam. The feeling o f freedom that 
Brody associates with Islam gives him strength. As a result of the promise he made to Nazir, 
this prayer-induced fortitude is exactly what he needs whenever he has doubts over his decision 
to avenge Issa’s death. Prayer and violence are therefore bound up with one another in 
Homeland’s depiction of Islam. Being a Muslim, the series seems to suggest, makes it easier 
to prepare for both murder and death.
When Jessica learns from her daughter, Dana (Morgan Saylor), that Brody has been 
praying in the garage, she is incensed, and angrily confronts her husband. She claims that she 
thought he had put all this “crazy stuff’ behind him, and throws his Qur’an on the floor, 
shouting: “These are the people who tortured you. These are the people who, if they found out 
Dana [. . . was] having sex, they would stone her to death in a soccer stadium” (“The Smile” 
36:53). For Jessica, Islam signifies nothing more than antediluvian cruelty. She fails to separate 
the religion itself from those who abuse and strain it to its limits, and asserts that she married
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a “US Marine,” meaning that, in her eyes, Brody’s beliefs are incompatible with his career in 
the American military and “cannot happen” to their marriage (37:47). That Brody can be both 
an American and a Muslim is unthinkable for Jessica, and I argue that her reaction is 
Homeland’s method of commenting on a specific type of American: one who is blinded by 
“Culture Talk” and cannot conceptualise Islam as anything more than a political marker of 
identity which, at its heart, is premised on violence (Mamdani 17).14 For Jessica, Brody’s new 
faith symbolises a disavowal o f the United States, and she sees her husband ideologically siding 
with the ‘enemy.’
Despite the mental and spiritual resilience that his conversion to Islam instils in him, 
Brody fails in his attempt to kill Walden. Carrie’s suspicions drive her to confront Dana and 
convince Brody’s daughter to call and persuade her father not to follow through with his plan. 
After a few excruciating minutes of internal conflict between his duty to Nazir and Issa and his 
love for Dana, Brody does not execute the meticulously designed attack.
Brody’s decision not to detonate his vest is a crucial moment in Homeland, as it 
undermines the show’s potential to adequately frame the repercussions of the War on Terror. 
The scene becomes saturated with an unwelcome didacticism and sentimentality, and seems to 
suggest that the desire to commit an act of terrorism can be overcome by something as simple 
as love for one’s family. Rather than having Brody go through with his plan -  therefore 
fulfilling the show’s early promise o f depicting the devastating consequences of American 
foreign policy -  Homelands narrative collapses into an unspectacular and predictable homily 
about the primacy o f family. This narrative is dangerous because it undercuts the political 
dimensions of terrorism by implying that suicide bombers who do detonate their vests have 
nothing to lose by taking both their own lives and the lives of others. In other words, Brody’s 
inability to detonate his vest propagates the opinion that successful suicide attacks are only 
successful because the perpetrators lack emotional depth and are capable solely of irrational 
violence.
Understanding the suicide bomber as unreasonable and exclusively volatile, claims 
Talal Asad, has been at the heart of American and European discourse on suicide terrorism 
(40). This discourse, according to the author, works to frame the bomber as “alienated -  that 
is, as not being properly integrated into Western civilisation” (41). As a Marine, Brody is a 
product of “Western civilisation,” perhaps indicating another reason as to why he cannot go
14 See Mamdani’s chapter, “Culture Talk,” for an analysis of the harmful ideological effects of perceiving 
culture and politics as bound up in single monolithic entity, 17-62.
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through with his plan. He is not, to use Asad’s term, “alienated” enough to kill his fellow 
citizens, and therefore fails as a would-be suicide bomber (41).
Only once Saul intercepts a micro-disk of Brody’s confession do any of Carrie’s fellow 
officers believe what seem, to them, her far-fetched accusations about the former Marine. Once 
in CIA custody, Brody confesses to his intentions. Carrie, Saul, and Estes assure him that his 
secret will be kept safe. His status as a ‘friend’ to Nazir means that Brody now represents an 
exceptionally useful asset to the CIA and so, instead of handing him over to  the FBI, Carrie 
and her team plan to use Brody to assist them in their fight against Nazir. Not for the first time 
does the character of Brody demonstrate how fluid the margins are between the ‘enemy’ and 
the ‘friend,’ and his ingression into the machinations of the CIA aligns him with the very 
institution responsible for Issa’s death.
Brody’s failure to fulfil his obligations to Issa prompts Nazir to make his way to the 
United States, where he kidnaps Carrie in a bid to force Brody to act. Although a team of CIA 
contractors eventually kills him, Nazir does coerce Brody to deactivate Walden’s pacemaker 
remotely, killing the vice president in the process. Nazir’s presence on American soil affirms 
the climate of insecurity in which Homeland operates. The al Qaeda leader asserts his refusal 
to “run, hide, and wait for death like a cowering animal, like bin Laden,” preferring to seek his 
revenge proactively (Dan Attias “Two Hats” 17:11). In distancing Nazir from his real-world 
predecessor, Homeland presents its viewers with a unique brand of ‘enemy’ mastermind: one 
who can covertly enter the United States, kidnap a CIA officer, and plan the assassination of 
the vice president. “Invisibility,” notes Mitchell, is the “chief characteristic of terrorism,” 
adding that “its ability to pass through all systems of surveillance without detection” is what 
makes terrorism so menacing (84). Nazir’s entry in the United States reiterates the 
unpredictability of this invisible threat, and validates Carrie’s paranoid mindset by framing her 
homeland as a country with permeable borders through which undetectable ‘enemies’ can slip.
3.3 Fictionalising Tragedy: The Lasting Legacy of 9/11
In the final episode of Season Two, “The Choice,” a massive explosion -  emanating from 
Brody’s car -  rips through the CIA headquarters at Langley, killing 219 people. Brody 
convinces Carrie that he is not responsible for the attack, but al Qaeda nevertheless release his 
confession -  meant for his attack on Walden -  to the news media. That Brody has nothing to 
do with the bombing at Langley is now irrelevant. Because, in the eyes of the public and
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intelligence services, he has shifted from ‘friend’ to ‘enemy’ he has no choice but to flee the 
United States.
The attack on Langley, referred to in the show as “12/12,” is Homeland’s most 
spectacular depiction of violence committed against American targets (Lesli Linka Glatter, 
“Tin Man is Down” 15:11). Not only does 12/12 act as an “intentional echo of 9/11” but, 
significantly, it becomes memorialised in the same manner (Hogan, “Finale Recap”). If, as I 
proposed in my first chapter, the attacks on Word Trade Centre and the Pentagon symbolised 
a violent challenge to America’s economic and military dominance over the globe, then 
Homeland’s representation of this tragedy on American soil takes the symbolism further to 
suggest the possibility of an attack on the centre of American intelligence. 12/12 represents a 
worst-case scenario in which no one, least of all the CIA, is safe and, as the very organisation 
in charge of stopping attacks of this nature, the Agency’s efficacy is brought into serious doubt. 
How can the CIA be trusted, Homeland asks, if they cannot prevent attacks such as this? How 
can they be tasked with winning the War on Terror if they cannot keep Brody -  a self-confessed 
‘terrorist’ -  in their clutches? The shortcomings o f the CIA are laid bare by Gansa and Gordon 
and, as a tattered American flag ripples in the wind outside a ruined Langley, Carrie bemoans 
the fact that she has failed in her task of “making sure we don’t get hit again” (Michael Cuesta, 
“Pilot” 54:40).
While al Qaeda release Brody’s confession and a statement claiming responsibility for 
the Langley bombing, we soon discover that the main culprit behind 12/12 is none other than 
one of the nation-states that made up George W. Bush’s original “axis o f evil” : the Islamic 
Republic of Iran (“State”). Rather than casting the perpetrator of 12/12 as a non-state group, 
Gansa and Gordon have chosen a familiar ‘enemy’ to fill the role o f the aggressor.15 The nation­
state of Iran has long been regarded by many Americans as an “existential threat to Israel” and, 
therefore, to the United States (Blum, America’s 96). I argue that, in the same way that Tony 
Blair and George Bush manufactured an image of Iraq as an imminent threat to British and 
American safety in order to justify the invasion and occupation of the country, Homeland 
imposes a frame around Iran that classifies the nation as an immediate danger to America.16 In 
reality, “Iran is not any kind of military threat” to the United States, yet the series appears to
15 For a considerable contextualization of Iran and America’s strained political relationship see Barbara Slavin’s 
Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies (2007), as well as Sayed Hossein Mousavian and Shahir Shahidsaless’s, Iran and 
the United States (2015).
16 See Sir John Chilcot’s Report on the Iraq Enquiry (2016), which underlines the erroneous reasons given by 
both Blair and Bush for the invasion and occupation of Iraq.
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insist on the notion that anyone, non-state or otherwise, can be configured as an ‘enemy’ in the 
War on Terror (Blum, America’s 105).
For a series which began by problematising an absolutist interpretation of the concepts 
of ‘friend’ and ‘enemy,’ Homelands depiction o f Iran as an undeniable ‘enemy’ of America 
from the outset of Season Three undoes the careful work that Gansa and Gordon achieved 
throughout the first two seasons. The creators, it seems, have fallen into a narrative that, 
according to The Washington Posts  Laura Durkay (2014), is premised on “mashing together 
every manifestation of political Islam, Arabs, Muslims and the whole Middle East into a 
Frankenstein-monster global terrorist threat that simply doesn’t exist” (“Most Bigoted”). 
Durkay’s observation echoes the thoughts of Jack Shaheen, author of Reel Bad Arabs (2009), 
who notes that Hollywood and American television’s often deprecating depiction of Muslims 
usually includes “the fictional setting [of] Arab Land,” which is always hostile to outsiders (2). 
As Homeland’s biased and one-dimensional depiction of the Muslim world demonstrates, 
Shaheen’s position remains pertinent. Furthermore, the idea that the Iranian regime would join 
forces with a non-state group like al Qaeda foments the notion of America as vulnerable to a 
multitude of threats. Thus, as mentioned earlier, Derrida’s description o f the imagining of a 
mass of ‘enemies’ as a “phobia” appears to be a perfectly apt description of the manner in 
which Homeland groups together those who are hostile to American interests (84). The 
manufacturing of innumerable enemies leads the show’s creators to align Iran (not to mention 
Hezbollah) with al Qaeda, meaning that the series offers an erroneous understanding of the 
internal politics of Islam, as well as a deeply problematic reading of complexities of allegiance 
in the Middle East itself.17
Before I begin my analysis o f Season Three, I should point out that Homeland s 
potential to frame the War on Terror through the eyes of America’s ‘enemies’ is significantly 
weakened by the disappearance o f Brody. Although he does play a key role towards the end of 
Season Three, the former Marine is no longer the same man who put on the suicide vest in 
Season One. The removal o f his unique perspective from Homeland’s narrative restricts the 
creators’ attempts to offer viewers a fuller picture of the War on Terror and, as a result, Season 
Three struggles to balance its sympathies between the CIA and their ‘bad Muslim counterparts.
17 The Iranian regime is the main source of funding for Hezbollah. See Mamdani, 171-72.
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3.4 Season Three: A Familiar and Necessary ‘Enemy’
With the CIA’s reputation in tatters -  and the main suspect of 12/12 having disappeared -  
Season Three opens with a series o f public investigations aimed at clarifying how the CIA 
could have allowed an attack on the scale of 12/12 to occur on American soil, let alone at 
Langley itself. These hearings are chaired by the new director of the CIA, Senator Andrew 
Lockhart (played by the playwright Tracy Letts), who claims that the Agency has been “driven 
into the fucking ground by poor decision-making and god-awful leadership” (Lesli Linka 
Glatter, “Still Positive” 05:38). While the Brody narrative takes an unusual turn with him 
rearing his wanted head in Karakas, Venezuela, Homeland's initial focus in Season Three 
appears to be on the status of the CIA, as well as its response to those accountable for 12/12.18 
Season Three also introduces an important ‘good’ Muslim character: the Iranian refugee, Fara 
Sherazi (Nazanin Boniadi), who is recruited by Saul to track the finances that made the attack 
of 12/12 possible.
Former White House journalist, Ron Suskind, claims that financial intelligence, or 
““finint,” is a “means of identifying the players, the place, and, possibly, the intent” of terrorist 
attacks. He adds that that finint is often more accurate that humint (human intelligence) or sigint 
(signals intelligence) because it goes after suspects who fund acts of terror rather than only 
those who commit them (114). During her time at Langley, Fara’s dedication to finint earns her 
many admirers in the CIA, and her commitment to the safety of the United States frames her 
undoubtedly as a ‘good’ Muslim. Like all ‘good’ Muslims, however, she has to prove herself 
to her American employers.
Fara first appears in the second episode of Season Three, “U h... O h... Ah” (Lesli Linka 
Glatter) and, as she walks through the security checkpoint at Langley, other Agency employees 
are disturbed by her observation of hijab. When she meets Saul in a situation-room, he looks 
at her attire and shakes his head in disbelief: “You wearing that thing on your head: It’s one 
big ‘fuck you’ to the people who would have been your co-workers [. . .]. So if you need to
18 It is interesting to consider that Venezuela is another nation that could be framed as an ‘enemy’ state from the 
perspective of the United States. Blum notes that Hugo Chavez’s “ideological crime” of being a socialist -  
combined with Venezuela’s oil-rich economy and independence from Washington -  earmarked him as threat the 
United States hegemonic ambitions in Central and South America during the Cold War (America's 173).
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wear it, if you really need to, which is your right, you better be the best analyst we’ve ever 
seen” (15:23).
Saul’s comments to the Agency’s latest employee raise a number of important points 
about the ‘good’ Muslim, ‘bad’ Muslim binary. First, the notion that Fara’s external display of 
her devotion to her religion acts as an affront to those who died on 12/12 only strengthens the 
parallel that Homeland draws between Islam and acts of terrorism, and implies that Fara is 
insensitive to the trauma and loss that the CIA -  indeed, America as a whole -  has experienced. 
Second, Saul makes it clear that it is Fara’s “right” to don the headscarf, as the United States 
is a nation in which freedom of religion occupies a primary place in the country’s constitution. 
His emphasis on American rights is significant, as he is perhaps differentiating the majority of 
Muslim countries, and their strict religious legislation, from American values. Last, by virtue 
of Fara being both a Muslim and a CIA analyst, Saul requires her not to be a mere ‘good’ 
Muslim but, in fact, to be the “best” Muslim. This is something she can do by joining the CIA’s 
Overseas Contingency Operations (“Uh... Oh... Ah” 15:30).
In the same way that Brody chooses the path of the ‘good’ Muslim after his arrest, Fara 
commits herself to the protection of the United States by virtue of her position at the CIA. As 
a result of Brody being an American character, however, he is granted a complex back story -  
in clear contrast to the Iranian Fara. She eagerly takes on the role of the ‘good’ Muslim, yet her 
reasons for doing so are unclear, and remain so throughout Homeland's duration. O f course, 
the fact that she is Iranian only reinforces the notion of her as a ‘friend’ to the CIA, for if she 
is willing to fight with the United States against the country of her birth then surely she is on 
the ‘right side’ of the War on Terror.
Fara is also similar to the protagonist of The Reluctant Fundamentalist, in that she, like 
Changez, realises the challenges involved in proving oneself a ‘good’ Muslim in the United 
States after 9/11 and Homeland's fictional echo of this attack in 12/12. Their respective 
occupations are premised on benefitting America but, while Changez eventually realises that 
his occupation facilitates conditions of precarity in the Muslim world, Fara remains resolute in 
her choice to be a “useful” ‘friend’ to her adopted nation (Derr ida 23). As a CIA analyst, her 
inherent value as a ‘friend’ is measured solely by her ability to assist the Agency in gathering 
financial intelligence about potential threats. Her friendship is therefore dependant on her 
ability to allocate enmity to others.
Writing for NY Daily News, Ethan Sacks (2013) notes that Fara is a “rare positive 
Muslim figure on a show where most Islamic characters are moustache-twirling bad guys” 
(“Episode Four Recap”). While Sacks makes a credible point, it is important to remember that
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the only reason Fara is portrayed as a “positive Muslim figure” is because she supports the War 
on Terror. An anonymous Iranian blogger writing for the popular culture website, Complex 
(2013), observes that Fara is “supposed to tap into the complexities of the Iranian-American 
diaspora” but ends up looking like a “two-dimensional poster girl for ideal immigrant 
behaviour” (“Notes from Iran”). It is difficult to disagree with this remark and I argue that, 
rather than problematising the ‘good’ Muslim, ‘bad’ Muslim dichotomy, Fara’s character 
actually reinforces this binary by being a role model for just how ‘good’ a ‘good’ Muslim 
should be.
Another important detail to consider is that Saul’s inflammatory outburst regarding 
Fara’s headscarf is in no way framed as Islamophobic, racist, or demeaning. Because he 
represents, in the words of Jacobin writers Deepa Kumar and Arun Kundnani (2013), 
Homeland’s “bearer of moral wisdom,” there is no suggestion that his anger at Fara’s outward 
display of her commitment to Islam is unjustified (“Imagination”). In fact, despite bringing her 
close to tears, Saul does no apologise for his hurtful and degrading remarks, and he instructs 
her to begin working right away.
Fara’s dedication to finint leads the Agency to the conclusion that Maijid Javadi (Shaun 
Toub), a Deputy Chief o f Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence, funded the attack on Langley. In a 
complex but factually improbable plan, Saul manages to lure Javadi to the United States. 
Before he is arrested and taken to Langley, however, the Iranian visits his ex-wife in the in the 
Washington D.C. area, where he brutally murders both her and his daughter in-law.
For a show that attempts to erect a plausible frame around the action of the War on 
Terror, Homeland s third season might seem too far-fetched. “Who on earth would have 
approved this mess [the Javadi operation] in the first place, in real life?” asks The Atlantic’s 
Richard Lawson (2013) -  a question that resonates with other reviewers (“Real Problem”). That 
Javadi, an experienced intelligence officer, could be lured to the United States under false 
pretences is evidence that the series, according to Pajiba’s Dustin Rowles (2013), appears to 
have “stretched its storyline beyond credulity” (“Absurdity”). The New York Post’s Robert 
Rorke (2013), admits to nearly abandoning the series mid-season, noting that it had transformed 
itself from a “critical darling” to a show “impossible to take seriously” (“Take Seriously”). 
Rorke continues: “If  Homeland was just another cheesy network show written by a bunch of 
LA hacks who don’t care what they throw against the wall, fans and critics wouldn’t feel so let 
down. But Homeland was supposed to be different, and it was. It was great. No more” (“Take 
Seriously”). The responses of these reviewers echo my earlier assessment of Homeland s 
failure to live up to its early potential, and where Season Three falls explicitly short is its
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inability to imbue its ‘bad’ Muslim characters with any nuance or complexity. Javadi is the 
perfect embodiment of this failure.
Javadi justifies his grisly murder of his ex-wife because she committed an act of 
infidelity by fleeing to America from post-revolutionary Iran. He even goes so far as to confess 
to Saul that he wanted to “stone her” but did not have adequate time (Carl Franklin “Gerontion” 
13:32). Javadi’s long-held grudge against his ex-wife is violently resolved, and Homeland 
makes it impossible to read his character as anything other than a brutally ‘bad’ Muslim. He 
has, in the words of Scott Collura (2013), who writes for the media company IGN, been 
“written into a corner” by Gansa and Gordon (“‘Still Positive’ Review”). Although Javadi 
shares a nationality with the character of Fara, the two could not be more dissimilar. Given that 
they are the only recurring Iranian characters in Homeland's plot, viewers could be forgiven 
for accusing the creators of not offering any depictions of Iranians who do not fall into the 
distinct polarities of the ‘good’ or ‘bad’ Muslim.
Having incarcerated Javadi at Langley, Saul tells him that he wants to ‘play’ him back 
into Tehran in order to kill the Iranian Chief of Intelligence, General Danesh Akbari (Houshang 
Touzie). The general’s murder, reasons Saul, will necessitate a regime change: a modus 
operandi that has historically been “normal policy” for the United States, at least according to 
Noam Chomsky (Imperial 44).19 White House journalist, Bob Woodward, echoes Chomsky’s 
claims, and asserts that regime change is a “baseline policy” for the CIA (10). Despite the 
disastrous consequences that have resulted from the CIA’s historical role in destabilising or 
removing various regimes -  Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and Salvador Allende’s Chile, for example 
-  Homeland acknowledges that this is a strategy fundamental to the purpose of the Agency.
In having Javadi side with the CIA, Homeland appears to disseminate a narrative that 
rests on a dangerous premise: as long as the former ‘enemy’ acts in the interests of the ‘friend,’ 
their past transgressions are deemed insignificant. This amnesiac approach to counterterrorism 
is problematic, as it requires one to operate under the assumption that the ‘friend,’ once 
befriended, will remain friendly. Under Saul, Javadi has been coerced into resembling a 
“useful” ‘friend’ (Derrida 23), and his adjustment of allegiance is made even more significant 
by the fact that he will be joined in Iran by another figure who is no stranger to the labile 
positions of the ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’: the disgraced Nicholas Brody.
19 In Rogue State (161-220), Blum provides a comprehensive list of countries whose governments have been 
subjected to infiltration or outright intervention at the hands of the CIA since the end of the Second World War. 
Countries such as Iraq (1991-2003); Libya (2011); Afghanistan (1979-92 and 2001); Panama (1989); Somalia 
(1993); Columbia (1990-2015); Venezuela (2001-2004); Chile (1973); and Nicaragua (1979-1990) are only 
some examples.
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3.5 Imagining Iran: Homeland Creates its Own Realities
Back in the United States from Karakas, Brody begins training with a team of Marines in an 
undisclosed location. This training, reasons Saul, will prepare him to cross the Iraq border into 
Iran, where he will seek asylum and then team up with Javadi to kill General Akbari. When he 
arrives in Tehran, Iran’s capital, Brody is met with wild celebrations from the Iranian public, 
and thousands of civilians gather in the streets to welcome him. By portraying his reception in 
this manner, Homeland seems to suggest that the Iranian public are not only familiar with a 
known ‘terrorist’ but actually celebrate the arrival of America’s most-wanted man -  someone 
whom they view as responsible for 12/12. Of course, the Iranian Ministry o f Intelligence knows 
that Javadi was behind the Langley attack, but it is the perception of Brody in the eyes of 
Iranian civilians that draws a picture of a county that endorses acts of terror aimed at the United 
States, and who, like Javadi, are capable o f holding a hateful -  perhaps even violent -  grudge.
Homelands depiction o f Tehran frames the city’s inhabitants as a veritable sea o f anti­
American ‘bad’ Muslims, and it does so with only partial recourse to a long history of American 
interference in Iranian politics. There is no mention, for example, of the 1953 coup -  organised 
by the CIA -  in which Muhammad Mosaddegh, Iran’s secular prime minister, was overthrown. 
Mosaddegh was replaced with the American and British-backed Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, 
who ruled as Iran’s shah for twenty-five years, until a revolution in 1979 saw the nation become 
an Islamic Republic (Armstrong, Fields 288-89). Without acknowledging the considerable 
impact that American foreign policy has had on Iran, Homeland offers an imbalanced 
interpretation of both the country itself and why some of its inhabitants might be hostile 
towards the United States. It is important, here, to remember the character of Fara, and her 
positioning as both an Iranian and a ‘good’ Muslim. Although she is included in the show to 
provide a semblance o f balance to Homeland s otherwise negative depiction of Iranians, it 
should be evident that her character alone does not absolve the framing of this particular 
country’s inhabitants as irrationally hostile to the United States.
Renowned Middle East expert, Fawaz Gerges (2013), claims that Homelands 
rendering of Iran’s capital city is “not only harmful and insidious,” but actually has the potential 
to “create and enforce hostilities between Americans and Iranians” (qtd. in L.A. Ross). Gerges 
continues: “the portrayal of Iran and Iranians as terrorists, as violent, as scheming, really 
enforces Iranians’ image of the United States as a hostile nation, as a nation that cannot be 
trusted” (qtd. in L.A. Ross). Ironically, then, Homeland's attempts to portray Iranians as
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innately untrustworthy has a detrimental effect on the image of the United States and, in the 
process, unintentionally frames Americans as ‘enemies’ through Iranian eyes.
Brody’s status as a hero in Iran grants him a meeting with his target: the Iranian Chief 
of Intelligence, General Akbari. Once in the general’s office, Brody follows through with the 
mission to assassinate him. He is then arrested and sentenced to death by public hanging: a 
traumatic scene to which Carrie bears witness in Episode Twelve, “The Star.” Notably, Brody’s 
gruesome death takes place in front of a colossal portrait of the late Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini.
Khomeini led the rebellion against the American-backed shah in 1979, and his 
subsequent reign as supreme religious leader of Iran brought with it “a new development on 
the world scene” (Mamdani 122). Post-1979 Iran, in the eyes of American politicians, was 
exceptionally threatening, for not only did Khomeini install “an Islamist regime,” but he was 
“determined to act independently o f all foreign influences, particularly the United States” 
(122). He also called the America “the Great Satan” after President Jimmy Carter extended his 
country’s hospitality to the recently deposed shah (121). The turning point for 
American/Iranian relations came in November 1979, when a group of Khomeini’s supporters 
infiltrated the American Embassy in Tehran, taking fifty-two Americans hostage for 444 
days.20 Memories of the hostage crisis, notes Karen Armstrong, still “sends a shiver through 
Western society” (Islam 149).
Homelands utilisation of Khomeini’s instantly recognisable face -  liberally plastered 
on almost every surface in the show’s version o f Tehran -  is a significant aspect of Season 
Three, and is designed to act as a symbolic trigger for American viewers in the series’ depiction 
of Iran as a country. As was the case with the iconographic depictions of Osama bin Laden and 
Saddam Hussein in the years following 9/11, Khomeini’s face acts as a visual signifier o f an 
American ‘enemy’: something to be freely associated with evil. Moreover, that the death of a 
former Marine takes place in front of this image suggests that Iranian animosity towards the 
United States has not been relegated to the past. Homeland neither completely ignores nor fully 
engages with the history between the United States and Iran. Rather, Gansa and Gordon appear 
content to languish in the long shadow left by Khomeini’s regime without also acknowledging 
that his reign arose in direct response to the rule of the American-backed shah. As such, the 
series creates its own semi-historical reality, in which fractious American/Iranian relations are
20 See Mamdani for a detailed discussion of what came to be known as “The Iranian Hostage Crisis,” 120-23.
116
framed as a result of the 1979 revolution rather than of the substantial history of American 
attempts to influence Iranian governance.
The death of Akbari by Brody’s hand, and the subsequent rise o f Javadi to the general’s 
position, ushers in an Iranian revolution that stands diametrically opposed to the one of 1979. 
Rather than Iran retreating into itself and withdrawing from diplomatic relations with the 
United States, Javadi’s covert role as a CIA asset allows him to fulfil the promises that he made 
to Saul, and he opens up the proverbial “black box” of Iran to American influence (“Still 
Positive” 36:14).
In reality, relations between Iran and the international community have normalised in 
recent times, but not as the result of a CIA-backed coup. In 2015, international diplomacy won 
an important victory when the permanent member states of the United Nations Security Council 
(P5+1) reached an historical Nuclear Deal with the Iranian government.21 The deal requires 
that Iran drastically reduce its nuclear enrichment programme in exchange for the lifting of 
United Nations sanctions, which have been crippling the country for over a decade.22 In the 
long term, the deal will bring relief to a country that has been suffering for an extensive period 
but, in the case of Homeland, Iranian benefits from rejuvenated international relations are far 
from the mind of the CIA. Instead, Gansa and Gordon focus on the benefits that renewed 
American/Iranian relations will have on the Agency.
Javadi’s placement on the upper rung of the Ministry is depicted as serving only one 
purpose: American interests. The man who murdered his own wife -  not to mention planned 
and funded 12/12 -  suddenly becomes more than a “useful” ‘friend’ to the CIA and the 
American government (Derrida 23), and is portrayed as an indispensable tool in the Agency’s 
imperial ambitions. Despite the fact that, in reality, forced regime change seldom works so 
smoothly, Saul’s plan is a great success -  for America. That the CIA has covertly enabled a 
mass murderer to occupy the most influential job in the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence is 
ignored by Gansa and Gordon, therefore validating, perhaps even romanticising, Saul’s 
irresponsible operation. With regime change in Iran, the ghosts of 12/12 seem to have 
dissipated, and all at the CIA congratulate Saul and Carrie. The only person who appears to 
receive no recognition is the man who made the operation possible: Nicholas Brody.
Carrie’s attempt to persuade the new CIA director, Andrew Lockhart, that Brody 
deserves a formal recognition of his sacrifice is ignored. He is, after all, still perceived as a
21 For more information regarding the Nuclear Deal see Richard Javad Heydarian’s article, “Iran Nuclear Deal is 
a Triumph of Diplomacy,” A l Jazeera (2015).
22 See Kasra Naji’s article, “Iran Nuclear Deal: Five Effects of Lifting Sanctions,” BBC (2016).
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‘terrorist’ in the United States, and will always be remembered as the man responsible -  in the 
public eye -  for the carnage of 12/12. To Carrie, however, Brody is more than a national hero, 
more than simply a ‘friend.’ She, like Javadi recognises that “no one is just one thing,” and 
believes that Brody’s chequered past should not stand in the way of the CIA recognising his 
crucial role in the Agency’s reputational rehabilitation following the damage of 12/12 (“The 
Star” 25:12).
Despite the clear distress that Brody’s death causes Carrie, some viewers found 
themselves relieved when the character was killed off. Vanity Fair's Mike Hogan (2015) 
asserts that he “practically applauded” when Brody was “strung up” in Tehran, noting that the 
long-winded relationship between Brody and Carrie detracted from Homeland's  ability to 
become a “high-class spy thriller” (“Why Season Five”). Gansa (2013) reasons that Brody’s 
“shelf-life had expired,” adding that he and Gordon felt that the series needed a “reboot” in 
order to keep viewers engrossed (“Why Brody”). While the relationship between Carrie and 
Brody did limit Homeland’s engagement with the substance o f the War on Terror by focusing 
much of the narrative on their volatile romantic affair, the former Marine represents a unique 
example in the series of the fluidity o f the ‘friend’/ ‘enemy’ binary. His removal from 
Homeland’s plot closes the only portal through which viewers can access the mind of the 
supposed terrorist, meaning the show’s narrative -  in Seasons Four and Five -  is framed almost 
exclusively from the perspective of the CIA and its employees.
There is precious little time for Carrie to mourn the loss of Brody at the end o f Season 
Three. For while relations between America and Iran begin to stabilise, another familiar 
‘enemy’ awakens' in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Season Four of 
Homeland begins in the same location where the War on Terror started in 2001, and Carrie 
takes up a position on the CIA’s drone programme in Kabul, Afghanistan.
3.6 Season Four: The Failing Status of the War on Terror
By setting Season Four in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Homeland's creators present a 
fictionalised account of how the War on Terror is progressing -  14 years since its inception -  
in the region in which it all began. Because the landscape of the Afghan/Pakistani border is 
similar to parts of South Africa’s Western Cape, Gansa and Gordon opted to shoot Season Four 
in South Africa. As a South African viewer, seeing the country’s Department of Arts and 
Culture emblem in Homeland’s credits is rather disconcerting, as one cannot help but feel
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complicit in fuelling the narrative about the War on Terror that the series is disseminating 
globally. Moreover, that this season was filmed a continent away from the setting o f its contents 
points to an underlying problem of Homeland’s narrative -  its lack of realistic engagement 
with the Muslim world.
The geopolitical setting of Season Four is a significant aspect of Homeland s overall 
narrative trajectory because it calls attention to just how ineffective the War on Terror has been 
in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.23 Saul comments on the short-sightedness of his 
government’s approaches to fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan in the first place: “Our 
planning cycles rarely look more than twelve months ahead. So it hasn’t been a fourteen-year 
war we have been waging, but a one-year war waged fourteen times” (Lesli Linka Glatter, “The 
Drone Queen” 11:35). The American Ambassador to Pakistan, Martha Boyd (Laila Robins), 
echoes Saul’s indictment on America’s capacity to rid the world of terrorism:
I saw the kill-list after 9/11. You know how many names were on it? Seven, including 
bin Laden and al Zawahiri. You know how many names are on it today? Over two 
thousand. It’s Alice in fucking Wonderland. You don’t even have to be a terrorist 
anymore apparently; you just have to look like one. (“The Drone Queen” 14:31)
Despite its sarcastic tone, Boyd’s statement underlines some significant problems of the War 
on Terror -  problems that Homeland does well to encapsulate in its narrative. She queries the 
efficacy of America’s current approach to fighting the War on Terror, and notes that the growth 
in animosity toward the United States stems directly from the country’s actions in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan after 9/11. Ironically, her role as an Ambassador requires her to present her 
country in a positive light, yet she has no qualms about criticising American foreign policy. 
Both Boyd and Saul’s comments present viewers with a degree o f self-reflexivity and, for a 
brief moment, Homeland appears to revive the promise it held in Seasons One and Two. 
Although Season Four does offer some criticism about the manner in which the United States 
has conducted itself on the global stage since 9/11, it does so through the perspective of 
American characters. Viewers are not afforded an opportunity to observe the actions of the CIA 
from Pakistani or Afghan positions and, for this reason, Homeland’s critique of the War on 
Terror -  at least in Season Four -  fails to provide a balanced interpretation of this conflict.
23 Since 2014, the Taliban -  who were ostensibly defeated by the American military in 2001 -  have been nothing 
short of resurgent. According to the United Nations, the group currently holds more territory in Afghanistan that 
it did after Operation Enduring Freedom, with nearly half of the country’s districts under their control. See Rod 
Nordland and Joseph Goldstein’s article, “Afghan Taliban’s Reach Is Widest Since 2001, U.N. Says,” The New 
York Times (2015).
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Because Season Four situates viewers in a location which is considered a frontline in the global 
War on Terror, we are able to acknowledge the military means by which this war is being 
waged. The most ubiquitous instrument in the America’s counter-insurgency arsenal is the 
drone, or UAV -  the use of which has become commonplace during Barack Obama’s 
presidency. Mohsin Hamid notes, “The tempo of US drone strikes in Pakistan today remains 
considerably higher than it was under President Bush” (Discontent 166).24 This increase in 
attacks is despite the fact that “the elimination of high-value targets -  al Qaeda or ‘militant’ 
leaders -  has been exceedingly rare, fewer than fifty people, or about two percent of all drone 
deaths” (166). As viewers witnessed in Season One, drone warfare is far from discriminatory, 
and Season Four has much to say about the both the efficacy and the damage of airstrikes -  
unmanned or otherwise.
3.7 “The Drone Queen”: How Much Is a Pakistani Life Worth?
Episode One of Season Four, “The Drone Queen,” opens with Carrie in a situation-room in the 
American Embassy in Kabul. She is hunting down a Pakistani Taliban leader by the name of 
Haissam Haqqani,25 who has been on her kill-list for quite some time.26 The intelligence with 
which Carrie has been provided suggests that Haqqani is hiding in a farmhouse in the Pakistani 
Tribal Areas. Viewers see the farmhouse from the perspective of the Predator drone circling 
above it and the target is framed by both the drone itself and the screen on which Carrie and 
her team are watching. In the same way that both Changez and Issa Shamsuddin witness the 
War on Terror through the frame of television, so too does Carrie. In the case of Homeland, 
however, the protagonist is in control of the frame -  she makes the decision about what will be 
considered the designated parameters of action.
Rather than using the Predator drone’s hellfire missiles, Carrie commands the pilot of 
an F-16 fighter jet to fly over and deliver the strike. Neither the viewer, nor the characters in
24 Chamayou explains that, in Pakistan, Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, “the number of patrols by American 
armed drones increased by 1,200 percent between 2004 and 2012” (13). He also notes that, in the United States 
Air Force, “more drone operators are trained than all the pilots of fighter planes and bombers put together” (13).
25The real-life Haqqani Network, led by Jalaluddin Haqqani, is a clear inspiration for this ‘bad’ Muslim character 
and his organisation. For information on the Haqqani Network’s rise to power in Afghanistan, see Vahid Brown 
and Don Rassler’s book, Fountainhead o f  Jihad (2013).
26 Every week, Barack Obama and his staff hold a meeting which has come to be known as “Terror Tuesday.” At 
this meeting, Obama updates his “kill-list”: a list of individuals to be targeted by drones in Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, Syria and Libya. See John Whitehead’s article, “Terror Tuesdays, Kill Lists and Drones,” 
The Huffmgton Post (2012).
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the room hear the jet fly over, but both see the devastation that its air-to-ground missiles cause. 
The farmhouse is obliterated; its occupants all but annihilated, and this destruction prompts 
wild celebrations from Carrie and her team. As the celebrations continue, a member of staff 
presents Carrie with a birthday cake with the words, “The Drone Queen” emblazoned on its 
icing. The commemoration of Carrie’s birth in front of a massive screen showing images of 
death and destruction creates a disturbing visual juxtaposition -  one that ought to make viewers 
uncomfortable. Remembering Butler’s assertion that those who “represent a threat to life” do 
not “appear as lives” (Frames 42), it is clear that Carrie’s ability to oscillate between taking 
and celebrating life represents a comment about drone warfare itself, and how detached from 
the effects of their actions those who operate UAV’s are required to be.
Despite the seemingly successful strike on the farmhouse, the celebrations by Carrie 
and her team do not last long, for the intelligence given to Carrie about Haqqani’s location is 
incorrect. Rather than the farmhouse containing the wanted man and his band of Taliban 
followers, it is being used for a wedding of one of his relatives. Carrie has murdered forty 
people who, from an American perspective, happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong 
time. What makes the deaths of these innocent Pakistanis even more unsettling is the reaction 
from Carrie and her embassy team. When she sees on the news that the target was, in fact, a 
wedding party, she argues that Pakistanis “pull this shit all the time. If it wasn’t a wedding 
they’d say it was a mosque [. . .] or an orphanage, or a mosque for orphans” (“The Drone 
Queen” 21:30).
Carrie’s remarks raise an interesting point about how “grievability” is recognised and 
how civilian deaths are all too often considered insignificant in the eyes of the CIA (Butler, 
Frames 2). When Carrie claims that Pakistanis “pull this shit all the time,” she denies that there 
are worthy lives that have been destroyed by her actions (“The Drone Queen” 21:30). By virtue 
of her being the “Drone Queen,” she has the benefit of not actually entering into a situation in 
which combat occurs, and the fact that her targets are no more than figures on a screen, or 
numbers on a list, means that collateral damage, in almost any guise, is both an acceptable and 
necessary element of what it means to play her part in America’s Overseas Contingency 
Operations. The military clout afforded to drone operators is something that Gregoire 
Chamayou explores in his book, Drone Theory (2015), and he claims that for nations or 
agencies utilising UAV’s rather than troops, “warfare, from being possibly asymmetrical, 
becomes absolutely unilateral. What could still claim to be combat is converted into a campaign 
of what is, quite simply, slaughter” (13). Of course, Carrie does not see what she does as 
“slaughter,” and this attitude is a reminder to Homeland's viewers that, throughout the War on
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Terror, the American government has given “all kinds o f reasons for its killings whilst at the 
same time refusing to call those killings ‘killings’ at all” (Butler, Frames 47).
Carrie’s reaction to the news that she has killed so many civilians emphasises the failure 
of the CIA to acknowledge its complicity in the suffering and death of others. Gansa and 
Gordon frame her arrogance and belligerence as a hindrance in the War on Terror effort, and 
they offer a clear criticism of the misguided nature of the CIA’s drone programme. Viewers 
are therefore invited into a situation from which we can evaluate the consequences (or lack 
thereof) of American military power, and how this power has been executed during the Obama 
presidency.
The CIA’s lack o f accountability for its actions is evident not only in Carrie’s response 
to the news o f her ill-executed strike. In fact, the individual who gave her the intelligence 
suggesting that Haqqani was in the farmhouse, the Islamabad station chief, Sandy Bachman 
(Corey Stoll), goes so far as to blame the victims of the airstrike: “Haqqani was a legitimate 
target. Everyone in that farmhouse had to know what he was: a marked man [. . .]. He put their 
lives at risk, not us” (“The Drone Queen” 15:54). Bachman’s claim appears to endorse the 
notion that individuals who are related to Taliban members should be considered ‘bad’ 
Muslims, and are therefore not to be mourned when their lives are lost. For Bachman, the notion 
that the CIA should be accountable for the deaths of those civilians is absurd. This is because 
his perspective is framed by the idea that the United States has the right to commit acts of 
wartime violence in a sovereign nation with which they are not at war. In his view, the death 
of those civilians is not the fault of the CIA, but of Haqqani’s relatives, for they are fraternising 
not with a father, uncle, or husband, but a ‘terrorist.’
Bachman’s response to the death of Pakistani civilians is shown to be everything that 
is wrong with American foreign policy, and Gansa and Gordon utilise the character’s 
superciliousness to pose a thinly veiled condemnation of the CIA’s drone programme. Like the 
Bush-era hangovers of Estes and Walden, Bachman’s attitude suggests the misplaced need for 
the United States to project its power at any cost, even if it requires the eradication o f non­
combatants. Homeland appears to be asking viewers to consider not merely the damage that 
the War on Terror has wrought but also the arrogance of the CIA in waging it. Both Carrie and 
Bachman’s claims are illustrative of how precarity is unevenly distributed, and Homeland 
challenges the frame through which collateral damage is reported and responded to.27
27 Many media outlets in the United States are reluctant to report on deaths caused by drone strikes in Pakistan. 
Chamayou admits that “[e]xact figures are very hard to establish, but in Pakistan alone estimates of the number 
of deaths between 2004 and 2012 vary from 2,640 to 3,474 (13).
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As punishment for her strike on the farmhouse, Carrie is sent back to the United States, but 
quickly persuades Lockhart to give her Bachman’s job o f Islamabad station chief. Carrie’s 
arrival in Pakistan’s capital coincides with a unique development in Homeland's plot, for 
viewers are soon introduced to another intelligence Agency: the Pakistani Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI). Through various interactions between the CIA and the ISI, Homeland's 
viewers encounter the complexity of international relations, as well as the difficulty of 
diplomacy between nation-states. The relationship between the ISI and the CIA is far from 
straightforward and, by characterising many o f the ISI’s employees as ‘bad’ Muslims, 
Homeland depicts the United States as isolated from its ‘friends’ and vulnerable to its 
‘enemies.’
3.8 Diplomacy, Demagoguery, and Death
Throughout Season Four of Homeland, the ISI are portrayed in a less than flattering manner. 
While there are legitimate reasons for believing that this organisation -  much like any civilian 
intelligence agency -  has factions within it that are corrupt, the manner in which the ISI is 
framed implies that there are elements within this institution that are deeply hostile to the 
interests of the United States.28 In reality, America’s historical relationship with the ISI is as 
resilient as it is duplicitous. The ISI initially rose to prominence during the Soviet occupation 
of Afghanistan, and the CIA used them as a channel through which they could supply weapons 
to the Afghan mujahedeen (Cockburn, The Rise 100). Since 1990, however, ISI support for 
non-state extremist groups that arose out of the Soviet withdrawal has not wavered, and 
Cockburn notes that there is clear evidence of the ISI sponsoring the Taliban (58).29
Given the controversial status of the ISI as an American ally, it can therefore come as 
no surprise that Homeland portrays this organisation as innately untrustworthy. Although 
Gansa and Gordon are astute to characterise the CIA as an institution that is not above reproach, 
their illustration of the ISI is as unambiguous as it is deprecating. An apt depiction of the ISI’s 
perfidious behaviour is when Saul -  having been in Islamabad to deliver a shipment of weapon 
materiel -  is kidnapped by an ISI agent, Farhad Ghazi (Tamer Burjaq), and delivered to 
Haqqani’s hiding place in the Tribal Areas. Saul’s kidnapping is not the only example of the
28 See Mohsin Hamid’s chapter, “Why They Get Pakistan Wrong,” Discontent and Its Civilisations, 137-51.
29 For more information on the relationship between the CIA and the ISI, see Mamdani’s chapter, “Afghanistan: 
The High Point of the Cold War,” 119-77.
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way in which the ISI is characterised as being in alliance with the Taliban and/or impinging on 
American interests in Pakistan. One significant ‘bad’ Muslim of Season Four is Tasneem 
Qureshi (Nimrat Kaur), an ISI official, who endeavours to destabilise any foothold America 
attempts to gain in Pakistan. Tasneem is a key player in the kidnapping of Saul, and she 
manages to persuade Martha Boyd’s husband, Dennis (Mark Moses), to pass on embassy 
secrets to her so that she might use them to harm Americans working in Pakistan. Qureshi even 
manages to coerce Dennis into switching out Carrie’s lithium medication for potent 
hallucinogenics, which causes Carrie untold misery throughout Season Four.
Following the capture of Saul, Lockhart makes his way to Islamabad to negotiate the 
former director’s release. Lockhart’s comments to the ISI’s officials are inflammatory and 
insensitive, and he accuses them of aiding Haqqani’s capture of Saul, as well as undermining 
American interests in the region. In fact, Lockhart claims that it is “no secret that there are 
elements within [Pakistan’s] intelligence services and armed forces which are sympathetic to 
Mr Haqqani [. . .] just as they were to Osama bin Laden” (Carl Franklin, “Redux” 13:56). His 
assertion is not without context, for we must remember that when bin Laden was found in 2011, 
his compound in Abbottabad was suspiciously close to the Pakistani Military Academy.30 The 
distrust that the United States has of the ISI is therefore understandable. What Director 
Lockhart fails to realise, however, is that the fictional Haqqani, just like the real bin Laden, is 
a hero of the Afghan war. By virtue of him being part of the mujahedeen that drove the Soviet 
Union out of Afghanistan, he is revered by many -  from Kabul to Islamabad.
Remembering Javadi’s assertion in Season Three that “no one is just one thing,” it 
should be clear that, in the eyes of the United States, Haqqani is an ‘enemy’ (“The Star” 25:12). 
To millions of Afghans and Pakistanis, however, he is a figure of heroic resistance -  someone 
who refuses to let his country be occupied and controlled by outside forces, be they Soviet or 
American. Former CIA employee-turned-author, Graham E. Fuller, notes that the epithet of 
“‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,’” while facile, “is also very close to the 
truth” (336). In the context of Homeland, the phrase appears perfectly applicable to a character 
such as Haqqani. As a former member of the mujahedeen, the CIA would have endorsed him 
during the Afghan War, making him an exceptionally “useful” ‘friend’ to America in the last 
decade of the Cold War (Derrida 23).
30 According to Mohsin Hamid, “ [h]unting down a wanted terrorist in Abbottabad is, in American or British terms, 
like hunting [a terrorist] down near West Point or Sandhurst” (Discontent 132).
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Lockhart’s aggressive demagoguery continues, and he tells General Bunran Latif (Art Malik) 
that the “double-dealing [Pakistan] has been engaged in for decades [is] unacceptable” 
(“Redux” 14:11). The irony of this statement should be evident, as the CIA, even within the 
fictionalised confines of Homeland, is an institution that appears to feel no shame for the 
double-dealings resulting from its multidirectional allegiances. Not so long ago, Estes, Saul, 
and Carrie were sending a self-confessed al Qaeda operative, Nicholas Brody, out into the 
world to do the Agency’s work. Lockhart eventually gives the ISI an ultimatum: “either Saul 
Berenson gets returned to [the American] embassy quickly and quietly, or [the United States 
will] put Pakistan’s $2 billion a-year aid package under immediate review” (14:22). Director 
Lockhart’s ludicrous demands place the responsibility of Saul’s capture firmly on the shoulders 
of the ISI and, while there are individuals within its apparatus that are accountable for the 
kidnapping, Lockhart’s elevated position allows him to hold the entire nation of Pakistan to 
ransom over the life of one man. By forcing the hand o f General Latif, Lockhart projects his 
power as an American and, more specifically, an American who represents the hard-hitting and 
self-aggrandising nature of the Bush-era doctrine.
Mike Hogan (2014), of Vanity Fair, notes that, because Lockhart is a former Senator, 
“he understands the art of negotiating by being a huge asshole” (“The One”). While 
colloquially put, Hogan’s point is clear: Lockhart is a stereotype o f the hawkish belligerents 
who dominated the War on Terror in its initial phases, such as Paul Wolfowitz and Dick 
Cheney.31 By making Lockhart the director of the CIA, Homeland presents us with the idea 
that American diplomatic efforts during Obama’s presidency have not altered significantly 
from the days o f George W. Bush. Furthermore, the fact that Lockhart’s unilateral approach to 
negotiation overrides any suggestions made by Martha Boyd and other American Embassy 
officials appears to be Gansa and Gordon’s way of criticising the degree of influence that the 
CIA has over sensitive diplomatic issues.
Lockhart gets his way and, having liaised with the ISI, Haqqani agrees to return Saul in 
exchange for six of his Taliban operatives. On the way back to the embassy, however, the CIA 
convoy is attacked by a horde of Taliban fighters in the centre of Islamabad. Carrie calls for 
backup, leaving the embassy vulnerable to attack. This has been part of Tasneem and Haqqani’s 
plan all along. Of all the secrets that Dennis Boyd has passed onto Tasneem, the most
31 Woodward describes Wolfowitz as the “intellectual godfather and fiercest advocate for toppling Saddam 
Hussein” (21). Cheney, Woodward claims, “harboured a deep sense of unfinished business about Iraq” following 
the first Gulf War, and was responsible for selling the American public the notion that Iraq “was the primary 
national security threat for America in the decades if not the generations to come” after 9/11 (9, 132).
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significant is information regarding a hidden entrance into the American Embassy. Using this 
entrance, Haqqani and his Taliban manage to get into the building itself.
As they proceed through the embassy, killing on sight, viewers are reminded of the 
Iranian hostage crisis o f 1979, as well as the September 11, 2012 attack on an American 
diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya.32 In the same way that 12/12 (the bombing of 
Langley in Season Two) has a figurative relationship with the non-fictional 9/11, Homeland’s 
portrayal of a vicious assault on an American Embassy attempts to convince viewers that an 
attack of this nature is not beyond the realms of possibility. Some, however, think that Gansa 
and Gordon’s depiction of the embassy invasion is too fanciful, with Josh Modell (2014), who 
writes for A.V. Club, stating: “It’s not bad enough that Haqqani looks like a right-wing 
cartoonist’s vision of a terrorist, but is it even remotely plausible that he would plan this kind 
of attack” (“Something Else”)? While this particular scene reminds us of Homeland s penchant 
for the spectacular, it is also important to remember a crucial tenet on which the show’s 
narrative rests: the United States, even its embassies situated on the soil of other nations, is, 
and always will be, susceptible to acts of terror. The fact that Haqqani’s Taliban has been 
brutalising many Pakistani citizens during its reign is ignored in favour of showing just how 
deadly this organisation is to Americans.
What is significant about the assault on the embassy is that it would not have been 
possible without Dennis and Tasneem’s relationship. The manner in which she bullies him to 
do her bidding seems to characterise her, even more so than Haqqani, as Season Four’s ultimate 
‘bad’ Muslim. The fact that she is a high-level member of the ISI in alliance with wanted 
terrorists blurs the boundaries between who can and cannot be considered a ‘friend’ to America. 
No one, Homeland implies, can be trusted in the War on Terror -  not the CIA, not the ISI, and 
certainly not the Taliban.
The assault on the embassy, and the death of forty Americans, marks a turning point 
for Pakistani/American relations in Homeland, and the United States severs all diplomatic ties 
with Pakistan. Their War on Terror in this part of the world, it seems, is over. As was the case 
with the aftermath of 12/12, the CIA seeks to establish how an attack of such magnitude could 
occur. The series of investigations that follow the attack take place back in the United States, 
but without Homeland s chief protagonist. Carrie has become disillusioned with the CIA and
32 On the eleventh anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, Ansar al-Sharia -  a Libyan militant group -  carried out a 
series of attacks on an American diplomatic compound, killing two Foreign Service employees. The following 
day, a CIA annexe was assaulted by the same group, leading to the death of two military contractors. See Fred 
Burton and Samuel Katz’s book, Under Fire (2014), as well as Anup Kaphle’s article, “Timeline: How the 
Benghazi Attacks Played Out,” The Washington Post (2014).
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she admits to Saul that “there are only wrong choices,” and that “nothing good can happen in 
this fucked up world” that the CIA have helped to create (Alex Graves, “Halfway to a Donut” 
44:54). Her final modicum of introspection characterises her as someone who has matured as 
an individual throughout Season Four, especially if we compare her admission to Saul with her 
earlier claims regarding the deaths of those in the farmhouse.
Alternatively, one could argue that Carrie’s decision to leave the CIA is a clear 
weakness in Homeland’s plot. One could make such a case not simply because Carrie resigns 
per se, but because of what motivates her to do so. It seems highly implausible that, having 
worked for the CIA for so long, she is only now realising the true consequences of her job. Her 
actions have caused so much harm and killed so many people that Gansa and Gordon’s attempt 
to portray her as naive seems misplaced, if not plainly contradictory. Carrie’s decision to leave 
the CIA also brings us back to the question of the frame, and how it works to include and 
occlude.
Viewers only see portions of the actual damage that Carrie does, such as the airstrike 
on the farmhouse, but we witness -  in intimate detail -  the psychological effects that her job 
has on her. We cannot perceive her actions, or the actions o f any other CIA employee, as 
outsiders to the American frame that Homeland imposes around Season Four. Although there 
is room in this frame for criticism of the CIA and the United States, such as Saul and Martha’s 
comments about the efficacy o f the War on Terror, Homeland’s fourth instalment ultimately 
fails to provide viewers with an alternative lens through which to view the actions o f its 
characters. The death of Brody marks the end of Homeland’s ability to situate viewers in a 
position sympathetic to America’s ‘enemies’ and, while Season Four began -  as did the series 
as a whole -  with the promise of problematising the manner in which the War on Terror is read, 
it ends with a portrayal o f America’s perceived precarity: the foundation on which the War on 
Terror was built.
Carrie’s decision to abandon her position at the CIA is easier said than done, and as 
Season Five begins, we see a protagonist who is still determined to fight terrorism, but who 
also has no desire to continue with the organisation that has facilitated so much death and 
destruction in pursuit of its ‘enemies.’
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3.9 Season Five: “Speaking Truth to Power” in a Risky Take on the War on Terror
Homeland’s fifth season is set predominantly in Berlin, amidst the growing refugee crisis 
brought on by the raging war in Syria. The notion of the ‘homeland’ has been extended to 
encompass not merely the United States, but Western Europe as a whole. In fact, the CIA is 
working in conjunction with the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND), to bypass the 
German privacy law preventing the surveillance o f its citizens. Governmental surveillance, as 
well as those who oppose it, is therefore a significant aspect of this season. Rather than relying 
on a fictionalised, “structuring” ‘enemy’ to guide the CIA’s actions (Derrida 84), Season Five’s 
antagonists are drawn from the numerous political actors involved in the Syrian War -  the 
Islamic State, Bashar al Assad’s Syrian regime, and Russia. Homeland’s concern with the 
Islamic State is not merely the mayhem the group is wreaking in its attempts to establish a 
caliphate in the Middle East but its ideological influence on European Muslims. As for Assad’s 
regime and Russia, the latter is supporting the former in the Syrian War -  both in reality and in 
Homeland itself -  and is undermining American interests in the Middle East.
Remembering Gansa’s claim that he and Gordon attempt to ask rather than answer 
questions, I would suggest that Season Five does not completely fulfil this promise (“The 
Creators”) . The show treads a fine line in fictionalising a war that, for many, is no fiction at all 
and, by offering viewers a semi-fabricated account of both the war in Syria and the Islamic 
State’s attempts to infiltrate Europe, Homeland appears to be playing out its own fantasy as to 
how the CIA should be dealing with these very real problems. For example, in Episode Four, 
“Why is this Night Different” (John Coles), Saul -  with the help of an old friend in Mossad -  
attempts to facilitate yet another regime change, this time in Syria. The Russians thwart his 
plan, but the message from Homeland is clear: Assad’s regime must be overthrown. Gansa 
notes that, as the show’s creators, he and Gordon “occupy a strange place right now as one of 
the few ongoing serialized dramas that are commenting on these things happening in the world” 
(qtd. in Jurgensen). The pair acknowledges that some viewers might find Season Five 
objectionable, but they also recognise that their thinly-veiled division between fiction and 
reality allows them to create television that will “get people to sit up and start talking” about 
the contemporary War on Terror (“Carrie’s Fate”). Apart from offering insight into the danger 
that the Islamic State poses to Europe, the latest season of Homeland is unique for another
128
reason: the voices o f dissent that were raised in Season Four seem more prominent in Season 
Five.
Characters who speak out against the conduct of the CIA and BND represent a growing 
public consciousness about the detrimental effects of the War on Terror. One of the war’s 
biggest critics is Allison Carr (Miranda Otto) -  the chief of the CIA’s Berlin station. In a 
flashback to 2004, when she was working as the chief o f the Baghdad station during Operation 
Iraqi Freedom, she rhetorically asks Carrie: “What don’t they get in Washington? [. . .]. “You 
can’t shove democracy down people’s throats” (Michael Offer, “Better Call Saul” 15:58). 
Allison’s valid questioning of one of the stated reasons for the invasion of Iraq echoes Martha 
Boyd’s comments about the execution of the War on Terror in Season Four, and both characters 
indicate the atmosphere of cynicism within the CIA itself. Carrie’s German employer, the 
philanthro-capitalist Otto During (Sebastian Koch), is another character who opposes the 
manner in which America has conducted itself since 9/11. He tells Saul, in no uncertain terms, 
that “nothing has made the world a more dangerous place in the last fifteen years than the 
foreign policy of the United States” (“Super Powers” 08:16). Laura Sutton (Sarah Sokolovic), 
an American journalist who works with Carrie at the During Foundation, argues that the actions 
of the American government throughout the War on Terror have only exacerbated the threat of 
global terrorism. Like Otto, she believes in “speaking truth to power” (Lesli Linka Glatter, “A 
False Glimmer” 45:08), and critiques the nation that has continuously “suspend[ed] habeus 
corpus, resort[ed] to torture, extrajudicial killings, and the wholesale surveillance o f its own 
citizens” (Seith Mann, “Our Man in Damascus” 33:10).33
While Otto and Laura’s claims may indeed be valid, their attitudes raise a number of 
crucial questions. Are these voices o f dissent -  characters who desire to see the United States 
take responsibility for the damage it has done in the name of the War on Terror -  strategically 
placed throughout Season Five as a reminder to viewers that, although their ethical stances 
might be correct, their solutions for dealing with the problem of terrorism are even less effective 
than those of the United States? Are their liberal-minded ideals too utopian, and unrealistic? In 
the case of Laura Sutton, Homeland appears to be unambiguous in its answers to these 
questions.
That Laura is referred to in the German media as a “dissident journalist” is telling, for 
it implies that she is at odds with the government and, therefore, the BND and CIA (“A False
33 “Speaking Truth to Power” is the title of a chapter in Edward. W. Said’s, Representations o f  the Intellectual 
(1993). In my research, I have yet to come across a critic or reviewer who acknowledges this fact.
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Glimmer” 46:01). Because she asks significant questions about the conduct of these two 
agencies throughout the War on Terror -  such as the necessity of their surveillance networks 
and tendency to spy on to Muslim citizens -  the label o f “dissident” is a means of dismissing 
and delegitimizing her complaints (“A False Glimmer” 46:01). Laura, however, is no typical 
investigative journalist, and is considered a threat to German and American security by virtue 
of her connections to a Turkish hacker, Numan (Atheer Adel). Numan has in his possession 
1,800 classified documents that he inadvertently hacks from the CIA’s Berlin station, and he 
reaches out to Laura to publish them. She accepts but her plans are foiled by the BND, who 
give her an ultimatum: either she can relinquish the documents and Numan will be deported to 
Turkey, or she can make them public and be extradited to America, where she will be arrested 
for violating the Espionage Act. Laura chooses the first option, and her decision is crucial 
moment in the context of Homeland’s portrayal o f a so-called “dissident” character (“A False 
Glimmer 46:01).
By letting Numan take the fall for her, Homeland frames Laura as lacking conviction. 
She is not willing to sacrifice herself for what she believes in, unlike those at the CIA or BND, 
whose jobs, as Homeland shows, are sometimes a matter of life and death. Laura, the show 
seems to suggest, is more concerned about the image of herself as a journalist-activist than she 
is about following through with her vociferous rhetoric. She wants to be a whistleblower like 
Edward Snowden -  reviled by the Right and praised by many on the Left -  but without 
suffering the consequences of her actions.34 Her one-dimensional character smacks of 
unprofessionalism and selfishness and, by implicating herself in Numan’s deportation, she is 
revealed as nothing more than a hypocrite.
Spy historian and intelligence expert, Vince Houghton (2015) -  who is often consulted 
by The Wall Street Journal apropos Homeland s believability -  calls Laura a “caricature of a 
journalist,” adding that one would very rarely “find someone like Laura in the real world” (qtd. 
in Leeds “Season Five Episode Two”). Indiewire’s Ben Travers (2015) finds her a 
“frustratingly stupid individual,” and he notes with disdain her “blindingly subjective 
viewpoints on everything” (“Review: Episode Four”). It is difficult to disagree with either 
Travers or Houghton, as Laura -  whose willingness to question the actions of unaccountable
34 Former National Security Agency employee, Edward Snowden, has become a divisive figure in global 
politics. In 2015, he leaked close to 10,000 classified CIA and NSA documents -  many of which detail the 
American government’s pervasive surveillance of its own citizens -  to two journalists in Hong Kong. He then 
fled to Moscow, where he was granted political asylum for a three-year period. Snowden is wanted in the United 
States for theft of government property and violating the Espionage Act. See Glenn Greenwal d’s book, No 
Place to Hide (2014) and Luke Harding’s The Snowden Files (2014) for background on Snowden’s life and a 
discussion of the lack of governmental transparency in the technological age.
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and powerful institutions should be commended -  ends up looking naive, illogical, and 
eventually fails to make any tangible difference. If Laura represents Homeland’s effort to give 
voice to those who see the War on Terror as a threat to civil liberties in America and Europe, 
then the viability of this position is swiftly foreclosed by her unreasonable and infantile 
qualities. Her journalistic activism is portrayed more as a hindrance than a help. Making a 
difference in the War on Terror, the show implies, is not achieved through the subversion of 
governmental or intelligence agencies. Rather, as has been the case throughout the series, 
unilateralism, military might, and extrajudicial surveillance operations are perfectly adequate 
approaches to fighting terrorism.
Compare, for example, Otto and Laura’s critiques to the one made by Peter Quinn 
(Rupert Friend), a CIA paramilitary officer who has just returned from a two-month tour in al 
Raqqa Province -  the Islamic State stronghold in Syria. Quinn tells a room full o f American 
joint-chiefs o f staff that the United States lacks strategy in its fight against Islamic State:
They [Islamic State] have a strategy. They’re gathering right now in Raqqa by the tens 
of thousands; hidden in the civilian population, cleaning their weapons, and they know 
exactly why they’re there [. . .]. They call it the end times. What do you think the 
beheadings are about? Crucifixions, the revival o f slavery, you think they make this shit 
up? It’s all in the book, their fucking book, the only book they ever read. They read it 
all the time, they never stop. They are there for one reason and one reason only: to die 
for the caliphate, and usher in a world without infidels [. . .]. That’s their strategy, and 
it’s been like that since the seventh century. So do you really think a few Special Forces 
teams are going to put a dent in that?
(Lesli Linka Glatter, “Separation Anxiety” 11:54)
When asked what his solution to the dominance of Daesh would be, Quinn tells the joint-chiefs 
that he would place “200,000 American troops on the ground, indefinitely, to provide security 
and support for an equal number of doctors and elementary school teachers” (13:10). Having 
learned their lesson from the disastrous occupation of Iraq, the joint-chiefs reject Quinn’s 
proposition. He then declares that if they are unwilling to sacrifice American lives to protect 
those who have been living under Islamic States rule for nearly two years, the United States 
should “hit reset” (13:48). When asked exactly what he means by that, Quinn looks at the joint - 
chiefs and tells them to “pound Raqqa into a parking lot” (13:54).
Quinn’s prescient speech about the danger t hat the Islamic State poses appears to fall 
on deaf ears. His suggestion of implementing an occupation in Syria and Iraq is rejected 
outright, and Gansa and Gordon subtly remind viewers of the horrors that befell American
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soldiers -  let alone innocent Iraqis -  during the previous occupation of Iraq. The Department 
of Defence, Homeland implies, is so fearful of putting American lives at risk that they are 
unwilling to take advice from a man who has been on the ground in Syria for two years. Rather 
than taking responsibility for the fact that the eight-year occupation of Iraq contributed to the 
rise of the Islamic State,35 the joint-chiefs appear to be content in continuing with their 
ineffective and damaging policies.36 Killing targets from a distance, therefore rendering the 
“subject’s own destructiveness righteous and its own destructibility unthinkable” (Butler, 
Frames 47, emphasis original) -  that appears to be Homeland's interpretation of America’s 
approach to fighting the Islamic State. The stubbornness of the joint-chiefs echoes Saul’s 
assertion that the War on Terror has been a “one year war waged fourteen times,” and they 
serve to remind viewers that American foreign policy is characterised by a lack o f imagination 
and political will (“The Drone Queen 11:35).
Despite the significance of the Syrian War to Season Five as a whole, Homeland's focus 
on the Islamic State is the potential danger that its European cells pose to Germany. Astrid 
(Nina Hoss), a BND officer in Berlin, even goes so far as to tell Laur a: “700 German citizens 
have gone to Syria to fight for the Islamic State. It’s not what they’re doing over there that 
scares us; it’s what happens when they come back” (Lesli Linka Glatter, “The Tradition of 
Hospitality” 23:43).
3.10 The Islamic State: A New Type of Terror?
Jessica Goldstein (2015), who writes for Esquire, remarks that the inclusion of the Islamic State 
in Season Five feels “a little too possible for comfort” (“Biggest Fears”). Variety's Debra 
Birnbaum (2015) also feels that “fiction is edging ever closer to reality” in the Homeland latest 
season, making the show “frighteningly timely” (“Frightening Reality”). The sense of unease 
that accompanies Season Five is something that Lesli Linka Glatter (2015), one of Homeland's 
directors, acknowledges: “It’s a bit intense that so much of the story we created has been 
playing out in some form in real life” (“Emotional and Potent”). Although Glatter claims that 
Gansa, Gordon, and the show’s writers and directors are in the business of entertainment, their
35 See Cockburn, The Rise o f the Islamic State (2015), and The Age o f Jihad (2016), as well as Fawaz Gerges’s, 
ISIS: A History (2016).
36 See Mohsin Hamid’s “Why Drones Don’t Help,” in Discontent and its Civilisations (165-177).
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focus on the Islamic State allows them to mesh their storytelling with the real world in order to 
create the “biggest nightmare” imaginable (“Emotional and Potent”).
Nightmarish indeed are the designs of Daesh in Homeland's fifth season. In Episode 
Nine, “The Litnov Ruse” (Tucker Gates), Quinn is kidnapped by an Islamic State cell 
comprised of German Muslims. The cell has somehow managed to obtain a large cylinder of 
sarin gas, and they decide to test it on Quinn. Intelligence expert, Vince Houghton, notes, “the 
idea that some guy is creating sarin gas in an abandoned building in Berlin or outside Berlin 
somewhere -  it’s kind of crazy. It’s ridiculous” (qtd. in Leeds, “Season Five Episode Nine”). 
While Houghton’s statement is difficult to dispute, I maintain that a central principle of 
Homeland is to play into its viewers’ deepest fears, no matter how improbable they may seem. 
The Islamic State cell film the gassing of Quinn, and the images of the deadly nerve agent 
infiltrating his body are screened by broadcasters around the world. Bibi Hamed (Rene Ifrah), 
the leader of the group then declares that the jihadists “give the U.N. Security Council 24 hours 
to recognise the legitimacy o f [the] Islamic State,” or else a major European city will be 
attacked with the sarin (Dan Attias, “New Normal” 20:07).
As has so frequently been the case in Homeland, the threat of terror attack on American 
or European soil is steeped in paranoia. Unlike the fictional 12/12, however, there have been 
recent attacks on major European cities for which the Islamic State have claimed responsibility. 
In fact, on November 13, 2015, five days after Episode Six, “Parabiosis,” aired, Islamic State 
operatives unleashed a series o f coordinated and deadly attacks on the streets of Paris, leaving 
130 dead and hundreds wounded. Gansa wishes that the series had not “hewed so closely to 
the facts of Paris, but at the same time claims that he and Gordon “did make a few minor 
adjustments” in order to include a reference to the attacks (qtd. in Goldstein; “Real-Life”). So, 
when Allison tells her team, in Episode Ten, “New Normal,” that “no one wants to see another 
Paris,” viewers are immediately reminded that Season Five of Homeland exists in the present, 
and provides a narrative which, for some, is more than semi-fictional (25:17). Furthermore, by 
singling out Paris as the apex of the Islamic State’s violence, Alison inevitably excludes the 
carnage that this organisation is wreaking in Muslim majority countries -  such as Turkey, Iraq, 
Syria, and Lebanon -  from her rhetoric. According to a United Nations report issued in 2014, 
the Islamic State killed 9,347 Iraqis during its rise to dominance in that same year.37 The fact 
that the majority of Daesh’s victims are Arab Muslims is ignored in Homeland's depiction of
37 See the United Nations’ “Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts in Iraq, 6 July-10 September 
2014” (2014).
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the group. Just like the Taliban of Season Four, the Islamic State appears to be to be an 
exceptionally deadly organisation -  but only to Americans and Europeans.
In the final episode of Season Five, “A False Glimmer” (Lesli Linka Glatter), Bibi and 
his cell attempt to release their supply of sarin into a train tunnel at Berlin’s Hauptbahnhof 
(central train station). The plot is foiled by Carrie, who, despite no longer being attached to the 
CIA, begs Saul to let her help. Carrie is not alone in her mission, and is joined by Bibi’s cousin, 
Qasim (Alireza Bayram), who has been having doubts about the attack and does not believe 
that “terror is the by-product of a caliphate” (“The Litnov Ruse 24:08). Carrie gives her gun to 
Qasim and instructs him to shoot Bibi. “I can’t kill him, he’s my cousin,” Qasim responds, and 
he instead tries to talk Bibi out of the attack (“A False Glimmer” 04:23). His plan fails, and he 
is killed in the ensuing gun battle between Carrie and Bibi.
Carrie’s assumption that Qasim would so readily kill his cousin is a significant moment 
in Homeland, and it raises pertinent questions about the frame through which the action of 
Season Five is structured. Killing Bibi, in Carrie’s mind, is a simple ethical decision -  a choice 
that she knows is right. O f course, as a former intelligence officer, taking another’s life is 
something with which she has a great deal of experience. That is not to say that she enjoys 
killing, as her decision to leave the CIA indicates, but that, when required, she will not hesitate 
to shoot. What is perturbing is her presupposition that Qasim feels the same way. Carrie 
attempts to reason with him: “There are hundreds of people on the platform up there, thousands 
in the station,” but he refuses to resort to violence (“A False Glimmer” 04:30). Framing her 
argument in such a manner -  as the death of one versus the death of many -  leaves viewers 
with almost no choice but to side with the protagonist. Although both Carrie and Qasim want 
to stop the attack, only her method is successful. As Qasim’s failed attempt to change Bibi’s 
mind shows, the ‘bad’ Muslim does not respond to reason or dialogue and must therefore be 
killed.
Price Peterson (2015), who writes for the popular culture website, Vulture, claims: “It’s 
not for nothing that in a season of Homeland where yet another Muslim extremist is the Big 
Bad, a conscientious Muslim extremist ends up saving the day” (“Easy Tears”). If we follow 
Peterson’s argument correctly, then it should be clear that Qasim’s importance to Season Five 
is not measured by what he actually does, but by what his actions represent. Gansa states that 
he and Gordon attempt to “show that Muslims in Europe are not speaking with one voice,” yet 
by characterising Qasim as an antagonist to Bibi, the creators once again present us with only 
two strict polarities: the ‘good’ Muslim and the ‘bad’ Muslim (“Real-Life”). Qasim’s decision 
to stop the attack means that he makes a seemingly instant switch from ‘enemy’ to ‘friend,’
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and his rejection o f violence portrays him as an example o f how European Muslims should 
conduct themselves when presented with the chance of joining a group like the Islamic State. 
Like the Iranian Fara Sherazi -  the CIA analyst from Season Three -  Qasim represents not 
merely the ‘good’ Muslim, but the ‘best’ Muslim, as he is willing to fight against his 
religiously-aligned kin in order to protect the Western world. Although it might be difficult not 
to see Qasim’s actions as valiant, his decision does make one wonder if Homeland is not being 
rather too prescriptive in its characterisation o f the ‘good’ Muslim.
Season Five of Homeland hinges on so many aspects of the contemporary War on 
Terror that it would be impossible to detail them all in this chapter. I have not paid much 
attention, for example, to the role that agents from both Russia and Israel play. Nor have I 
focused enough on Carrie’s attempts at atonement for her past transgressions. I chose to focus 
specifically on how Gansa and Gordon attempt to include voices of dissent in their narrative, 
and how these voices fail in the face of state power. I have also analysed the significance of 
the Islamic State, as Homeland draws away from fictionalised, quasi-bin Laden figures, and 
focuses on a very real, ‘enemy.’ As Actively rendered as the show’s Daesh operatives might 
be, Homeland is nevertheless creating its own realities where, perhaps, it ought not to.
3.11 The Threat of Terrorism Marches On
When the first episode (“Separation Anxiety”) of Homeland's Season Five was being shot, a 
trio by the name of the Arabian Street Artists was hired to lend the set a sense of authenticity.38 
They were tasked with spraying Arabic graffiti on the walls of what was supposed to be a 
refugee camp in southern Lebanon, but the artists decided to use this opportunity to air their 
thoughts on Homeland's depiction o f the Middle East. The Arabic script they sprayed on the 
walls included phrases such as: “Homeland is racist,” “The show does not represent the views 
of the artists,” and, most significantly, “Homeland is not a TV series.” The fact that not one 
member of Homeland’s crew could identify a problem with the graffiti speaks volumes about 
the intentions of an American show attempting to frame the War on Terror from the perspective 
of both those waging it and those suffering it.
38 For an interview with the artists, as well as a video detailing the graffiti in its entirety, see “Homeland is not a 
series,” on the Field o f Vision website (2015).
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Although Homeland tries to disturb its own American frame, these disturbances are seldom 
consistent, and the potential to present a balanced interpretation of the War on Terror that is 
carefully written into the show’s first season fails to materialise in later instalments. Barring 
the example of Nicholas Brody, Homeland's narrative often ignores the root causes of 
terrorism, and focuses more on how terrorism is fought rather than why is exists in the first 
place. The CIA does not only target individuals but, more importantly, attempts to “kill an 
idea” (“Marine One” 1:11:40). This “idea” -  ‘terrorism’ -  cannot be defeated through the 
violence that Homeland's CIA endorses, but Gansa and Gordon seem to offer no tangible 
alternative to the ceaseless cycle o f war.
The series all too often disregards the complex political and socio-economic realities of 
the Middle East in favour of depicting a homogenous and threatening Muslim world. Those 
who occupy this world are, more often than not, nameless and featureless ‘enemies.’ Some of 
Homeland's ‘bad’ Muslims, however, are exceptionally important to the CIA. Not only because 
they provide a pretext for the continuation of the War on Terror but because they can be turned 
into ‘friends’ to aid the American cause. It is this “spiralled hyperbole” of friendship and enmity 
(Derrida 72), that Homeland attempt to frame and the series makes it clear that loyalties and 
allegiances are fleeting.
When queried about the direction that Homeland's sixth season would take, Alex Gansa 
responded: “the threat of terrorism not only in Europe but here in the United States seems to 
be growing and it seems to have captured people’s attention in a significant way, and I imagine 
that will be reflected in next season’s story” (“Real-Life”). Tellingly, Season Six o f Homeland 
is set amidst a presidential election in the United States. If, as Gansa suggests, the season is 
focused on the threat that America faces from terrorism, then it seems important to ask how 
this thematic premise is any different to Homeland's previous five seasons. American paranoia 
and vulnerability have dominated the show’s overarching narrative and, while there are brief 
illustrations of how the United States is partially responsible for the proliferation of precarity 
in the Muslim world, these moments are of little consequence in Homeland's ultimately 
unbalanced configuration o f the War on Terror.
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Conclusion: Have We “Tamed the World By Framing It?”
The attacks on the World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001, seemed, to some, a singular 
occurrence. Jean Baudrillard describes 9/11 as “the ‘mother’ of all events,” adding that the 
images of the “suicidal” collapse of the Twin Towers had a profound “symbolic impact” on 
viewers the world over (5, 8). While individuals such as Baudrillard acknowledge the 
spectacular dimensions o f the 9/11 attacks without overlooking their politico-historical context, 
the American president at the time, George W. Bush, claimed to be “amazed that there’s such 
a misunderstanding of what our country is about that people would hate us” (qtd. in Blum, 
America’s 30). Although political figures and the mainstream media have imposed their own 
particular frames of “intelligibility” around 9/11, this thesis has demonstrated that literature 
and television represent alternative means of engaging with both 9/11 itself and America’s 
response to these attacks: the War on Terror (Butler, Frames 6). Selecting texts from 
contrasting geopolitical contexts has allowed me to identify the War on Terror as a global 
phenomenon, and to underline the importance of understanding this war -  as well as 9/11 -  as 
coextensive with the historical context that preceded it. As Baudrillard notes, one cannot ignore 
the “deep-seated complicity” of the United States in having “fomented all [the] vio lence that 
is endemic throughout the world” (6, 5).
Comparing American to non-American sources has permitted me to gauge how Islam 
has been portrayed and discursively disseminated in the fictional landscape since 9/11, and I 
have demonstrated that George W. Bush’s binary of ‘good’ Muslim, ‘bad’ Muslim -  despite 
its flaws, biases, and lack o f nuance -  remains an interpretative framework for many, although 
not all, American perceptions about who constitutes a ‘friend’ or ‘enemy. ’ The structure of this 
thesis has followed the trajectory o f the War on Terror, beginning with Hamid’s depiction of 
the World Trade Centre attacks and ending with Homeland’s fictional depiction of America’s 
contemporary Overseas Contingency Operations. Configuring my thesis in such a manner has 
allowed me to investigate my chosen texts individually and in relation to one another, whilst 
simultaneously tracing the development of the War on Terror since its inception.
In my first chapter, I examined Mohsin Hamid’s novel, The Reluctant Fundamentalist, 
with the aim of understanding how the United States, 9/11, and the War on Terror are perceived 
through the eyes o f a Pakistani who gives up on his “American dream” (93). With close 
reference to Mahmood Mamdani’s Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, I demonstrated that Hamid’s 
novel underlines the problematic perception of Muslims in the United States, and subverts the
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reader’s assumptions about fundamentalism as a strictly religious term. As such, I argued that 
the author aligns Changez’s occupation as a financial fundamentalist with the America’s 
capacity to wage war and dominate the global free market. Because he is both a Pakistani and 
a “useful” ‘friend’ to Underwood Samson (Derrida 23), Changez’s allegiances to his adopted 
nation are tested by the repercussions of 9/11. His unorthodox reaction to the televised images 
of the attacks sparks an irreversible rupture in his belief in the “fundamentals” of American 
finance, as does his viewing of the military “mismatch” of Operation Enduring Freedom. 
(Hamid, Reluctant 98, emphasis original).
As the War on Terror places Changez’s family -  indeed, the whole of Pakistan -  directly 
in danger, he returns to his home to protect those who are adversely affected by the “differential 
distribution of precarity” (Butler, Frames 25). The removal o f his “blinders” permits him to 
reconfigure his priorities, and he eventually realises that his occupation at Underwood Samson 
implicates him in America’s “project of domination” (Hamid, Reluctant 93, 126). In returning 
to Lahore, he does not resort to religious fundamentalism -  as the title o f the novel might 
suggest -  but adopts a more humane and important set of “fundamentals'”: the ethical need to 
protect those who cannot protect themselves from the power of the American “empire” (152, 
98, emphasis added).
The recognition of precarity is a crucial aspect of my second chapter, which considered 
Ishtiyaq Shukri’s novels, The Silent Minaret and I  See You, as unique and timely literary 
responses to the War on Terror. Following on from Ronit Frenkel’s observation that Shukri’s 
work should be read as the product of a “transnational South African-produced consciousness,” 
I argued that the author’s narrative perspective is “trans-global” in its outlook (“Reconsidering” 
15; Shukri, Silent 29). The “trans-global” is an inclusive frame through which to understand 
the world, and requires an awareness of the positioning of the individual in relation to the 
collective (29). Shukri’s narratives are at once local and global and, by drawing together 
multiple historical moments and geopolitical settings, he links the War on Terror to a long 
history of human violence -  a history in which certain populations have been, and continue to 
be, subjected to condition of precarity. As a result of its broad historical scope, Shukri’s fiction 
refuses the notion of a ‘post’ -  be it postcolonial, post-9/11, or post-apartheid -  for many 
populations around the world, and the author demonstrates that the “entanglement” of the past 
and the present inevitably results in an interconnected global system of power and violence 
(Mbembe, Postcolony 16, emphasis original).
The multiple temporalities, spaces, and literary texts that the author employs create a “blurring 
of contexts,” and he transports the reader between and across circumstances in which precarity
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and vulnerability are commonplace (I See You 66). This “blurring of contexts,” however, is not 
only a means of understanding violence (66). It is also Shukri’s means o f appealing to his 
reader to recognise the similarities between diverse peoples and histories -  to see oneself as 
woven inescapably into the fabric of a “trans-global” community (Silent 29). I therefore claim 
that Shukri’s novels urge the reader to discard the structuring frames of nation, religion, and 
culture in favour of a more comprehensive manner of reading the world. Then, and only then, 
can one apprehend the precariousness that is intrinsic to humanity.
The frame of nation is inseparable from the contents of my third chapter, in which I 
analysed Alex Gansa and Howard Gordon’s award-winning American television series, 
Homeland. What makes this series an important inclusion in this thesis is that it attempts to 
present a semi-fictional account of how the War on Terror has been fought during Barack 
Obama’s presidency, and therefore provides the viewer with a contemporary interpretation of 
the shape of America’s post-Bush foreign policy. Initially, Homeland asks some pertinent 
questions about the dichotomy of the ‘friend’ and the ‘enemy’ by allowing the viewer access 
to the perspectives of both CIA employees and their (predominantly Muslim) targets. 
Following the death of Nicholas Brody, however, the series struggles to break away from the 
narrative positions o f characters under employ by the CIA, and stumbles in its attempts to offer 
a full and unbiased picture of the War on Terror.
Although Homeland does invite the viewer to scrutinise the conduct of the CIA, Gansa 
and Gordon consistently frame the deeds of America’s antagonists as potentially more 
damaging to human life than the conduct of the Agency. Furthermore, the show often fails to 
provide the viewer with the necessary historical context out of which the War on Terror has 
arisen. Barring the examples of Brody and Nazir, no mention is made of why it is that some 
individuals seek to harm the United States -  meaning that the show’s ‘bad’ Muslims are all too 
often portrayed as irrational and one-dimensional. There are, in fact, no Muslim characters who 
do not fit into the ‘good’ or ‘bad’ binary that Homeland adopts, and the series struggles to 
provide a truly nuanced interpretation of Islam and its followers. Despite its creators’ claims 
that they seek to ask rather than answer questions, Homeland all too often collapses into a 
narrow and didactic narrative that inadvertently frames American lives as somehow more 
vulnerable -  and therefore more worthy of protection -  than the lives o f non-Americans (Gansa, 
“The Creators”). Organisations such as the Taliban and the Islamic State are certainly 
dangerous to Americans and Europeans, but Homeland prefers to ignore the fact that these 
groups pose a far greater threat to the populations who have the misfortune of living in the 
regions they control. While Shukri and Hamid successfully call the function of the frame into
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question, Homeland -  despite its initial premise of complicating the perspective through which 
the War on Terror is structured -  cannot help but organise its narrative around the concerns of 
the CIA and its employees, therefore jettisoning attempts to read, interpret, and understand the 
full impact of this war on people outside the United States and Europe. Furthermore, by 
exploiting the viewer’s memories of 9/11 through the depiction of acts of terror committed 
against American subjects, the series appears to linger in the past despite its attempts to portray 
the present.
Before I conclude, I should concede that this thesis is by no means a comprehensive 
study of fictional responses to 9/11 and the War on Terror. Both my chosen texts and the field 
itself deserve more attention, especially given the perennial state of war that has engulfed the 
Middle East since Operation Iraqi Freedom. My research represents only a glimpse into an 
array of creative and challenging interpretations of the shape of the world since 9/11, and there 
are numerous other artists, writers, and directors whose work could, and should, be considered 
for future research. Regarding the novels with which I engaged, much has been left unsaid. 
There are other critical angles from which to study these texts, one of these being an 
examination into how they provide access to an embodied experience of precarity. 
Understanding the manner in which Hamid and Shukri frame the affective repercussions of the 
War on Terror would signal new and important research on the work of authors whose 
perspectives are vital literary interventions in the twenty-first century. In the “age of 
interruption,” fiction plays an important role (Shukri “Ten Questions”). It demands that the 
reader remain thoughtful and open to different ways of seeing and understanding the world, 
especially at a time when so many “ungrievable” lives are occluded from the frame of relevance 
(Butler, Frames 24).
So, have we “tamed the world by framing it?” (Shukri, I  See You 175). Yes and no. The 
frame remains omnipresent in all instances o f perception, but it need not be static and inflexible. 
It is, according to Butler, subject to “perpetual breakage,” and is always open to scrutiny and 
subversion (Frames 10). In this thesis, I have demonstrated that fiction often attempts to undo 
the manner in which dominant forms of media and political power organise our experiences, 
and I have shown that the taming of the world results in simplistic and damaging readings of 
humanity. It should not, as it does for Changez, take a catastrophic event like the War on Terror 
for one to realise just how manufactured and illusory are the frames that govern our judgements. 
Rather than dividing the world along the binaries of ‘good’ and ‘bad’; ‘friend’ and ‘enemy,’ 
we should, like Shukri’s protagonists, understand that the recognition of precarity represents 
an attempt to read the world in its fullness, in its totality. Is this request too utopian, too naive?
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Perhaps; but as long as the asymmetrical allocation of precarity remains a tactic manipulated 
by the powerful to minimise their own precariousness, it is vital that one continues to engage 
with narrative and visual frames that call this power into question.
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